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ABSTRACT 
WACC has traditionally been used as a measure of the cost of capital for companies and as a discount 
rate of the future company's cash flows for valuation purposes. The WACC, especially for "distressed" 
companies, can play a key role in determining the efficiency of the restructuring framework for companies 
heading into bankruptcy. The theory and the practice show that companies that file for Chapter 11 have a 
higher probability of rehabilitation as a going concern and boost the recovery of the stakeholders as a 
whole than more credit friendly restructuring frameworks. Additionally, rehabilitated companies from more 
debtor friendly proceedings that have undergone a profound restructuring through efficient tools should 
also enjoy a higher probability of survival.  In the first part of the thesis, we aim to prove that empirically by 
thoroughly looking at the market based WACC of a sample of American and European companies one 
year before and after the filing date. If we meet with success, then we should be confident that the WACC 
could result in a powerful tool to evaluate the efficiency of the restructuring framework of the company's 
filing.  
In the second part, we look at the impact of Basel III on the banks and their capital structure. We discuss 
that the implementation of Basel III will turn the focus of banks towards the WACC rather than ROE due 
to overall increase in the cost of capital. Banks have traditionally enjoyed "cheap" funding due to the 
systematic support from the governments. Basel III advocates for a capital structure "bail-in" rather that 
"bail-out" coupled with higher capital requirements will make the achievement of high ROEs a difficult 
task. We compare the WACC under Basel II and Basel III frameworks and we draw some conclusions.  
We then focus on the CoCo, a debt like contingent capital instruments that converts into equity upon a 
credit event. The existence of the CoCo will boost the overall WACC due to its higher price as a result of 
its loss absorbing features. We conduct a theoretical and empirical model to evaluate the impact of the 
CoCos on the WACC on a pre and post conversion basis and the implications for the equity holders who 
have traditionally enjoy higher ROEs with low COEs and hence constant equity multiple expansion. Here, 
again, we expect to prove the useful role of the WACC in "distress" to suggest the optimal capital 
structure for banks.   
In summary, we attempt to genuinely contribute to the vast literature of the cost of capital, theoretically 
and empirically, by “coining” the expression “Going Distress on WACC”.   
KEY WORDS 
WACC, solvency, restructuring, bail-in/out, Basel III, CoCo, capital structure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of the average weighted cost of capital (WACC) has traditionally delivered an in depth 
theoretical and empirical models by well-known academics and researchers which have mainly focused 
on companies or securities valuation, or otherwise as a key element within the capital structure and cost 
of funding literature.  The WACC plays a role in the former as a discount rate to estimate the future cash 
flows of a company and set a fair price of its intrinsic value. The WACC in the latter assesses the cost of 
the different sources of capital of a company to optimize the capital structure and the cost of funding. As 
the WACC can be estimated using book values (balance sheet and profit and loss account numbers) or 
market values by looking at the market price of the equity and debt, the analysis of the WACC becomes 
more relevant for financial "distressed" companies due to the significant differences between the value of 
the funding sources booked in the balance sheet and their market price. This is due to the impairments 
and recovery value assigned by equity and debt holders to their instruments in a restructuring / liquidation 
scenario not only based on the fundamental recovery for the security holders but on the efficiency of the 
regulatory restructuring framework of the company's filing 
As a consequence, we can envisage a third role for the WACC as a measure of the efficiency of the 
restructuring proceeding where the company could file for bankruptcy should liquidity, solvency or funding 
prompted a corporate rehabilitation. To do so, we look at the main corporate restructuring proceedings in 
US and Western Europe and through a sample of public companies that filed for bankruptcy between 
2000-2009, we estimate the WACC at market prices to dwell on the WACC's ability to capture the 
efficiency of the restructuring framework. In theory, on a pre-restructuring basis, all things equal, 
companies in countries with debtor friendly restructuring proceedings that enjoy powerful tools for the 
company rehabilitation should command lower WACC than those in more creditor friendly countries which 
are more prone to look out for the secured creditors rights rather than looking after the company and the 
rest of the security holders ("junior" and equity holders). This is due to the higher expected recovery of the 
entire capital structure and the preservation of company's value. Likewise, on a post restructuring basis 
and all things being equal, a company emerging from a debtor friendly proceeding should have a lower 
WACC than those of more creditor friendly ones due to the high expected recovery for the capital 
structure in the future owing to the well-established and proven restructuring tools implemented in the 
company that guarantees its future viability.   
In the second part of the thesis we evaluate the impact that the new Basel III rules has on the WACC of 
the banks. Basel III rules seeks to shore up the capital in the banks to avoid another meltdown of the 
financial system that we was witnessed over the course of 2008. It seeks to bolster solvency at the banks 
by making the capital structure more loss absorbing beyond the equity, which will also have to be raised 
from current levels. The new debt instruments will have to contain loss absorbing features to withstand 
future losses ("bail-in") to avoid the need to resort to the taxpayer’s money ("bail-out") as it occurred 
during the 2008 financial turmoil. By doing so, the WACC of the banks will rise given the need to hold 
more equity as well as Basel III compliant instruments, whose cost will be higher as a result of the loss 
absorbing characteristics . We assume these instruments can display CoCo (Contingent Convertible")'s 
features like that issued by Credit Suisse early 2011. We first aim to estimate the WACC of the banks pre 
and post Basel III to evaluate the change in cost of capital for the banks. In a second step, we turn the 
WACC into a "distressed WACC" by assuming mounting losses that trigger the CoCo's conversion into 
equity driving up the WACC.  
In summary, we aim to genuinely contribute to the comprehensive theoretical and empirical literature with 
two new topics: the theory of the efficiency of the "distressed WACC" and the impact of the new Basel III 
capital structure and its consequences on a "distressed WACC" scenario. 
13 
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SECTION 1 
World global credit markets have experienced a major change over the last two decades. 
Desintermediation have brought new products, investors, structures and regulation altogether which has 
impacted the way companies funds themselves. Investors are now required to understand the bankruptcy 
regime in which they are involved when they invest in a company. Thus, this first section aims to “flesh 
out” the key features of the main regimes in both United States and Europe and to compare providing the 
theoretical underpinnings which we will use in the next two parts of the thesis.  
This section splits into three parts. The first part explains in detail the concept of corporate default 
including a roadmap for the generic insolvency procedure; the concept of recovery rate in which we lay 
out the typical financing securities and collaterals, the subordination and some of other key features, and 
lastly the concept of event of default that will lead the company into either a restructuring or liquidation.  
In the second part we focus on each individual bankruptcy regime including US, Germany, UK and 
Wales, France, Italy, Spain and Ireland. The comprehensive description of each regime will enable us to 
understand the finding and conclusions of the third section of this chapter in this thesis in which we will 
analytically compare the efficiency of the insolvency procedures in terms of the cost of capital between 
the US regimes and the main Western European bankruptcy codes. In this part, we will review the main 
law, the different existing securities, the pre insolvency proceeding, the insolvency code that breaks down 
into the restructuring and the liquidation law, and finally the order of payment in the event of a default. 
This second part also covers the so called “forum shopping” that occurs when company move their COMI 
(Centre of Main Interest) amongst different countries to benefit from the special features of the local 
bankruptcy.  
In the third section, we select the main features of the insolvency law in terms of rehabilitation and 
liquidation. This summary will allow us to identify which regimes are more creditor or debtor friendly, 
which are more likely to facilitate the rehabilitation or trigger the liquidation and which are more likely to 
boost the recovery rate of the investors.  This theoretical framework coupled with the output from the 
empirical project will allow us to draw some conclusions over the absolute and relative value of the cost of 
capital between American and European distressed companies and ascertain the ability of the WACC to 
capture the efficiency of the restructuring proceedings2
We thank again Nomura’s distress and fixed income team for their contribution in terms of literature and 
their valuable time and inputs from my interviews with their Restructuring Legal team.  
.  
1. Generic insolvency procedure 
Before discussing in depth the main US and European insolvency law regimes, we establish a standard 
template for the insolvency procedure to enable the reader to grasp the main concepts of a distressed 
situation.  
 
 
                                                          
2 See Section 3.  
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Figure 1: Generic Insolvency Procedure 
 
Source: Nomura (2010); author analysis 
The first stage begins with the company in financial distress which can be insolvent or not. Each 
jurisdiction has its own insolvency definition. In some cases it is just a suspension of payments (the 
company cannot meet any of its financial obligations as they come due), a balance sheet test (negative 
net asset value) or in some other regimes there is a third test whereby the management is confident the 
company could be insolvent in the near term. 
Sometimes the company is facing financial difficulties but is still solvent and thus management is not 
required to apply for any insolvency procedure (however some jurisdictions allow the company to enter a 
formal insolvency procedure). The company and its creditors are allowed to conduct an informal/out of the 
court process to carry out a liability exercise to fix the capital structure using a standstill or forbearance 
agreement. The “sine qua non” condition is that the company reaches an agreement with all creditors 
which might turn out to be challenging under a debt structure with several lenders’ classes (senior and 
junior). Moreover, entering in restructuring exercises could trigger an event of default under several debt 
agreements. 
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There is no clear cut path leading to insolvency, let alone the involving issues that gives rise the 
distressed event. Management can envisage that the insolvency is looming and uses valuable cash 
reserves to meet its financial obligations to conceal the reality from financial and trade creditors.  In some 
jurisdictions, there is no requirement for an insolvent company to apply for an insolvency procedure. 
However, as a general rule, and in order to protect the interests of the creditors, an insolvent company is 
obliged to file for an insolvency proceeding or management can face personal liabilities (Altman 1984).  
Once the company has entered the insolvency process, it boils down to either pursue a restructuring as a 
going concern or face liquidation. This is not an obvious issue and in most cases it has to be gauged by 
an external party, either the court or an independent insolvency practitioner. The external party will liaise 
with the company, creditors and shareholders to come up with a plan to evaluate the viability of the 
company and to ascertain whether the company is worth more as a going concern (restructuring) or as a 
gone concern (winding up). The latter will entail the entire asset disposal and the use the proceeds to 
repay the stakeholders (Moyer 2005).  
The reader must keep in mind that any “overlevered” firm has to undergo a debt refinancing at some 
stage in their business cycle. The optimal refinancing solution will need to be tailored to the companies’ 
financial situation as well as to shareholders’ plan/exit horizon. However, an “overlevered” but viable firm 
with a weak cash flow generation capacity, poor capital structure and solvency and a challenging 
business outlook has to go through a restructuring or otherwise face the inevitable liquidation. Below an 
overview of alternative refinancing / term out solutions for levered companies in terms of the leverage 
ratio (Net Debt / Ebitda) and fixed charge cover (free cash flow before debt service). As we observe, at 
some point, a restructuring/debt for equity swaps is just inevitable to overhaul the capital structure and 
bring leverage down. The Red Cross marks the areas where our sample of companies in section 3 lies in.  
Figure 2: Alternative refinancing/term out solutions 
 
Source: Standard & Poor’s Leveraged & Commentary & Data; Nomura analysis 
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We distinguish between liquidation/winding up and a restructuring/rehabilitation proceeding 
When there is no viable plan for the company to emerge from insolvency, the company is liquidated. The 
goal is to dispose the assets and distribute the proceeds in line with the APR (Absolute Priority Rule). 
1.1 Liquidation proceedings 
3
In some instance, a solvent debtor can apply for liquidation (voluntary winding up). This is something 
common between companies that were set up to fulfill a mission. Once it has been accomplished, 
management has to prove the company is solvent and all creditors receive par. If management fails to do 
so, then creditors take over the company and it is liquidated under a standard procedure. 
The liquidation procedure can be initiated by either the company or by any of the creditors that proves 
the company to be insolvent. If the court approves the plan, then an insolvency practitioner is appointed 
to set about the liquidation procedure. Management is consequently removed and the liquidator initiates 
the asset disposal. Proceeds are distributed. The senior creditors receive the proceeds form the secured 
assets whilst the unsecured are left with the remaining proceeds until they are exhausted (Nomura 2010).  
In some markets, the APR rule is sometimes unobserved. This could happen if the law contemplates that 
out of the money equity holders and employees are stakeholders in a company and have some residual 
rights. Another common APR violation is the provision of “insolvency puts” to out of the money creditors 
or shareholders allowing them to delay the procedure or harm the in the money stakeholders. To 
discourage them from exercising that put, out of the money investors are provided with some financial 
compensation and thus violating the APR (O’Kane 2010). 
Generally speaking, the shorter the corporate restructuring is delayed the lower the risk of value 
destruction in the company as cash is not depleted, valuable assets badly disposed and employees and 
trade creditors remain within the corporate structure. Consequently, countries have implemented 
rehabilitation or restructuring procedures to enable the company to avoid liquidation and remain as a 
going concern.  
1.2 Restructuring proceedings 
In many jurisdictions, solvent companies facing financial headwinds are allowed to apply for a 
restructuring proceeding to encourage quick action before the company becomes insolvent. The most 
common features are voluntary and involuntary restructuring, a stay on any security enforcement by 
creditors, court supervision, insolvency financing with super senior status or the need of majority vote on 
the restructuring plan. Let us briefly go over them. 
The first step of a restructuring procedure can be voluntary (by the company) or involuntary (by creditors). 
The latter case can be contested by the company and the dispute is settled in court. The main advantage 
of the involuntary filing is that incentives creditors and management to engage in discussions. 
Furthermore, unsecured creditors can also resort to it in order to benefit from a stay on secured creditors 
as the sale or seizure of assets that might undermine their future recovery in liquidation.  
                                                          
3  The APR dictates that a creditor cannot be reimbursed until all more senior creditors have been fully repaid. 
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The stay is one of the key features and it enhances the success of the company rehabilitation as it gives 
room to the different parties to hammer out an agreement before the secured creditors enforce their 
securities. It also deters trade creditors from collecting their overdue payables or leaving the company for 
good and thus, jeopardising any restructuring plan. 
Some restructuring proceedings allow management to stay in the firm over the process to avoid any 
disruption, but it is subject to creditors ‘approval. Some others remove management immediately. Even if 
the management remain in the company, the process may be court-supervised and it varies in every 
jurisdiction. An insolvency practitioner is usually appointed to engage with management and creditors to 
clinch an agreement. Court approval is usually mandatory for particular transactions that fall outside the 
ordinary business of the company.  
Some insolvency proceedings allow some sort of post insolvency financing which is granted with a 
preferential status under the APR. This new money is a key feature for a successful rehabilitation to prop 
up the current business whilst the restructuring is underway. Given the risk of these loans, these new 
creditors are granted with a level of seniority of at least the same as that of the secured creditors.  
Current or new management have to produce and deliver a restructuring plan within a time horizon. This 
plan has to be approved by creditors and (sometime by the equity holders) in the creditors’ committee. 
Secured creditors are sometimes left out as long as they receive full recovery. Some jurisdictions allow 
the setting up of different creditor classes to deal with the specifics of each class so that they can express 
their own view on the agreement and vote accordingly. The pursuit of a agreement may become difficult 
when there are cross holding investors in different debt securities or credit derivatives to hedge 
positions4
It is quite common to see jurisdictions with different voting thresholds for the restructuring plan approval.  
Most jurisdictions require a simple majority of creditors in number and value but some others require 
66.6% or even 75%. Once the plan is approved it becomes binding to all creditors including the dissenting 
ones (Nomura 2010).  
. 
When an insolvent company enters into a restructuring plan, equity holders are out of the money (as the 
economic value of the company is less than the value of the debt). The value of the company “breaks” at 
a particular level of debt (the “fulcrum creditors). Those creditors fallen below are considered out the 
money. In theory, only in the money creditors should be allowed to vote but some jurisdictions view equity 
holders and employees as stakeholders and might have a say on the restructuring plan.  
Some jurisdictions include a cramdown on dissenting creditors meaning that a veto on the plan by these 
creditors can be overridden. This is meant to prevent some creditors from undermining a potential 
restructuring plan. Once the plan is approved, the company emerges as going concern, with a revised 
capital structure and with a viable long term business. If the restructuring plan fails, the company is 
usually put into a liquidation process.  In some instance in which the jurisdiction does not provide for all 
                                                          
 4  The most common one are the CDS (Credit Default Swaps) which are meant to hedge the bondholders’ exposure (bonds) in the 
company. The CDS is a credit derivative insurance product whereby if the company defaults the insurance seller reimburses the 
former at par. 
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these enhancing features and creditors view the insolvency framework as value destructive (as a result of 
low expertise of the court, speed of the proceeding etc), creditors could pursue an out of the court 
agreement or even move their centre of main interest to another more favourable jurisdiction. It must be 
noted also that the cost of a restructuring are usually high (fees of lawyers, court etc) and usually rank 
first in the APR. The amount of fees is subject to the size and duration of the case and can detrimentally 
affect creditor’s recovery. One quick and efficient way to save on these fees is a through a pre pack 
restructuring plan where debtor and creditors agree a plan before the insolvency filing (Scarberry 1996).  
In the third section of this chapter, we go about estimating the WACC pre and post insolvency to assess 
the efficiency of the insolvency framework or in other words, the estimated recovery rate of the investors 
in distressed companies. But how is the recovery rate defined? There are several well established 
definitions. For example, Moody’s defines it as the price of the debt from a defaulted company 
approximately 30 days after the default event. The CDS market defines it as the price given in an auction 
of a company that has triggered a credit event. For distressed debt investors, it is regarded as what they 
receive in an insolvency proceeding which can be either liquidation or restructuring. Therefore, as the 
debt might experience haircuts or maturity rescheduling, the final outcome is not easily predictable.  
2. Recovery rate 
It must be noted that the bond price post default is sometimes not too accurate to account for the final 
recovery rate as a result of some market technical factors. This is due to the fact that some of the debt 
holders sell their debt to distressed debt specialists and thus the price is driven by the expected future 
workout price and the volume of distressed debt outstanding. According to Nomura, this could be a 
reason why the average recovery rate (as the average price of defaulted bonds 30 days after the credit 
event) usually decreases as macroeconomic defaults rates increase. In other words, distressed debt 
investors are short of funds to purchase all the distressed debt and consequently prices fall (Frank 1992).  
To estimate the debt recovery rate, one has to have a clear view on the company’s valuation. Once the 
company’s value is set at a price, then factors such as debt priority, subordination, enforcement rights 
and collateral will determine the final debt valuation. Once the valuation work is done, we must determine 
where the value breaks in the capital structure to estimate the recovery rate of each single debt tranche. 
The type of debt where creditors get less than parity is called “fulcrum security”.  It is actually the security 
at which the value breaks in the capital structure. All debt holders of this security are ranked pari passu 
hence all receive the same amount. This is the starting point for any rehabilitation exercise as it enables 
to determine which creditors are in the money and therefore should be asked over the restructuring 
process. 
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Figure 3: Value Breaks in the Capital Structure 
 
 Source: author 
A “must be” in every single distressed situation is that if a company is worth more as a going concern 
than in a liquidation scenario, the company should have the chance to be restructured to maximise the 
recovery rate of the creditors. By all means, in a restructuring process, conflicts will rise between in and 
out of the money creditors and shareholders concerning the distribution of the economics interests of the 
debtor. This involves the engagement between the creditors, management and the court to envisage the 
most viable restructuring plan for the debtor. One of the most efficient methods to set the “breaking” point 
in the capital structure is through an auction of the company’s assets as a going concern. The potential 
buyers carry out their own due diligence on their assets which helps to estimate the value of the assets 
and hence where the value breaks in the capital structure (Nomura 2010).  
There are usually two useful approaches that are deemed to be superior to any company breakdown 
exercise or collateral’s disposal: 
o Debtor in Possession common in the US Chapter 11 allowing management (and sometimes 
shareholders) to remain in control of the debtor to help through the restructuring process.  
o Debt for equity swaps and debt forgiveness where the impaired creditors swap some of its claims 
into equity of the debtor helping the company’s recapitalisation and the agreement on the debt 
haircuts.  
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Creditors usually demand some sort of collateral to provide financing to a company. This security allows 
creditors to seize and sell this collateral up to the value of their debt. This security can take the form of a 
property, cash, inventory, equipment and so on. Generally speaking, these assets can take two forms: 
immovables (real estate) or movables (anything else).  
2.1 Security 
Following Nomura (2010), broadly speaking, jurisdictions usually provide for some legal devices that 
grant rights over assets to creditors. The most common ones are:  
Security Description 
Legal Mortgage Automatic transfer of the company’s asset to the creditor in an event of default. 
Pledge Creditor receives the company’s asset and keeps it until debt is paid off. 
Lien Right to possess someone’s property until that person carries out a particular 
obligation. It is different from a pledge as the asset here is transferred to the 
creditor for some other purposes (custody) and not for the purpose of the security 
itself. 
Charge This is the custody of an asset until the debt is paid off. There two types: floating 
and fixed. 
Fixed charge This is a security attached to a particular asset. The charge’s holder does not hold 
the asset but he’s is entitled to receive any proceeds from its sale. The company 
can only dispose the asset once the debt is reimbursed and the charge is 
removed. 
Floating charge It is a fixed charge but attached to a group of current of future assets (e.g 
inventory). If an event happens that frees up the floating charge it becomes fixed 
charge to the designated assets. 
Source: Nomura (2010); author analysis 
Creditors face the risk that the assets that secures their debt was used at a later stage to grant security 
on another loan. To avoid that, creditors usually demand their security to be “perfected” and this collateral 
to be recorded in a publicly official register5
                                                          
5  Bond indentures usually include negative pledge clauses to avoid the granting of the same security on two different loan classes. 
. However, this “perfected” security can be used to secure two 
different loans but it has to state the repayment seniority between both debt classes in then official 
registration (Rosenberg 2000).  
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Some jurisdictions provide for an automatic stay preventing the secured creditors from enforcing their 
collaterals, repossessing the assets and selling it afterwards. The stay allows the debtor to gain some 
time to continue its business as a going concern and achieve a restructuring plan with its creditors.  
Subordination is a key concept to understand distress valuation and the different legal frameworks. A 
debt class is said to be subordinated if it only receives proceedings once the senior debt are being paid in 
full under any default or liquidation scenario. In line with Nomura (2010), there are three ways of 
subordination: 
2.2 Subordination 
In any liquidation, all assets are listed and valued at market prices. First lien secured creditors receive all 
the proceeds from the sale of the assets up to the value of their claim. If there are any remaining 
proceeds, second lien creditors get the balance (Nomura 2010).  
2.2.1 Subordination by lien 
Credit Documentation Description 
Credit Agreement This is main legal piece of a loan. It lays out the size, description, 
currency, coupon, etc of the loan. It also states the covenants, the 
event of defaults and the remedies if the covenant is breached. 
The Intercreditor Agreement It sets out the relationship between first and second lien and on 
the other hand the mezzanine lenders. It also includes the security 
trustee provisions between all lenders. 
The Collateral Trust Agreement For secured debt, this agreement sets out natures of the assets 
used as collaterals as well as the rights and obligations between 
the parties. 
Security documents They set up securities over all or some of the debtor’s assets to 
fulfil its debt obligations. 
Source: Nomura (2010); author analysis 
The table above list the main type of credit documentation between creditors. It is the intercreditor 
agreement that govern the lien subordination between the first and second lien creditors. This is usually 
undertaken by stating in the documentation that second lien creditors will not interfere in the enforcement 
of the collateral by the first lien creditors. Moreover, the second lien creditors agree to stand still for some 
period after the default giving some time to first lien creditors to enforce their security6
                                                          
6  If assets are to be sold, second lien lenders have to approve it. 
. Additionally, 
second lien usually accept that the first lien security is “perfected” for the benefit of the first lien before any 
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right is granted to the second lien creditors. The intercreditor agreement may also include a US type DIP 
loans (Dahiya 2003). This clause might state that these new loans ranks pari passu with the secured 
debt.  
Second lien creditors usually enjoy the right to vote on any reorganisation plan or new debt and also the 
granting of additional collateral to better protect their economic interest if the collateral value has 
decreased.  
It must be noted that the interest of the secured and unsecured creditors can be misaligned. This 
happens when the secured creditors receive full recovery and pursue a quick sale of the asset. They will 
not deem necessary to hold off for a better restructuring plan if that only benefits the unsecured 
creditors7.  
This type of subordination shows how the proceeds are distributed among the entire spectre of creditors 
according to the priority rule. It basically says that any proceed above the claim of the secured creditors 
are flown through to the second lien and mezzanine creditors (Gilson 2000). 
2.2.2 Payment subordination 
The trust deed or the bond indenture is the agreement between the debtor and the bond trustee, who 
looks after the bondholders rights. It also governs the seniority of the bonds and how they get paid back. 
Each legal jurisdiction has its own framework for the priority of payments so it is necessary that all the 
credit documentation do not stray from this rule. Generally speaking, the ranking of creditors usually look 
this way: 
o Secured creditors: these lenders have a collateral as security (immovable or movable) and are 
usually financial creditors but in some instances trade creditors. 
o Preferential or privileged creditors: includes commissions paid to administrators, court fees or to 
insolvency professionals. Some jurisdictions include employee wages and some type of taxes. 
o Unsecured creditors: these are creditors with no or partial security granted to their claims. They 
are usually financial lenders but also supplier or some employee claims. 
o Subordinated creditors: those creditors that agreed to be repaid after the former.  
This type of subordination stems from the debt issued at different entities within the company. The typical 
structure comprises a holding company (HoldCo) which owns several operating companies (OpCos). 
These OpCos owns the main assets of the company and generates the cash flows to service the debt at 
2.2.3 Structural subordination 
                                                          
7  A major traditional difference between the US and Europe corporate debt market where the latter is mainly represented by banks. 
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the HoldCo level. To some extent, the Opcos are structurally senior to HolCo as they are close to the 
cash and assets (Nomura 2010).  
In liquidation or winding up, the effects of the structural and contractual subordination as well as the liens 
interplay with each other. Structural subordination looks at the proximity of the assets. Liabilities at the 
OpCos are paid off through the proceeds of their assets and move up the capital structure until the 
proceeds are used up. Certain guarantees on the OpCos assets are granted to the HolCo debt to 
enhance the recovery prospects in some instances and to some extent eliminate the structural 
subordination. These types of guarantees are called “upstream”. 
Figure 4: Types of guarantees 
                        
Source: Nomura (2010); author analysis 
In the absence of a guarantee, debt at the OpCo is structurally senior to debt sitting at the HolCo level. 
With a guarantee in place, both debts are pari passu to each other and to other senior unsecured OpCo 
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debt. In the event of any OpCo going under, the guarantee implies that any structurally senior debt must 
be paid off first. Additionally, any other debt at the OpCo level (senior bank debt and trade creditors) is 
also paid down before any remaining proceeds is sent up to the HoldCo level.  
The relevance of structural subordination depends on the jurisdictions. In US, companies issue senior 
secured debt with high yield bonds out of the same vehicle. Senior lenders feel comfortable that the 
inherently contractual subordination implied in the high yield bond documentation is enough to protect the 
rights of the secured creditors. In Europe is more uncommon as secured creditors fear that the insolvency 
regimes will bypass the priority rules and prefer the bondholders to be structurally subordinate. The bonds 
are then issued at the HoldCo level which are usually several steps above the OpCo debt and hence 
further away from the assets.  
Below an example of a corporate structure that shows the structural subordination in a company. The 
initial equity is placed at the top and flows downwards via intercompany loans or equity injection until it 
gets to the parent company. Also, high yield bonds are usually issued by a finance company which also 
flows through to the parent company (Nomura 2010).  
Figure 5: Structural Subordination 
 
Source: Nomura (2010); author analysis 
The secured debt usually sits in the parent company. Below, the operating companies which either 
guarantee the secured debt and leave the bondholders structurally subordinated or grant some upstream 
guarantees in forms of assets or operating metrics (Ebitda, Free Cash Flow, etc). Therefore the secured 
creditors at the parent company enjoy a stronger position than the bondholders given the subordinated 
nature of the guarantee. Therefore, the bondholders are structurally subordinated to the secured creditors 
in any liquidation/winding up. 
3. Event of default 
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An event of default (EoD) is a situation that enables the creditor to accelerate the instrument. If the 
creditors decide to accelerate it, then the debt redeems at par along with the accrued interests. If the 
company cannot comply with that then the EoD is triggered and the company falls into a restructuring or 
the insolvency. 
There are several type of EoD. The best known is the company’s failure to pay the debt as it becomes 
due or the interest attached to the debt. This is called a payment default. There is usually a 5 days grace 
period on the interest but not on the principal to allow the company to look for alternatives to fix the 
problem.  
The other most common trigger of EoD is the technical default or a covenant breach. These covenants 
are meant to instill some discipline on the company to preserve the credit quality and allow the 
management to take the necessary steps before the payment default occurs. The grace period in 
covenants is usually 30 days in loans and 14 to 28 days in bonds.  
Some other EoD are the misrepresentation of the financial documentation of the company, the cease of 
the business activity or the sale of a subsidiary.  
Once a company has incurred in a payment default on a loan or bond, there are several clauses to 
protect all creditors against the enforcement of securities by the first creditors that might undermine the 
recovery of the others creditors’ classes. These clauses are meant to treat all creditors in a fair and 
orderly manner. The main clauses are the cross payment default, cross default or cross acceleration 
(Keisman D. 2006). 
Cross defaults states that any EoD in a debt instrument will trigger a default and acceleration on other 
loans and bonds with this feature attached. Cross acceleration states that it is the acceleration of the 
instrument by the creditors than brings about the acceleration of other debt. This a weaker protection 
compared to cross default as creditors are at the expense of the affected creditors to accelerate their 
instruments as there are no legal obligations of the latter to trigger the EoD. 
Cross default usually applies also to the subsidiaries of the company, and hence a default on the OpCos 
usually triggers the EoD at the HoldCo level. This situation will have to be thoroughly documented in the 
debt agreements (Nomura 2010).  
An alternative to any acceleration is a waiver from the lenders in return for some kind of compensation to 
allow the company to grapple with the problem and rectify it. This waiver is usually granted provided the 
problem is fixable (a breach of a maintenance covenants for example). Once a waiver on an EoD has 
been granted, the EoD cannot be used to accelerate the debt payment any longer.  
A standstill agreement is also quite common whereby a temporary suspension on acceleration rights or 
enforcement is granted to the company, and only creditors can accelerate once the standstill is over.  
 
3.1 Incurrence covenants 
These negative covenants restrict certain actions of the company many of which are based on financial 
ratios being, the most common one, the EBITDA. These covenants are only tested when the company 
carries out a designated action. For example, incurring in more debt (except for the permitted debt or 
carve out that replaces debt or adds vital debt for the debtor), purchasing another company, granting 
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security to other creditors (negative pledge), ability to make some capital expenditures or selling some 
assets. These are usually found in leveraged or high yield bonds.  
3.2 Maintenance covenants 
These covenants are tested periodically (usually on a quarterly basis) and are contingent on the 
company’s performance. They are commonly based on financial ratios being the most important: 
o Leverage ratio: Debt/Ebitda expressing how many times the debt is covered by the Ebitda. 
o Interest Coverage ratio: Ebitda/Interest expense expressing how many times the interest are 
covered by the Ebitda. 
o Fixed Charge Coverage ratio: Free Cash Flow before Debt Service/ (Debt Maturities + interests + 
Dividends) expressing to what extent the cash flow of the business is enough to assist the debt  
service.  
o Maximum capital expenditures. 
o Tangible Net Worth and assets to liabilities. 
To some extent, a breach of a maintenance covenants implies a potential future default. Therefore, the 
company usually approaches to the creditors to get a waiver on the covenant breach to avoid the EoD 
trigger and rectify the problem. Creditor in return usually gets a higher margin on their loans/bonds. 8
4. Bankruptcy regimes 
 
To evaluate each bankruptcy regime it is worth setting out a list of key features to understand and 
compare each jurisdiction (Nomura 2010): 
- Definition of insolvency: the concept is wide across each regime ranging from the inability to 
service the debt obligations, lack of liquidity or when the net asset value is negative. 
- Courts in charge of the insolvency case: some jurisdictions have special judges with an 
experienced team behind to deal with insolvencies and bankruptcies. 
- Types of securities: some regimes are characterized by dealing with different securities that grant 
different creditor rights, mostly on Anglo Saxo regimes with floating and fixed types of securities. 
- Creditor’s rights to bring about liquidation or restructuring: some regimes allow creditors to trigger 
liquidation of an insolvent company against management to preserve both cash and assets. 
Likewise, it enables secure senior creditors to boost their recovery in detriment of the out of the 
money creditors (junior) and equity holders. 
- Directors’ role: some strict jurisdictions do not allow management to pursue a workout as soon as 
the company is insolvent which might trigger an immediate liquidation. Some others allow the 
management to continue as a going concern through a pre restructuring to minimize costs and 
maximize the value of the company. 
- Automatic Stay: this clause aims at deterring senior creditors from seizing the assets and 
prevents junior creditors from initiating legal actions against the company allowing it preserve 
                                                          
8  During the year of the “bull market” many LBO companies were granted covenant lite loans with very few or no covenants at all. 
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valuable assets. It is either automatic, imposed by a judge or grants a moratorium on the debt 
service allowing the company to retain its assets during the restructuring procedures. 
- Management status during the insolvency/restructuring: in some jurisdictions management is 
automatically removed. Some others either allow management to remain if the costs and 
disruption of a replacement or the supervision by an external advisor are significant. 
- Creditors’ role during the process: if we assume creditors have a say on the restructuring plan, it 
boils down to their position in the capital structure and to what extent they are in/out of the 
money. It is also reliant on the bargaining power between senior and junior, its voting power and 
whether the agreement is binding on a dissenting minority of creditors. It is also important 
whether the dissenting out of the money creditors wishes can be overridden (crawdown).  
- New financing during the restructuring process: some regimes allow additional financing during 
the process to provide cash to allow the company to operate. Nonetheless, the overriding 
question is to what extent this financing is senior to the current capital structure and undermines 
the recovery of the current creditors. 
- Set off: this framework creates a security to the company if a creditor owes money and can set it 
off against the debt that company stills owes to the creditor. 
- The length of the process: the jurisdiction has to strike a balance between a short process 
(resulting in lower fees and better preservation of the valuable assets) or a longer one (making it 
more predictable and fair for creditors). 
- Clawback: this clause allows some transactions around the insolvency filing to be voided so as to 
avoid granting preferential treatment to some creditors and prevent assets from being 
uneconomically undermined. 
- Fees: in both restructuring and insolvency, fees are usually substantial given the array of judges, 
experts and lawyers engaged in the process. The longer the process the higher the fees that 
might effectively reduce the recovery of the creditors as these fees usually rank senior to them. 
Best way to compare fees is to compare the average time of the restructuring in each jurisdiction 
(Nomura 2010).  
4.1 United States (US) 
The US bankruptcy code is the most comprehensive and influential code of all existing regimes dating 
back to the 1789 US constitution. It sits under the federal law and therefore it is applied uniformly across 
the entire country. The current regime is ruled under the 1978 Bankruptcy code having undergone several 
amendments, most recently in 2005. Bankruptcies are usually dealt with by the specialized courts that 
belong to the US district courts that govern both core and non core bankruptcy matters. The latter can be 
actually scaled up to the District Court and ultimately to the Supreme Court if necessary. 
There are two major bankruptcy regimes in the US code: 
- Chapter 7: This is the proceeding for the company liquidation under the supervision of court 
appointed trustee. 
- Chapter 11: this is the procedure to attempt to restructure the company (“debtor in possession”) 
in which the directors stay in control. 
Requisites to filing for either of these two regimes, the company must have a domicile, property or a place 
of business in the US.  
Insolvency is defined as the sum of the debt being greater than the asset value. However, the company 
could well be solvent before initiating the procedure and can file in order to take advantage of the special 
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rights granted by the code to address a looming financial problem. Moreover, companies are not legally 
obliged to apply for bankruptcy protection if it has been able to secure an agreement with its creditors. 
The main type of security is the mortgage but in general any asset can be used as collateral to senior 
creditors. Set-off rights are also contemplated as long as it is also permitted under state law (Brands 
1992).  
4.1.1 Pre insolvency/Workouts 
Financially stretched companies are allowed to reach an agreement with their creditors out of the 
bankruptcy code. This comprises changes in the loan agreement, grace periods, covenant waivers etc. 
Such modifications must be approved by the majority of the creditors. If this does not happen and the 
financial situation of the company is rapidly deteriorating, then the filing becomes the next immediate 
step. Furthermore, companies can also file even if they have reached an agreement to benefit from the 
special rights provided by the bankruptcy code including the automatic stay. The most common one is the 
“pre-packaged plan” whereby the company seeks to reach a reorganization plan in advance of a filing. 
Once the agreement is attained, then the company applies for Chapter 11 and presents the judge the 
support of the different creditors allowing the company to shorten the time spent in the bankruptcy 
process as well the negative impact that the filing might have on the company (in terms of reputation, fees 
and so on).  
Below the layout of the US bankruptcy regime. 
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Figure 6: US Bankruptcy Regime 
 
Source: Nomura (2010); author analysis 
4.1.2 Chapter 7 
Both the creditors and company can file for the liquidation proceeding. In the former, the company can 
contest the procedure and operate normally forcing creditor to prove the company is not complying with 
his debt service duties. Should the petition go ahead, a trustee is appointed and in charge of disposing 
the asset to distribute the proceeds amongst the different security holders. In the proceeding, the 
company ceases its operations, starts running down the business and laying off the workforce. There is 
an automatic stay as well under Chapter 7 whereby all properties repossessions and foreclosures by any 
of the creditor or set off rights are halted. For multinational companies, the stay also applies to all 
worldwide assets.  
The major difference between liquidation in Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 is that in the former, the 
management remains in the company and undertakes the liquidation as opposed to the latter being 
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performed by the trustee.  The result under both proceeding might be the same but Chapter 11 allows the 
management to buy more time to better sell the assets of the company as a “going concern” and 
enhances the recovery of the creditors. The proceeds are usually higher than those of Chapter 7 and 
therefore becoming the preferred route for liquidation (Franks 1992).  
Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code governs (rules) the liquidation of the company and advocates that 
any sale must be approved by the trustee. One interesting feature of the code is the “melting ice cube” 
test that allows assets to be sold off faster than expected if the value is eroding as a result of the 
liquidation. 
4.1.3 Chapter 11 
The US restructuring is usually articulated through the Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. This 
proceeding begins with the creditor or the company filing it with a bankruptcy court. Once the filing is 
granted, the automatic stay sets in and halts all creditor claims. Likewise, the company has to provide an 
in depth balance sheet and profit and loss account (P&L) as well as a schedule of contracts, leases etc. A 
company under the governance of Chapter 11 is called DIP (“Debtor In Possession”). The management 
remains in place and run the company normally subject to supervision of the secured lenders and a 
trusted appointed by the unsecured creditors. In general, management has “leeway” to carry out his 
duties albeit for some required transactions (sale of key debtor’s assets, new borrowing, etc) court 
approval is mandatory.  
Management could lose its DIP status if they are proven guilty or dishonest. If so, a trustee is set up by 
the creditors and manages the business over the course of the procedure. It may also happen that 
creditors file their own plan or take the Chapter 11 into Chapter 7 to wind the company up. 
The automatic stay prevails over the course of the proceeding and applies to both secured and 
unsecured creditors. Reasons for circumventing the stay could be that some of the company’s assets lack 
the necessary equity or they are not essential in the operating business.  
The unsecured creditors’ trustee, usually formed by the seven largest creditors, plays a pivotal role in the 
restructuring process as they look after the rights of the unsecured creditors as well as ensuring that the 
reorganization goes as planned. The trustee can hire accountants, advisers or lawyers and have their 
expenses accounted for by the company along with interacting or interviewing the management and use 
all internal information. 
The company can raise new financing through the “Super Priority/Senior” status (“DIP” Loans) ranking 
above all liabilities including taxes, wages,  administration fees and senior secured debts) allowing DIP 
lenders to support the company. “DIP” financing can only be approved by the court provided that the 
other secured creditors have been adequately protected - interest payment, new granted securities (but 
still junior to the DIP lenders) etc.  
Management or the trustee replacing the former has 120 days (or a maximum of 18 months) to propose a 
restructuring plan to the court. The purpose of this plan is to present it to the creditors who will vote on or 
against it. If the deadline is consumed and no plan is presented, then any of the creditors can propose a 
new reorganization plan. This plan lays out the relationship and treatment of the different securities. Not 
all the creditors will vote on the plan. Creditors receiving par on their loans will refrain from voting whereas 
the fully impaired ones will probably reject the plan. The rest of the unimpaired creditors must vote on the 
plan. These creditors are divided into classes and each one votes within it. In each class two-thirds or 
more of creditors by size of claim and more than 50% of creditors by number must vote for the plan for it 
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to be approved by that class. If this happens, all creditors are bound by the plan even those against it. 
The court will then confirm the plan once it has been accepted at least by one class of non-insider 
(Insiders are relatives, general partners, and directors or officers of the debtor.) holding impaired claims.  
The Bankruptcy code also includes the so called “cramdown mechanism” whereby a vote of the 
dissenting creditors of a plan can be overridden under certain conditions. These conditions include a 
requirement that another class of impaired creditors must have voted in favor of the plan, that there must 
be no unfair discrimination, that the plan must be fair and equitable and that the plan must obey the 
absolute priority rule (Bercker 1995). This states that a junior creditor cannot receive any payment until all 
more senior creditors have been repaid in full” (Nomura 2010).  
Once the court confirms that the reorganization plan complies with the code, the plan is confirmed and 
the company emerges from Chapter 11. It must be noted that assets can be disposed during the 
proceeding provided that the company files for a motion with the court, notifies all creditors and has the 
sale approved by the court. Section 363 rules the sale procedure and it warrants a sale provided that it is 
done in the best interest of the creditors 
4.1.4 Priority of payments 
The US Bankruptcy code is articulated under the “absolute priority rule” (APR) stating that a creditor 
cannot be partially or fully paid unless all senior creditors has been fully paid. The priority list is as follows: 
1. Super Senior/priority claims under DIP loans. 
2. Administrative expenses: legal fees, certain taxes, etc. 
3. Wage claims, employee benefit plans and certain taxes. 
4. Secured claims. 
5. General unsecured claims. 
4.2 The England and Wales (UK) 
The England and Wales bankruptcy code is probably the most used and known within Europe. It is used 
by England and Wales based companies as well as foreign companies that can prove any connection to 
this jurisdiction. The code comprises several laws mainly the Insolvency Act 1986, 2000 and the 
Enterprise Act 2002. 
The main proceedings are: 
a) Members’ voluntary liquidation. 
b) Creditors’ voluntary liquidation. 
c) Compulsory liquidation / Winding-up. 
d) Administration. 
e) Company voluntary arrangements. 
f)  Schemes of arrangements. 
In UK, bankruptcy procedures are usually handled by the country court where the company has its head 
office as there are no dedicated bankruptcy courts. Insolvency is defined as the situation where the 
company is unable to service its debt.  A twofold test is undertaken: a balance sheet test to assess 
whether assets are higher than liabilities and a cash flow test to ascertain whether the company can 
service its own debt. If either or both are negative then the company is deemed to be insolvent. This is a 
compulsory requirement for a company to file for insolvency. However, there is no obligation to file for 
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insolvency even if the company is insolvent. The 2006 Company Act states that the board of directors has 
the duty to preserve the right of the stakeholders and therefore the welfare of the company. If 
management is found to behave dishonestly, there is an offence (“wrongful trading”) that carries a penal 
fine (Gilson 1989).  
Securities can be either immovable or movable. The former is usually property (real estate) than can be 
secured using fixed charge or a mortgage. A mortgage usually shifts the legal ownership of the asset 
from the debt to the creditor until the debt is paid down.  A fixed charge means that the company can sell 
off the asset once the creditor has been reimbursed but no transfer is done.  
As far as movable securities are concerned, they could be mortgages or fixed charges. Additionally, there 
are floating charges, liens and pledges. A floating charge is linked to a class of assets and not to a 
specific asset. If the company defaults, then the floating become fixed to a specific asset and behaves 
like a fixed charge. The lien grants a creditor the right to retain the asset until his debt is repaid. The 
pledge however gives the creditor the right to possess the asset until the debt is reimbursed.  
4.2.1 Pre insolvency 
As the company is allowed to carry on operating while insolvent, it is not easy to distinguish between pre 
and post-bankruptcy. One of the most popular pre insolvency routes for insolvent or close to insolvent 
companies are the “pre pack” whereby the company or some of its assets are sold after an agreement 
has been reached before the announcement of formal insolvency and having been approved by the 
administrator prior to his formal appointment. Once the company initiates the administration proceeding, 
the administrator executes the sale agreement (Nomura 2010 & Gilson 2000). 
Below the layout of the England and Wales bankruptcy scheme. 
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Figure 7: UK Bankruptcy Regime 
Source: Nomura (2010) and author 
4.2.2 Liquidation 
The bankruptcy code contemplates three ways for a company to begin liquidation: 
Member’s voluntary liquidation 
This proceeding cannot be used unless the directors can officially prove that the company is solvent and 
75% of shareholders approve on it. Management is removed and a liquidator takes over.  If the directors 
cannot declare the insolvency, then the proceeding moves to a creditor’s voluntary liquidation.  
Creditors’ voluntary liquidation 
To be eligible for this procedure, the company must be insolvent and counts on 75% of the shareholders’ 
support. A liquidator can be appointed by the shareholders but with very limited powers. Directors must 
hold a meeting within 14 days and present an in depth document of the current state of the company. The 
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liquidator can be replaced through a vote by the majority of the creditors and then apply to the court for a 
stay on proceedings. 
Compulsory liquidation / Winding up order 
Creditors can take the company into liquidation (winding up order) if they apply to the court for a 
compulsory liquidation. The trigger would be that the company is unable to service its debt or has failed 
either the balance sheet or cash flow test. If the petition is approved, then management is removed and 
the company can be run off.  
In all these procedures, a liquidator is appointed to sell all the company’s assets. This may be done by 
public auction or private contract without court sanction. Then, all the proceedings are shared between 
creditors and equity according to the priority of payments (Nomura 2010).  
4.2.3 Reorganization 
If the purpose is to restructure the company, there are three options: 
4.2.3.1 Administration 
Introduced by the Insolvency Act 1986 and revised by the Enterprise Act 2002, its purpose is to rescue 
the company as a going concern. This procedure can be initiated either by court order or out of court. In 
the latter a security holder with a qualifying floating charge can appoint an administrator. Additionally, the 
company management can appoint an administrator prior notice to the security holder. In the former case, 
the creditors or the company can apply for an administration order to the court and prove the company is 
insolvency or close to insolvency. The administration has different statutory priorities in a fixed hierarchy: 
first is to rehabilitate the company as a going concern; second, if the former is not applicable, the 
administration will aim to attain a better outcome for creditors rather than a simple winding up. If this is not 
viable, then the administration will pursue to dispose the company’s assets to realize the value for the 
secured and senior creditors without undermining the interests of the entire universe of creditors (Nomura 
2010). 
Once the administration sets in, there is an automatic stay on proceedings and any creditor enforcement 
action. However, there are some exceptions as the owners of financial securities (shares, debt or cash) 
are allowed to terminate their contracts, enforce securities and fulfill rights of set off. These security 
holders can ask the court to temporally lift the stay provided that this would not hamper the administration 
procedure. The administrator takes over the management and looks after the interest of the creditors as a 
whole. This has to be published in the major newspapers. 
The administrator has to send a proposal of the administration procedures after eight weeks and present 
it to the creditors. The proposal has to reach simple majority by value of creditors present and voting 
including unsecured creditors and also those secured that have been impaired. If the proposal is 
declined, then the administration will turn to the court for guidance. After 12 months, the administration 
expires (it can extended by six months more subject to creditors request and court approval). During the 
administration the company can take on new loans senior to both floating charges and unsecured 
creditors but junior to secured and fixed charges. 
Administration is mostly used a mechanism to enable a “pre pack sale”. The administrator is provided with 
a company’s sale plan before it is actually appointed by the company. The plan should contain a 
company’s valuation showing the creditors are obtaining the best possible outcome and then a buyer is to 
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be found. The approval to sell assets has to come from the secured creditors, albeit the administrator 
does have some additional powers to deal with secured assets free from the security. Once the sale is 
agreed, then the administrator is appointed and the sale is closed out immediately. If the whole business 
of the company is sold off then the company does not survive (but the business does) and it is wound up.  
4.2.3.2 Company Voluntary Arrangements  
CVA was introduced by the Insolvency Act 1986 and mostly used when the company is likely to come out 
as a going concern. Its main purpose is to clinch a deal between the company, share/debt holders in 
which creditors are willing to delay or reduce debt payments. This arrangement does not provide for an 
insolvency practitioner (administrator) taking powers over the company and there is no requirement for 
the company to be insolvent. This proceeding is started by the management through a proposal to 
shareholders and creditors. There is an automatic stay but only applicable to small companies: a turnover 
less than £5.6mn, assets worth not more than £3.26mn and no more than 50 employees. Initially the stay 
is for 28 days but with creditor consent it can be extended to up to three months. There is no stay for 
large companies. 
CVA requires majority approval above 75% of unsecured creditors and they are not divided into classes 
to both encourage discussion and to protect the rights of all creditors. It also allows out of the money 
creditors to block the restructuring if they have no economic interest. If the agreement is reached, then it 
becomes binding to all creditors but cannot affect the secured/preferential creditor rights without their 
consent and has also come with the approval of the shareholders. Nonetheless, if the creditors and 
shareholders disagree, the creditors’ agreement prevails subject to the court order. Once it is 
implemented, the insolvency practitioner is appointed to supervise. The role of the court is effectively 
down to resolve any disagreement or dispute.  CVA is applicable to any EEA company provided that it 
has a COMI in the UE.  
4.2.3.3 Scheme of Arrangement 
This arrangement is supervised by a court within the 2006 Companies Act. There is no insolvency 
requirement. The scheme can be initiated by any creditor or the company and there should be a formal 
application to set up a creditors’ meeting. Management keeps his powers and no insolvency practitioner 
is appointed. Majority of approval above 75% or more by value and in number of each class is necessary 
and must also count on the shareholder’s approval. The company has to decide over the different 
creditors classes to approve the scheme. There is no stay during the scheme; hence secured creditors 
are allowed to exercise their securities and unsecured creditors to take claims against the company. This 
is by far the most detrimental feature of the scheme. By all means, these rights can be removed as long 
as the scheme is approved and received a court sanction. Once approved the management implement 
and supervises it.  
4.2.4 Priority of payments 
The distribution is contained under the Insolvency Act. In general, CVA or the scheme should never give 
a creditor a lower recovery than otherwise achieved through liquidation. In a declining order, the priority 
list is as follows 
1. Fixed charge holders (as secured assets are excluded from the estate). 
2. General expenses and the costs of the liquidation, including the liquidator's remuneration. 
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3. Preferential creditors which generally relate to employee rights such as accrued pay and pension 
rights. 
4. A fund for unsecured creditors (up to a maximum of £600,000) from the realization of assets subject to 
a floating charge. 
5. Floating charge holders. 
6. Unsecured creditors. 
4.3 Germany 
The German insolvency framework (Insolvenzordnung) is based on the 1989 German Insolvency Act. 
There are two main regimes leading to either liquidation or to an insolvency plan. There both court 
supervised by the district the company has its head offices. The main forms of securities are land charge 
(grundschuld) and the mortgage (hypothec). For moveable securities, the main ones are the transfers of 
receivables/assets, chattel pledge or the retention of title. Set off is permitted provided that the position 
came up before the beginning of the insolvency process (Nomura 2010).  
Insolvency is assessed using two tests: 
• Illiquidity: evaluating whether the company can service its obligations 
• Over-indebtedness: occurring when the company’s obligations are not covered by their assets  
Below, a summary of the German restructuring code. 
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Figure 8: German Bankruptcy Regime 
 
Source: Nomura (2010); author analysis 
4.3.1 Pre Insolvency 
Informal workouts are common between creditors and debtors as long as consensus is reached. 
4.3.2 Insolvency 
Management is contractually bound to file for insolvency in no more than three weeks from the moment 
they are aware that the company is either short of liquidity or over indebted. Failure to do so is a criminal 
offence under the civil law. The insolvency procedure, in any of the two forms, is initiated by applying to 
the preliminary process by either the company or the creditors. In the latter case, the company is entitled 
to be briefed before any petition is conceded. In the former, the company can file and an administrator is 
appointed to draw up a report assessing the financial health of the company.  
Amongst several roles of the administrator, the most common one is to monitor the management that 
remains in the company. Also, the court can impose the company to obtain the administrator consent 
before an asset sale is undertaken but there is no prohibition on asset sales (the so called “weak 
administrator” status) or otherwise grant the administrator full responsibility on asset sales (“strong 
administrator”).  
During the preliminary procedures, a stay on moveable assets is usually imposed. Real estate assets 
may be also stayed by the administrator’s decision. The court must determine, in a maximum period of 
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three months, whether the company’s assets are enough to cover all the costs of the procedure. If so, 
then the proceedings are opened and the court appoints an administrator. Creditors and debtor can put 
forward their suggestions but ultimately it’s the court’s call. Then, there is an automatic stay on ordinary 
creditors. Secured creditors are allowed to enforce their rights over immoveable assets and also over 
moveable assets as long as they are in their possessions (Pantaleo 2005).  
The main goal of the administrator is to keep the company as a going concern until the creditors get 
together sometime within the first three months since the initiation of the proceeding. New money can be 
raised to keep the business operating and is granted preferential status. The creditor’s meeting is made 
up of secured/unsecured creditors (representing a majority of claims) plus the company and the 
administrator. The administrator must count on the approval of the creditor’s committee for any relevant 
transaction and compile the list of creditor’s claims to decide whether to liquidate or rehabilitate the 
company.   
4.3.3 Liquidation 
If the creditor’s meeting calls for the company insolvency, a verification meeting is set up to confirm the 
amount and claim’s rank. Then, assets are sold and employees laid off. 
4.3.4 Restructuring 
The insolvency is law is meant to restructure and preserve the value of the company. It is also intended to 
sell the company using for instance a pre-pack plan or to facilitate liquidation. The plan can only be put 
forward by either the administrator assisted by the creditors or by the company itself and among other 
features, it should lay out the treatment of every single creditor (secured creditors, employees, etc).  
The administrator is allowed to borrow new financing that will rank senior to existing lines including fees 
and administration costs but below claims that arose in pre insolvency order contracts.  Therefore, this 
new financing cannot be regarded as super senior since the new lenders sit behind other creditors as it is 
described in 4.3.5. For a plan to be approved several conditions must be met: 
• A majority in value and number of the voting creditors of each class must support it. The 
insolvency plan allows for a crawdown mechanism. Should a plan is accepted by the majority but 
not all classes, the court can still accept the plan as long  as the nonvoting creditors are better off 
with the plan than without it and the recovery is equitable and fair versus the recovery of other 
creditors. Additionally, there must an equal treatment of creditors in each class. Moreover, the 
non-voting creditors are supposed to receive a reasonable share of the economic value under the 
plan. 
• The plan has to be adopted by the debtor. His opposition can be invalidated if he is equally 
treated by and without the plan. 
• The court must also approve the plan and implement via the supervision of an administrator. 
Once the plan is approved, the administrator stands down and the management takes over the 
debtor again.  
If the plan is rejected by the creditors or dismissed by the court, the courts will decide to pursue 
liquidation or a sale. It must be noted that the insolvency code includes a provision for self-administration 
enabling the management to maintain control on the company under the supervision of an expert 
appointed by the court in line with Chapter 11. However it is usually common to replace the current 
management for an experienced body of directors in corporate restructurings. 
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4.3.5 Priority of payments 
The order of distribution in insolvency proceedings, unless an insolvency plan states otherwise, is as 
follows: 
 
1. Secured creditors. 
2. The following rank equally and so are paid pro-rata: 
a. Cost of insolvency proceedings including court fees and administration costs. 
b. Post-order and post-filing claims resulting from the actions of a preliminary administrator with 
complete control over the company’s assets. This includes so-called “DIP-style” loans made to 
the company after the filing. 
c. Claims resulting from pre-order contracts if the administrator chose performance of the 
contract. 
3. General unsecured creditors. 
4. Subordinated unsecured creditors. 
5. Equity (according to shareholders’ rights). 
4.4. France 
The French bankruptcy regime, once labeled as a creditor unfriendly framework, has come a long way to 
ensure the rehabilitation of companies facing financial distress through several new laws (the last in 2005 
– The Safeguard Insolvency law). These new Chapter 11 type of laws and reforms are meant to 
encourage voluntary arrangements between creditors and debtors by promoting insolvency procedures 
before the insolvency tests fail. The main proceedings are: 
- Liquidation proceeding 
- Mandat ad hoc proceeding 
- Conciliation proceedings 
- Safeguard proceedings 
- Redressement judiciaire 
In general and in most of these proceedings, the responsibility lies on the commercial court where the 
company has its office registered. Immoveable assets usually command a mortgage or a lien. For 
moveable assets, pledge or title retention is the typical security. Floating charge is not contemplated. Set 
off are common for reciprocal debts happening either after or before the initiation of the proceeding.  
In France, the insolvency is defined as a company not being able to pay its debts as the come due 
(“cessation des paiements”). The balance sheet test does not apply.  
Below, the layout of the French bankruptcy scheme. 
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Figure 9: French Bankruptcy Regime 
 
Source: Nomura (2010); author analysis 
 
4.4.1 Pre insolvency 
Creditors and debtors face no hurdles to informally agree a restructuring whilst the company remains 
solvent.  They can use any of the available restructuring proceedings: for solvent companies, insolvent 
companies for less than 45 days and for truly insolvent companies.  
4.4.2 Liquidation 
Any company within 45 days of becoming insolvent can apply for conciliation, redressment judiciaire or 
liquidation proceedings. If the company is not operating anymore or recovery is very low, the liquidation 
judiciaire will set in.  
A creditor can start the process involuntarily after proving the court it has not received the payment. 
Additionally, the creditor must also prove the company has ceased its trading or the recovery is not 
possible (Nomura 2010).  
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The court appoints a liquidator who replaces the management. If the company cannot operate as a going 
concern, then it will split the company into parts to be disposed. If the company can trade as a going 
concern, a three month (extendable to six) period is opened to sell the company. Creditors have to file a 
statement of claims within two months (if based in France or four months otherwise) after the liquidation 
order is published in the Official Gazette (Nomura 2010). 
There is a stay for both secured and unsecured creditors but the former can lift it in two scenarios. In the 
first, the court does not allow the company to trade as a going concern and the liquidators fail to dispose 
the secured assets within three months since the liquidation begins. The second case involves the 
authorization of the company as a going concern but after the three or six month period, the collateral 
was not incorporated in the company’s sale. If the company is liquidated, the distribution of proceeds 
follows the priority laid out in 5.4 and usually lasts between three to four years.  
4.4.3 Reorganization 
There are four different rehabilitation proceedings: 
4.4.3.1 Mandat Ad Hoc proceedings 
This mechanism can only be initiated by the company. It a simple, informal and confidential procedure 
that can only be used if the company remains solvent (the debtor has not breached the cessations des 
paiements test).  
In this procedure, the management stays in the company and a professional (mandataire ad hoc) is 
appointed to help the management to formulate a rehabilitation program with creditors. Nevertheless, his 
decisions are not binding and the court could impose a rescheduling/moratorium of debt 
maturities/payments and force a stay on the collateral. This procedure has no deadline hence it lasts as 
long as the court decides.  
There is no drawdown mechanism therefore a court needs the consent of all creditors to impose a 
rescheduling of their claims. This usually implies the out of the money creditors receiving some sort of 
recovery (usually in equity) to achieve unanimity. If the rescue plan is not agreed, this could trigger 
liquidation or the transfer to any of the other three proceedings. 
4.4.3.2 Conciliation proceedings 
This procedure can only be used if the company is solvent or has been insolvent less than 45 days and 
has to be initiated by the company. The management has to provide the economic, social and financial 
situation to the court to decide if the company’s situation is fixable. Management stays in the company 
and a professional is appointed to facilitate the negotiation of a voluntary agreement with the creditors. 
Likewise, there is no automatic stay on the collaterals. The court might impose a two year rescheduling of 
the creditor claims. The negotiation period ends after four months and requires the consent of all 
creditors. There is no cramdown, therefore, creditors are not forced to accept any rescheduling/reduction 
of their claims.  
One of the key features of this proceeding is that post insolvency financing is permitted as long as the exit 
from the plan is public (however it is junior to employee salaries, court expenses and fees). If the 
agreement is reached, either it is certified by the president of the court rendering the agreement and the 
process confidential or it is just approved by the court, made it public and given the legal power of a court 
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judgment. The latter entails that the company is a going concern, solvent and the agreement does not 
unfairly undermine the interests of any of the creditors (Franks 1992). 
4.4.3.3 Safeguard proceedings 
This rehabilitation process is only allowed if the company is still solvent at the filing. To be eligible for this 
mechanism, the company has to prove that faces strong difficulties that cannot overcome. The 
proceeding has to be initiated by the debtor only and file it in the appropriate court. The court is to decide 
whether this is the appropriate mechanism and if it is likely to survive. This proceeding and its decisions 
are always made public. Management stay in the company and an administration could be appointed to 
oversee or help the management to reach an agreement with creditors.  
The company has up to six months to negotiate a plan that can be extended up to 18 months. There is an 
automatic stay across the entire capital structure as well as temporary suspensions on debt payments 
and on acceleration. For big companies, there are usually two creditor’s committees, namely one for the 
main suppliers and other for credit institutions including holders of bank debt purchased in the secondary 
market. The company presents the restructuring plan to the credit committee assisted by the 
administrator. Plan approval involves at least 66% majority by claim size in both groups. If there are also 
bonds outstanding, the plan requires at least two thirds majority by claim size.  Then the court can 
approve the plan which will be binding for all debt holders. If a court approval is not reached, then 
creditors are consulted individually on the debt repayment proposals. The plan cannot force debt 
forgiveness and lasts longer than 10 years.  
If the company becomes insolvent during this proceeding and can still be rehabilitated, this mechanism 
can be turned into our last proceeding: the redresseemnt judiciaire. 
4.4.3.4 Redressement judiciaire 
Similar to the previous one but only applies for insolvent debtors. It can also be initiated by the creditor 
but has to prove that the company has failed to repay its obligations. To initiate this procedure, the debtor 
must still be operating and has a good chance to be restructured. The maximum observation period is six 
months that can be extended to 18 months whereby the courts evaluates to what extent the company 
should undergo a restructuring or liquidation.  
There is an automatic stay on security enforcement. The approval of the rescue plan is similar to that of 
the safeguard procedure. At the end of the process, if the agreement fails, the court can present a plan 
where the stay can last up to 10 years. If not, the company is liquidated.  
4.4.4 Priority of payments 
Since a number of different laws address the priority of payments, it is not possible to state a precise 
order that will always be valid. However, roughly speaking, the payments to creditors are made in the 
following order starting with the highest priority: 
1. Unpaid amounts due to employees (e.g. wages, amounts due with respect to accrued and untaken 
holidays) for the 60 days before opening of proceedings. 
2. Judicial costs. 
3. New post-insolvency financing (see the Conciliation process). 
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4. Perfected mortgages and pledges with retention rights. 
5. Post-judgment claims incurred in the course of the insolvency process (fees, claims). 
6. Pledges without retention rights. 
7. General privileges, including tax and social security claims. 
8. Unsecured debts which arose before the start of proceedings. 
4.5. Spain 
Spain has been historically a regime that filing companies have been wound up rather than rehabilitated. 
One key reason would be the major presence of banks in the supply of corporate debt. As bank debt is 
usually secured, they are more prone to liquidate the company and execute the security rather than 
attempting to restructure the company. 
The Spanish parliament has been quite active in upgrading the current legislation (last time was in April 
2009) and passed a new insolvency law (ley concursal) in April 2003 inspired by the several overhauls of 
the German law and fundamentally by the US Chapter 11. This new law tend to simplify the former 
insolvency regime with a single entry point (concurso de acreedores) leading to either restructuring or 
liquidation. Moreover, it aims to reduce the time spend by companies in liquidation or restructuring as well 
as its related costs (Nomura 2010). 
There are four main insolvency proceedings: 
o Solvent winding up. 
o Common Entry leading to anticipated creditor’s agreement. 
o Common Entry leading to ordinary creditor’s agreement. 
o Common entry leading to liquidation. 
Insolvency cases are supervised by special courts created by the 2003 law based in the region where the 
company has its main commercial interests.  Insolvency is defined as the inability to regularly meet 
financial obligations. It is a cash flow test ie no balance sheet test. If the company is financially stretched 
and the management continues with the ordinary business that undermines the positions of its creditors, 
they could be held accountable for penalties, including prison.  
The main type of security for immoveable assets is the mortgage whereas for moveable assets is the 
pledge. The former must be granted in a public document and registered in the Registro de Bienes 
Muebles. The latter is held by the creditors until debt is reimbursed and has to be granted via public deed. 
Set off can be allowed under certain circumstances (Newton 2003).  
Below, the layout of the Spanish bankruptcy mechanism. 
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Figure 10: Spanish Bankruptcy Regime 
                              
Source: Nomura (2010); author analysis 
4.5.1 Pre insolvency 
Companies and creditors can informally agree an informal restructuring but the agreement has to be 
reached among all creditors to become binding. The main pre insolvency proceedings are: 
o Solvent winding up: any solvent company can voluntarily apply for a winding up. Shareholders 
must hand down a resolution to liquidate the company. Management is usually removed and 
liquidators take over to sell the assets. If the financial situation of the debtor has worsened to a 
level where the net asset value of the company might drop below half of the value of the capital 
(impairment test), the board is compelled to call up a general shareholder’s meeting. This 
meeting will allow seeking an increase or decrease of capital unless the company is bound to file 
for insolvency. Distress companies can raise pre insolvency refinancing provided that the 
agreement is approved by at least 60% or creditors by value, by an independent expert and must 
be articulated in a public document. If the debtor’s insolvency is imminent, then it can apply for a 
post insolvency proceeding.  
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4.5.2 Insolvency 
4.5.2.1 Liquidation 
The Spanish liquidation process is not liquidation per se as it focuses its emphasis on selling the business 
as a going concern by preserving the economic value of the company. The liquidation plan is drawn up by 
the liquidator and it does not need to the approval by the creditor or debtor.  
There is limited stay where pledges and mortgages holders can enforce their securities as long as the 
asset is not essential to the business or a year has gone by without the liquidation process begun.  
4.5.2.2 Out of court restructuring 
Most of the court restructurings have historically ended up in liquidation mostly due to the presence of 
bank creditors within the capital structure. Nevertheless, one can witness how lately the banks are 
switching their strategy to out of the court debt renegotiation involving in many cases banks seizing up 
their guarantee and becoming shareholders of the company. In other situation, banks are more proactive 
to agree on a restructuring plan to steer clear of a bankruptcy proceeding. 
4.5.2.3 The Concurso de Acreedores 
The most recent Spanish insolvency procedure is the concurso de acreedores (creditors’ meeting) which 
can lead into either restructuring or liquidation. The company is bound to apply for the insolvency process 
within two months of becoming insolvency otherwise management can be held liable for the losses. This 
can be extended to an additional three months provided that has been communicated to the court and is 
meant to facilitate the creditor’s negotiations. After that, the debtor has to file for insolvency in the next 
month.  The company must provide the annual accounts of the last three years, a financial report 
specifying the company assets, and a full list of creditors. The judge has full power to decide whether the 
insolvency procedure is applicable by evaluating the financial situation of the company (whether it is 
insolvent or it is likely to be insolvent in the near future). 
If the debtor contests the application of the involuntary insolvency procedure, a hearing will take place. 
Creditors will have to provide any of the following proofs: company’s assets have been foreclosed; 
company has ceased payments; company is winding itself up gradually and could compromise certain 
obligations to be paid such as wages (Nomura 2010). 
In an involuntary insolvency, the first creditor to apply for the proceedings sees 25% of its claims 
promoted within the privileged status in the priority of payments. In addition to that, any creditor that has 
bought the debt after it was due cannot apply for the insolvency within the next six months.  
If the insolvency proceeding is approved by the judge9
An automatic stay is imposed on unsecured creditors as well as on the debt interests. The judge can also 
extend the stay to senior creditors to preserve the business operating as a going concern.  
, the management remains on board and three 
administrators are appointed comprising a lawyer, unsecured creditors representative, and either an 
economist or an accountant. Their task is to assess the company’s assets and debt and agree on the 
process.  
                                                          
9  Then it has to be published in the Public registers and in the website: www.publicidad. Concursal. es 
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The insolvency law contemplates claw backs including harmful transactions to the debtor’s assets over 
the last two years before the insolvency announcement.  
The insolvency procedure breaks down into several stages: The common period that finishes with a 
detailed report of the debtor’s assets and the list of creditors. After that, the creditor’s meeting is set up 
with more than half of the creditor present to lay out the next step leading to restructuring or liquidation.  
4.5.3 Court restructuring 
There are three main proceedings within the Insolvency Act 2003 aiming to restructure the company as a 
going concern: 
4.5.3.1 Anticipated Creditor’s agreement 
The convenio anticipado (composition agreement) is a pre-packaged type of agreement first agreed by at 
least 20% of secured and unsecured creditors by value during the common period. If the anticipated 
proposal is put forward at the beginning of the process then 10% of creditors are enough to apply for this 
procedure. The aim is the continuation of the business including debt equity swap, debt cancellation etc. 
Then the plan is presented to the rest of the creditors and has to be agreed by at least 50% of the 
unsecured creditors. Minority creditors can be crammed down. There is no a Chapter 11 type DIP 
financing but it provides higher priority for all the post insolvency payments on services and goods  
4.5.3.2 Ordinary Creditors’ agreement 
The convenio ordinario (ordinary creditors’ agreement) is a back up restructuring if the previous 
proceeding fails. This is plan is presented by the company or more than 20% of creditors by value at the 
end of the common period. This framework is more restraining compared to the previous one. For 
instance, there is no change in priority of creditors, write downs above 50% of the creditors’ claims, or 
debt cancellation longer than 5 years.  This plan has to be approved by both senior creditors on both 
secured and unsecured basis. Junior creditors have no vote on this plan. Creditors that have purchased 
debt after the announcement of the insolvency do not vote on the approval of the plan10
4.5.4 Priority of payments 
.  
The insolvency act distinguishes between claims against the créditos contra la masa (estate) and claims 
against the créditos concursales (insolvency). Claims over the estate includes administrator fees, legal 
costs, debt incurred during the insolvency and salary for the 30 days before the announcement of the 
insolvency limited to a twice of the minimum salary. These claims have absolute priority over the rest of 
the claims. 
The ranking is as follows: 
1. Privileged claims: 
                                                          
10  A strong reason why the Spanish distressed debt market has not reached scale.  
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a. Specially privileged: covering secured creditors on real estate, mortgage, pledge and 
securities. 
b. Secured creditors are paid off the proceeds of the securities. If they are still impaired, 
they have a claim at the ordinary level. 
c. Generally privileged: salaries up to a limit, certain taxes and 25% of the claims of the first 
creditor filing for insolvency. 
2. Ordinary claims: claims not deemed privileged or subordinated. 
3. Subordinated claims: contractually subordinated debt, interest and related party debt: 
a. Shareholder’s claims owning over 5% of the capital of listed companies and 10% of non-
listed companies. 
b. Claims  of directors, liquidators or lawyers of the company with positions within two years 
before the insolvency declaration. 
c. Subsidiaries of the company and their shareholders.  
4.6. Italy 
The Italian insolvency law has evolved significantly over the last ten years and has shifted the focus from 
“punishing” the company to encouraging the rehabilitation. The insolvency code is laid out in the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1942 amended in 2003 and 2004 by the Manzano Law. Since then, several 
amendments have been taking place including the popular claw backs.  
The insolvency proceedings in Italy are: 
o Liquidation proceedings (fallimento). 
o Compulsory administrative liquidation. 
o Reorganization plan (Article 67). 
o Debt Restructuring agreement. 
o Pre-bankruptcy agreement. 
o Bankruptcy agreement (concordato fallimentare). 
o Extraordinary administration (Prodi and Manzano). 
The Italian law states that insolvency is the inability to meets its obligations in an ordinary manner. 
Additionally, it regards other situations as insolvencies such as the sale of assets below the market price 
to raise cash or when the company pays its creditors in an untypical manner such as the payment in kind 
(PIK). Director might face criminal liability if the company incurs in losses instead of declaring the 
insolvency.  
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The main type of securities for immoveable assets is the mortgage and for the moveable assets is the 
pledge. The latter includes a pegno rotativo (revolving pledge) which is usually attached to shares and 
resembles the floating charge type of UK security. Set off is available.  
The court managing the insolvency is the court of first instance based in the area where the company has 
its centre of interest.  
Below, a summary of the Italian bankruptcy proceeding. 
Figure 11: Italian Bankruptcy Regime 
 
Source: Nomura (2010); author analysis 
4.6.1 Pre Insolvency 
Companies have the liberty to negotiate an out of the court restructuring agreement with its debt and 
equity holders provided there is enough unanimity. There is also a possibility that all these agreements 
are clawed back at a later stage. However, Italian law offers some pre insolvency proceedings that help  
the companies to reach agreements.  
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4.6.1.1 Reorganization plan (Article 67 of the Bankruptcy Act) 
The piano attestato (reorganization plan) is a quick, confidential and out of the court whose aim is to 
rehabilitate the company.  It spins around the restructuring plan proposed by the company which has to 
be validated by a field expert appointed either by the company or by the court. This proceeding has the 
advantage of excluding payments and acts from future claw backs. It is only binding to those creditors 
that have accepted the plan and hence there is no cramdown to other creditors.  
4.6.1.2 Debt Restructuring agreement (Article 182) 
The accordo di ristrutturazione (debt restructuring agreement of the Bankrupcty Act) can be thought of 
prepackaged restructuring proceeding since the plan is agreed between the company and its creditors to 
be implemented after the court approval. The first stage is for the company and the creditors to agree on 
a plan that is validated by the independent expert through a report. Then, creditors have one month to 
contest it or raise objections. Then the court approves or rejects the plan.  
There is a 60 days automatic stay beginning once the publication of the plan has been registered (in the 
registro delle impresse). However, a new law permits the stay to start before the agreement has been 
reached provided the petition has been filed in the court and proves that the agreement is underway with 
at least 60% of the creditors in the negotiation. In this framework, the plan has to be approved by at least 
60% of the creditors by value. The law also contemplates super senior loans as long as they are ratified 
by the court (Nomura 2010).  
In both procedures, super senior lenders are not included in the majorities required to approve the plan. 
4.6.1.3 Pre Insolvency agreement 
The concordato preventivo (pre insolvency agreement) is a proceeding for companies in a financial crisis 
which begins with the debtor filing a plan in the court and validated by a report from an independent 
export. Then, the court decides on whether the company is meeting the conditions to file and then the 
proceeding is opened. There is an automatic stay on all securities that usually lasts until the end of the 
process. A commissioner is appointed to engage with the creditors, to keep them apprised of the details 
of the plan and the date of the hearing. Management stays in control under its supervision.  
The law allows for the segmentation of creditors into different classes. At the creditor’s meeting, the plan 
has to be voted by the majority of creditors or by all classes of creditors and then becomes binding to all. 
Therefore, there is a cramdown on all those creditors that do not support the plan.  
Priority claimholders are not entitled to vote unless they waive their right of priority. There is a provision in 
the law to impair the secured creditors as long as they receive no less than the market value of the 
secured assets and are not unfairly treated versus the unsecured ones. All transactions undertaken 
during the court approved program cannot be clawed back. 
Super senior loans are also permitted provided they are approved by the court and they are not included 
in the majorities for the approval of the agreement by the court.  
The pre insolvency agreement proceeding has to end within the six months (possible 60 days extension) 
of the filing date or otherwise the company could be declared bankrupt. 
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4.6.2 Post insolvency liquidation 
There are two main liquidation processes: 
4.6.2.1 Liquidation proceedings 
The fallimento (liquidation procedure) is used to wind up a company in such a way that looks after the 
rights of the creditors and removes the company from the market. This procedure can be initiated by the 
company, creditors or a public prosecutor. This proceeding is only applicable to companies of a certain 
size in terms of assets, revenues and indebtness. Once the court verifies the company is suitable for 
bankruptcy procedures, management is removed from the company. The company is then taken over by 
a trustee and supervised by the court and creditors appointed by a judge which represent all types of 
claims.  
There is an automatic stay on all securities enforcement allowing the trustee to initiate the clawback 
process unless the counterparty proves that it did not know that the company was insolvent. All 
transactions carried out throughout the restructuring process are not usually clawed back. 
The trustee is tasked to liquidate the assets or sell the debtor as a going concern.  
4.6.2.2 Compulsory administrative liquidation 
The liquidazione coatta amministrative (compulsory administrative liquidation) only applies to supervised 
firms such as insurance companies and banks. It can be initiated by the company, creditor or a public 
prosecutor and the court opens the process if the company is found insolvent. 
The management is removed and the company ceases its business. There is an automatic stay on all 
enforcements. A liquidator is appointed and in charge of informing all creditors about the size of its 
claims. The liquidator presents a plan that is subject to creditors’ approval and can be either a liquidation 
or restructuring. If the plan is rejected, debtor’s assets are sold and all proceeds distributed according to 
the priority order 
4.6.3 Post insolvency restructuring 
We distinguish two different restructuring processes 
4.6.3.1 Bankruptcy agreement  
The concordato fallimentare (bankruptcy agreement) is supervised by a court and it is only applicable 
after the bankruptcy declaration. Creditor or other third parties can initiate presenting a plan during 
bankruptcy procedures. Management is removed and a trustee takes over. 
The plan has to be approved by the majority of the creditors or otherwise, if needed, from the majority of 
creditors classes. Once the plan is taken forward, it becomes binding to all creditors and therefore there is 
a cramdown on the minorities (Gilson 2000).  
4.6.3.2 Extraordinary administration 
The amministratione straordinaria (extraordinary administration) is a restructuring process for big 
insolvent companies which has two ways:  
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o Prodi’s law for companies with a more than 200 employees and total financial leverage of more 
than 2/3 of the assets and more than 2/3 of the revenues of the last fiscal year.  
o Manzano’s law applying to companies with more than 500 employees and financial leverage 
above €300mn. 
Both regimes can be used provided that the company proves the viability of the business through either 
the sale of the business in a year or a rehabilitation plan in less than two years. 
We briefly describe now the Manzano procedure. To begin the procedure, the company must apply to the 
Minister of Economic Development and the assigned court. The Minister supervises all the proceeding. 
The Minister then decides to take this procedure forward and keeps the court well informed about his 
decisions. A commissioner is appointed by the Minister who is in charge of proposing a financially 
restructuring plan to the Minister over the next 3 months.  
There is a stay on all enforcement carried out by creditors, both secured and unsecured and the 
commissioner can initiate claw back anytime. He also replaces management. New debt raised over the 
proceeding is granted with privileged status and ranks as credito prededucibile. 
The rehabilitation plan must be approved by the Minister and by the majority of the creditors or by the 
different classes becoming binding to all creditors ie crawdown on dissenting creditors 
4.6.4 Priority of payments 
The ranking is as follows: 
1. Super senior claims (fees and expenses associated to the proceeding) and other supported by 
the law (crediti prededucibli) including the post insolvency debt and the 80% of the shareholder’s 
loans within the debt restructuring agreement and the pre insolvency agreement. 
2. Privileged claims of government for judicial expenses. 
3. Secured claims. 
4. Pledge or mortgage secured claims. 
5. Unsecured claims. 
4.7 Ireland 
The Irish Insolvency law is articulated through the Companies Acts 1963-2006. Recently it has been 
supplemented by case law. The main proceedings are: 
o Creditors’ voluntary winding up. 
o Compulsory court liquidation (official liquidation). 
o Receivership. 
o Examinership. 
o Schemes of Arrangement. 
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Let us go over them a little more in depth.  
In Ireland, it is the High Court and Supreme Court of Dublin who manage the insolvency procedure in 
Ireland even though it can be sometimes conducted by the Circuit Court. Immoveable property can only 
be secured by fixed charge as a 2009 act removed the mortgage as an immoveable property based 
security. The Irish insolvency law also provides for floating charges that can be attached to both an 
immoveable or a moveable assets but has less seniority than the fixed charge. Lien and pledge are also 
common securities for moveable assets. 
Insolvency is defined twofold: balance sheet test looking at whether the value of liabilities exceeds the 
value of assets and a cash flow test asking if the debtor can pay its debt as it comes due.  
Management will not be held guilty if they are found to be running an insolvent company under the belief 
that they can overcome the financial difficulties. If they are found guilty, then they can be suspended from 
becoming directors of another company for up to 5 years and also face criminal charges for that. 
Below, a summary of the Irish bankruptcy process. 
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Figure 12: Irish Bankruptcy Regime 
 
Source: Nomura (2010); author analysis 
4.7.1 Pre Insolvency 
In general Irish law does not contemplate exclusively formal pre insolvency proceedings. The main 
procedures address insolvent or close to insolvency companies. 
4.7.2 Liquidation procedures 
There are three main liquidation proceedings: 
4.7.2.1 Creditors’ voluntary liquidation 
This is an out of the court proceeding in which directors believe the company is not able to pay its debt 
and apply for a winding up resolution. This proceeding is independent of the court. To initiate the 
proceeding, an extraordinary general meeting must pass the resolution and at the same time hold a 
meeting with creditors. At this meeting, a liquidator is appointed and management is removed. There is 
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no stay. The liquidator then disposes the assets and distributes the proceeds in line with the priority of 
payments. 
4.7.2.2 Compulsory court liquidation 
 It is a court-led liquidation proceeding. It can be initiated by the debtor or the creditors. To commence the 
procedure, the claiming party has to apply it to the High Court resulting in a more lengthy and expensive 
procedure than the previous one. Throughout the process, creditors are not allowed to enforce their 
securities unless permitted by the High Court. Fixed charge secured assets are not included within the 
liquidation fund. Creditors with large debt in the company are usually advised to hire a receiver to dispose 
their secured assets as the liquidator charges a 4% tax on all assets. 
4.7.2.3 Receivership 
This proceeding is characterized by the appointment of a receiver by secured debt holder to dispose his 
assets. This receiver is tasked with selling these assets at the best price for the creditors. This procedure 
is not a formal collective insolvency proceeding. Once the receivership has been operating for more than 
3 days, an examinership restructuring cannot be initiated upon the company. Under this scheme, secured 
creditors enjoy a great deal of power as they appoint a receiver to shorten the period to enforce their 
securities as opposed to the more lengthy examinership procedure 
4.7.3 Restructuring procedures 
4.7.3.1 Examinership 
This rehabilitation procedure was incorporated in the Company Act 1990 to help the companies cope with 
financial difficulties to pay off their debt. To enter in this proceeding, the company must have a 
reasonable chance to be rehabilitated as a going concern (Nomura 2010).  
To initiate this proceeding, a formal petition has to filed to the High Court by the company, directors, 
creditors or even employees than own at least 10% of the voting capital. This petition has to be supported 
by a official report from an accountant stating that the company has a good likelihood to emerge from the 
examinership as going concern.11
During this procedure, there is a stay on all creditors giving the examiner enough time to look into the 
company and evaluate the likelihood of the company to come out of the proceeding as a going concern 
by formulating a scheme of arrangement. The latter usually engages an investor willing to buy the assets 
along with a “haircut” of debt across the whole capital structure. The examiner has between 70 to 100 
days (the duration of the stay) to come up with a plan to convince shareholders and creditors to agree on 
the scheme of arrangement. The examiner is also allowed to all fixed and floating charge attached assets 
as long as they are not crucial for the survival of the company.
 
12
                                                          
11  If the accountant document is not available upon filing petition, the court might appoint an examiner for up to 10 days until the 
report is delivered. 
 However, he has to count on the court 
approval or the affected creditors. Fixed charge assets proceeds are used to repay the debt whereas the 
floating charge ones entitle the creditors to have a charge over the sale’s proceeds.  
12  It can also sell the assets attached t o lease finance agreements, or retention of title claims. 
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To take the scheme forward, the examiner must hold meetings with every single class of creditors and 
shareholders. The former are divided into different classes (secured, unsecured, preferential creditors, 
employees etc) and vote in their committees. The voting mechanism is by value and number. 
Should at least one impaired class of creditors accept the scheme, the examiner can apply for it to the 
court and makes it binding to all creditors, including the dissenting ones, so there is some sort of 
cramdown. 
If the scheme is not approved by at least one class of creditors or is rejected by the court, a liquidator or 
receiver is appointed to initiate the winding up of the company. Recently, the procedure has been used to 
implement a pre pack.  
4.7.3.2 Scheme of Arrangement 
The Irish law also includes a scheme of arrangement to help achieve an agreement between the 
company, creditors and shareholders. To initiate, a petition has to be filed to the High Court by either the 
company or the creditors and counts on a majority in number and 75% in value of the creditors. There is 
no automatic stay. It lies at the court discretion reason why this scheme is not as usual as the 
examinership.  
4.7.4 Priority of Payments 
The priority of payments is as follows: 
1. Examiner’s costs, remuneration and expenses. 
2. Payments to holders of fixed charges. 
3. Approved, certified expenses due to creditors which were incurred during the examinership 
period. 
4. Costs and winding-up expenses. 
5. Fees due to the liquidator. 
6. Some social insurance contributions7. Preferential debts (employee liabilities and other 
taxes such as VAT, corporation and income tax). 
8. Payments to holders of floating charges. 
9. Unsecured creditors. 
5. Country comparison 
Having explained in detail each country insolvency framework, we now conduct a country to country 
comparison to better grasp which regimes are more secured or unsecured creditors friendly, which 
regimes aim to preserve the value of the business whilst the debt is restructured and which regimes 
attempt to reach a fair restructuring agreement. 
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5.1 Liquidation procedures 
To make a comparison of the liquidation processes, we look at the different priority of payments. The 
most important difference among regimes is the priority given to: 
o Secured creditors. 
o Insolvency related expenses (legal, administration, etc). 
o Employee wage claims and pensions. 
o Post insolvency debt. 
Based on the table beneath, we can draw the following conclusions: 
1. Secured creditors are placed at the top of the priority ranking in England and Wales and 
Germany. In these jurisdictions, the secured creditors do not even contribute to the 
liquidation expenses or employee wages. On a ceteris paribus basis, their recovery 
should much higher than those of other regimes. 
2. Employees are ranked first in France and Spain and to a lesser extent US that grants 
some priority over secured claims. These jurisdictions regard the employees as 
stakeholders whose rights have to be upheld. 
3. Insolvency proceedings related expenses are ranked at the top in Italy and Spain. These 
are the jurisdictions where the creditor’s recovery is very much subject to the amount of 
fees and expenses of the liquidation.  
4. Some regimes, especially US but others such as Germany, France, England and Wales 
and Italy, provide for some post insolvency financing.   
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Source: author  
 
 
Order of Payments
`
US Post insolvency financing
Insolvency procedure 
expenses, certain 
taxes
Limited wage claims Secured claims Unsecured claims
England and 
Wales
Secured claims with 
fixed charge
Insolvency procedure 
expenses and post 
insolvency financing
Employee wages and 
pension rights
Limited fund for 
unsecured creditors
Secured creditors with 
floating charges Unsecured creditors
Germany Secured claims
Insolvency procedure 
expenses, post 
insolvency financing 
and pre insolvency 
contracts claims
Unsecured claims
France Employees wages
Insolvency procedure 
expenses and post 
insolvency financing
Post insolvency 
financing (conciliation 
process)
Secured claims Post insolvency claims Pledges without retention rights
Taxes, unsecured 
claims
Italy
Insolvency procedure 
expenses and post 
insolvency financing
Privileged claims of 
government for judicial 
expenses
Secured claims Unsecured claims
Spain
Insolvency procedure 
expenses, post 
insolvency financing 
and wages
Secured claims
Limited employee 
wages, taxes and 25% 
of the claims of first 
creditor to file for 
insolvency
Unsecured claims
Ireland Insolvency procedure expenses
Secured claims with 
fixed charge
Other costs and 
expenses Taxes
Secured creditors with 
floating charges Unsecured creditors
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5.2 Rehabilitation procedures 
All regimes pursue the same objective, either a restructuring of the debtor as a going concern, or an 
orderly and fair liquidation, the details of each procedures differ significant between each other. We look 
at the main criteria for a comparison analysis: 
o The situation for entry in the proceeding. 
o The stay. 
o Who has the control over the proceeding. 
o The level of majority to have the rehabilitation plan approved. 
o Cramdown. 
o Post insolvency financing. 
Needless to say, this is not an in depth list but aims at capturing what we consider the key difference 
among the different jurisdictions. The table below displays the main restructuring procedure in each 
regime.  
o Entry condition: most jurisdictions impose that the company be insolvent before it can apply for 
any restructuring proceeding. In US and Italy, the company can be solvent and be eligible for a 
restructuring procedure. In France on the contrary, the firm must be solvent. 
o The stay: most countries provide for a stay on unsecured creditors. in US is automatic. In some 
other cases, the court must grant the stay. In some other regimes, the stay is also extended to 
secured creditors. For instance in UK, only the administration out of the three formal procedures, 
has a stay on all creditors enforcements. 
o Control: most of the regimes keep the management when the company enters the restructuring 
procedure except for  Germany, England and Wales that removes the management 
o Voting level: the threshold of agreement between creditors to approve the plan can take very 
different forms. The main condition is that it has to be a majority in terms size of claims and 
numbers of creditors. This is the requirement for Germany, Spain and England and Wales. In 
US, and France, this minimum levels increases to a 2/3 majority by value. The most demanding 
ones are the UK scheme of arrangements and CVA procedures with 75% and 75.1% 
respectively. By all means, the higher the threshold, the more difficult it become for the plan to go 
ahead. 
o Cramdown: only US has a comprehensive cramdown law whereby the court can overrule or 
ignore the dissenting creditors provided they have not been treated unfairly and the absolute 
priority rule is respected. Some other jurisdictions have softer versions of that where dissenting 
creditors vote all in the same class. As Nomura (2010) says, the English scheme of arrangement 
cramdown can be regarded as cram-in where the majority of creditors in a class can bind the 
dissenting creditors. Cramdowns are also allowed in Germany, Spain and France but the lack of 
comprehensiveness in the implementation have inherent risks for all stakeholders 
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o Priority post insolvency loans: the grant of the priority status to the post insolvency financing is 
becoming more common in many jurisdictions. It is the case in US, England and Wales, France, 
Germany, Spain and Italy. Nonetheless, the rank in priority list varies across each country. In UK 
or instance, these post insolvent loans are only senior to the floating charge and unsecured 
credit.  
6 EU insolvency regimes 
Since the EU was created, there have always been discussions over the insolvency law to be applied in 
companies with interests across different EU countries. This situation encouraged companies to look for 
the best insolvency regimes in Europe to protect their rights (the so called “forum shopping”). 
To set out some basic rules to govern the cross border insolvencies, the EU implemented the EC 
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 2000 in 2002 which refers to all members except for Denmark. 
This law is not meant to put all insolvency regimes under the same umbrella but to let the each country to 
embrace the insolvency framework of other EU countries. This regulation only rules the collective 
insolvency proceedings and leaves out the informal or private proceedings as well as the insolvency on 
credit institutions and insurance companies (O’Kane 2010).  
This new EU law sets out two layers of insolvency procedures:  
o Main proceedings: the insolvency procedure must be governed by the country insolvency law. To 
accomplish so, main proceedings and their effects in the country in which the procedure is 
opened, are recognized across the EU.  
o Secondary proceedings: they can be implemented in any EU country in which the company has 
enough presence but in some instances they are subordinated to the main proceedings. 
The main proceedings are opened in the country where the debtor has its centre of main interest (COMI). 
The regulation sets out two main requisites to identify the COMI: it is thought to be the location of the 
registered office unless proven otherwise; it should be the location where the company manages the 
administration of its main interests. However, these two criteria have somehow turned out to be a bit 
vague which has allowed the companies to move the COMI to other more favorable jurisdictions. In some 
instances, it has been up to the local courts where the main proceedings are opened to solve situations in 
which the location of the registered office and the location where the company conducts the 
administration of its interests are different.  
The pivotal point of the new rule is to enable the company to open its main proceedings in the countries 
where the COMI is based and therefore, the first party to call the main proceedings assigns the state 
which will conduct the process (the so called “first mover advantage). Appeals by other parties attempting 
to open the proceedings in other countries are ultimately heard by the European Court of Justice  
Secondary proceedings are usually opened in a non COMI country and concerns over the liquidation of 
local subsidiaries or the disposal of assets. The prerequisite is that the company has an “establishment” 
in the country. These proceedings can be opened by the office holder in the main proceedings or by 
creditors for instance under most of the European Insolvency laws (Jefferies 2003). 
This new EU regulations allow to manage the insolvency of a company registered in a EU country but 
operations EU wide. This regulation aims at companies at an entity level and not at corporate groups with 
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a holding company in a EU country and subsidiaries in other markets. In this case, each entity has its own 
COMI. This might result in each entity with its own main proceedings in a different EU member.  
In spite of this rule being aimed at reducing the forum shopping, we have witnessed many companies 
moving their COMI to UK to benefit from its wide range of insolvency proceedings.13
Companies then seek to locate their COMI in a favorable jurisdiction. Creditors must be aware of that and 
negotiates adequately the “COMI covenants” in the credit documentation. According to Nomura (2010), 
elements which underpin the COMI status are: it has the registered office and is incorporated there; 
operations and assets are based there; board meeting are held there; creditors’ meeting take place there; 
funding and finance are supplied there.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 It must be noted that EU insolvency regulations exclusively apply to collective insolvency proceedings. In UK, this includes the 
CVA, administration and mandatory winding up but no schemes of arrangement. 
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Source: author  
`
Restructuring 
Proceeding Entry Condition Stay Control Voting Threshold Crawmdown
Priority of post 
insolvency loans
US Chapter 11 None Yes, automatic and comprehensive Management
50% by number  and 
66.7% by value Yes Yes
Scheme of 
Arrangement(1)
None No Management Majority in number and 75% by value Yes No
Administration Insolvent Yes, automatic and comprehensive Administrator 50% by value Yes Yes
CVA None No(2) Management More than 75% by value Yes No
Germany Insolvency plan Insolvent
Not automatic for 
preliminary period. Stay 
automatic when main 
proceedings open. Not 
comprehensive
Insolvency 
Administration(3)
50% in number and 
value
Yes, subject to some 
conditions on fairness
Yes, but only preferred 
creditor status
France Safeguard Solvent company facing financial headwinds
Yes, automatic and 
comprehensive Management
66.7% by value of two 
committees Yes Limited
Extraordinary 
Adminstration
Large company 
insolvent Yes, comprehensive
Judge/government 
appointed 
commissioners
Tribunal approval Yes Yes
Restructuring 
Agreement None Yes, comprehensive
(4) Management 60% by value No Yes(5)
Spain Anticipated Creditors' Agreement Insolvent
Yes, only on unsecured 
creditors Management
50% of unsecured 
creditors Yes Yes, but limited
Ireland Examinership Insolvent Yes, only on unsecured creditors Examiner
At least 50% by number 
and value in at least one 
class
Yes No
(1) We choose this as the most similar procedure to Chapter 11. (2) Except for small
companies. (3) It is possible but unusual for self-administration to be allowed in which case 
management stays in control but this is the exception rather than the rule. (4) After petition has been filed with a bankruptcy court informing it that restructuring talks are under way 
with the creditors representing at least 60% of the total credits. (5) Recent revisions in the code allow for loans provided by banks and financial institutions to have priority status.
England & 
Wales
Italy
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7 Conclusions 
To many practitioners, the US insolvency law is predicated on the idea that it is better to rehabilitate 
distressed companies and preserve their value rather than filing the company for liquidation to pay off the 
creditors. Chapter 11, by far the most popular bankruptcy framework, is both creditor and debtor friendly. 
It is debtor oriented because management is allowed to stay in the company and push for a restructuring 
plan through. It is also creditor friendly because of the strong involvement of senior and junior creditors in 
the process under a tight control by all stakeholders. Chapter 11 attempts to maximize the chances of the 
company to emerge as a going concern whilst it aims to look after the rights and the economics of all 
creditors, regardless of the class.  
All major jurisdictions (Germany or France) have felt the influence of the US bankruptcy law in order to 
enhance their rehabilitation proceedings but they still lack the consistency and success of a framework 
which has been active since 1978. Market participants have already tested the framework throughout this 
period and they are aware of the advantages and disadvantages providing significant clarity on the 
process which might14
The England and Wales procedures are very comprehensive and bespoke. However, to fully benefit from 
these schemes one needs to understand the restructuring, the creditors and the intended agreement. It is 
definitely a case by case basis. Administration is not usually a helpful rehabilitating procedure as 
management is replaced and the stay is not as thorough as that in Chapter 11. However, it has been 
lately used as pre pack sale where the rehabilitating agreement has been reached before the company 
enters administration allowing management to transfer the assets to the administrator who will look to sell 
them. CVA is not a common restructuring framework as it cannot bind secured creditors without their 
consent (Frye 2002). Nonetheless it is a helpful tool to restructure the debt since all unsecured creditors 
vote as one making it easier than the scheme of arrangement. The latter has traditionally been used by 
large restructuring corporations. This proceeding allows management to stay in the company, bind 
dissenting secured creditors and reasonably rid itself from out of the money creditors enabling the 
company to normally operate and restructure its capital structure. The court does not significantly engage 
in the process (unless disputes prompt them in) and keep insolvency related fees low as the process 
usually takes less than 3-4 months. Overall, all the proceedings are still “imperfect” versus Chapter 11 as 
the stay is not as comprehensive, there are constraints for the administrator to secure super priority 
financing and cramdown on dissenting creditors is not as obvious as in Chapter 11.  
 lower the overall risk premium and financing costs (and hence the WACC) for 
distressed companies heading into Chapter 11.  
In Germany, despite the implementation of the new insolvency law more prone to rehabilitation, distress 
companies have usually followed the winding up path where the recovery for creditors is usually 
prioritized before the restructuring of companies. It is striking given the enhancing features of the new 
legislation including the stay or the cramdown framework The out of the court restructuring are not very 
common given the company needs full agreement with its creditors. Additionally, management is bound 
by law to file within the first three weeks of the company becoming insolvent and thus restraining them to 
find the adequate plan to rehabilitate the company. This is the main reason why German companies 
transfer their COMI to jurisdictions such as UK to apply for out of the court proceedings (scheme of 
arrangements).  
                                                          
14  The purpose of our  thesis. 
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France’s insolvency law has traditionally been considered a debtor friendly proceeding as a result of the 
long stay and the limited power by the creditor through the insolvency process. However, new steps such 
as the safeguard procedure has boosted creditor rights and allowed them to exert more influence in the 
process.  
The Italian bankruptcy law stands out as a complex one with many procedures which have undergone 
several amendments to render them more restructuring oriented. It is regarded as fairly debtor friendly 
due to the long stay on secured creditors. However, proceedings such as the extraordinary administration 
for large companies see the management leaving the company for an administrator.  
Spain is a different story versus some of its western peers. The new insolvency is hardly used and 
restructuring is usually undertaken on an informal and out of the court basis. There seems to be some 
weak knowledge of the insolvency law. Banks are obliged to provision against future losses during the 
insolvency procedure. Furthermore, banks are usually the main providers of financing for corporates on a 
secured basis making the recovery fairly high in a liquidation scenario discouraging them from supporting 
any corporate rehabilitation. The new laws are also quite lengthy in general extending the insolvency 
process several months (even years) which gradually erode the value of the company and hence the 
recovery for creditors.  
Finally, Ireland is a secured creditor friendly jurisdiction. The stay is usually short and secured creditors 
can resort to a receiver to enforce their securities and avoid the court. It also includes restructuring 
oriented proceedings such as the examinership that offers a maximum of 100 day period stay from 
creditors as well as a cramdown mechanism. This process is quite fast and in the even of failure a 
liquidator/receiver is appointed. This procedure has been extensively used by companies and become 
very familiar amongst creditors and lawyers.  
In our empirical model in section 3 we will seek to validate our theoretical thoughts over these bankruptcy 
proceedings under the distressed cost of capital framework and support the Chapter 11 efficiency thesis.  
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SECTION 2 
There is plenty of literature about the cost of capital but very little theoretical and empirical research about 
the impact of distress on the WACC. A distress corporate deal is intricate by its own nature due to the 
several moving parts that interplay with each other (credit and operating creditors, shareholders, 
management etc). The agency cost and the asymmetry information is very significant (Myers, Majluf 
1983) as the management have information that the rest of the other counterparties do not. Management 
do know whether the company is worth the restructuring/liquidation whereas the rest of the parts remain 
in the “dark” until management takes an action. And even during the restructuring process, management 
enjoy a privileged information that gives rise to under/over investment / debt overhang problems ( 
Modigliani/Miller, 1963) and investors do not hold the information to make the right decision15. 
Additionally, each restructuring regimes has its own bias towards restructuring (from the debtor friendly 
Chapter 11 to the credit friendly UK restructuring code) which challenges the dichotomy between the 
shareholders’ vs the stakeholders’ approach16
Another interesting topic is that the restructuring process aims to maximize the value of the firm and this 
is consistent with efficiency (Jensen/Meckling, 1976). This is what we attempt to determine in our 
empirical exercise. To what extent, the market prices based WACC captures the efficiency of the 
rehabilitation framework of the company that is supposed to maximize the value of the company. If the 
company is rehabilitated, its value has been maximized for all stakeholders. Otherwise, the firm should be 
liquidated and the proceeds be distributed to the senior creditors whose collateral has a claim on the 
company assets. It is interesting how the traditional theory of the cost of capital bodes well with our 
empirical analysis on the Distressed WACC and how the agency costs and the asymmetric information 
are exacerbated during the restructuring process.  
.   During a restructuring several outcome determine the 
fate of the company. In some instances management is remained in place and still pursues the traditional 
dual profit/market value maximisation (Modigliani/Miller 1959) but in some other cases, they just want to 
survive somewhat and they just look after their own interests (adverse selection; asymmetric information). 
In some other instance, management is removed, a special team is placed on board and then the 
rehabilitation tends to look out for all stakeholders rights by maximizing the overall value of the company.  
More than in any other case, agency costs are real (Jensen/Meckling, 1976) and represent huge costs in 
distress. Whether the company needs new debt or new equity from current or new investors is only 
objectively assessed by the management who holds insider information and knows the fate of the firm. 
Investors are just players in a game with many outcomes (Stern 2006).  
We first briefly outline the theoretical underpinning of the cost of capital decomposing its main factors 
which will enable us to conduct our empirical exercise, the cornerstone of this section.  
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Somehow it is a game theory problem.  
16 The former is predicated on the protection of the shareholders’ interest and the latter on the protection of the interests of all 
stakeholders as a whole.  
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1 The Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
The Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) is a key concept in Corporate Finance. It is used as an 
estimation of the price that the company pays for holding capital in its business. It is the rate that a 
company is supposed to pay on average to all its security providers17
It is also used as a discount rate to find the NPV of the expected free cash flows generated by the assets 
of the firm to calculate the value of the firm (Sharpe 1964).  
 for financing its assets. 
Below a summary of the WACC as a discount rate within the discounted cash flow valuation framework. 
Figure 13: Discount Cash Flow Valuation 
 
Source: Damodarán (2005) 
Below the WACC formula (Farber 2006): 
WACC = D / (D+E+Pe)*rd (1-T) + E / (D+E+Pe)*re  + Pe / (D+E+Pe)rpe 
D = Market Value of debt 
E= Market Value of equity 
Pe = Market Value of preferred equity 
                                                          
17 Common and preferred equity, senior and junior debt etc. 
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re = Cost of equity 
rd = Cost of debt 
rpe = Cost of preferred equity 
t = Corporate Income tax rate 
Generally speaking, a firm’s assets are financed through equity and debt. WACC is the weighted average 
cost of these financing sources, each of which is weighted by its use at any point in time. By weighting the 
average, one can see how much the company is paying for every dollar it finances.  
Our mission here is to thoroughly explain the market price based WACC as the more realistic and 
accurate WACC for trading companies in general and distressed firms in particular. We will see how 
distorting and inaccurate book based WACC could turn out to be for distressed companies.  
1.1 Major pitfall in the academic WACC 
The capital weights that we use to estimate the WACC obviously affect the result. Academics tend to 
focus exclusively in the debt and equity instruments and treat hybrids (preferred stock, mandatory 
convertible bonds, Tier 1 bonds, etc) as either pure equity or debt and assign the same rate of return. 
This is the first pitfall. Equity like instruments are of different nature relative to the common equity and so 
are the expected returns and therefore hybrids should be accounted for separately within the cost of 
capital.   
Once we have broken down the capital structure between equity, hybrids and debt, we come up with the 
weighting. One weighting source could be the total amount of these three financing holdings in the 
balance sheet. We could calculate the weights by determining the amount that each source represents in 
the overall capital structure. Academics and practitioners tend to use the book value instead of the market 
value. This is the second pitfall. 
The main problem with book value weights is that the balance sheet capital sources are historical and not 
based on current market values18. This is even more relevant in distressed companies trading for 
instance at discount to book / NAV19
It is then very important to always use market values or at least a proxy of the implied market value. The 
main reason is that book values show the historical amount of securities placed in the market whereas 
the market values show the current amount of outstanding securities in the market.  
 given the expected recovery of the equity is lower than the amount 
recorded in the balance sheet. The market continuously calculates the value of each capital source at any 
given point in time so market values are more accurate and appropriate. The calculation of market value 
weights is similar to that of book value weights but we must first estimate the market value of the capital 
sources which is, in some instances, an intricate process. 
                                                          
18 Book value is acceptable in some circumstances if the value was recorded when interest rates were similar to today or the credit 
rating of the company was similar.  
19  NAV: Net Asset Value;  meaning that the equity is worth less than the value booked in the balance sheet 
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In our sample in section 3 of our thesis we have used public companies so it is fairly straightforward to get 
hold of the market value of equity, which is the market capitalization20
• There are no historical prices of debt in any database at the time. 
. For the debt and hybrids is 
become a more difficult task as: 
• Some company's bonds or other form of debt such as commercial paper, revolving credit facilities 
or senior debt do no trade in the market. 
To estimate market values is always a challenging process but we still prefer to estimate the market value 
of the financing sources rather than relying on the book values. We will lay out our assumptions and 
methodologies to fairly estimate market values for the different WACC components. 
1.2 Market Value of debt 
There are three approaches to estimate the market value of debt 
1.2.1. Probability of default 
We adjust the book value of debt for the probability of default by using S&P historical cumulative 
probability of default for American corporates (Damodaran 2005). 
Dmarket = Dbook * (1-Pd)  
being the Pd=Probability of default. 
                                      Source: Moody’s (2007) and author 
 
 
                                                          
20  Adjusted for the preference shares. 
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1.2.2. Bond approach 
This approach consists on converting the book value of debt into market value by considering each 
tranche of debt in the balance sheet as a coupon bond with a coupon set equal to the interest of the debt 
instrument and then value this coupon bond at the cost of debt of the company at the time. Once we have 
the market values of the different debt instruments, we calculate the weighted average to come up with 
the debt weighting in the capital structure. We stick to the same rationale to estimate the market value of 
the hybrids. Then  
Market value of debt = Interest expense*[(1-(1/(1+cost of debt)^maturity) / cost of debt] +Book value of debt / 
(1/(1+cost of debt)^maturity 
This is the method that we will use in our empirical analysis. 
1.2.3 Merton Model 
This model aims to assess the credit risk of a firm by featuring the firm's equity as a call option over all its 
assets (London Business School 2008).  
Let Et be the equity value at date t, Dt the debt value, Vt the enterprise value, F the face value of the firm's 
only zero coupon debt maturing at T, σ the volatility of the enterprise value, Pt(T) the price at t of a zero 
coupon bond that pays $1 at T and N(d) the normal cumulative distribution function evaluated at d: 
Et = VtN(dt) - Pt(T)FN(dt- σ*(T-t)^(1/2)) 
where dt=(Ln(Vt)-Ln(Pt(T)F)/(σ*(T-t)^(1/2)) + 0.5σ*(T-t)^(1/2)) 
and Dt=Vt-Et 
This is just an application of the Black and Scholes formula for pricing a European call option. We make 
the following assumptions for that: 
• V, the Enterprise value, follows a log normal distribution with a constant volatility (σ):dV=µPVpdt+ 
σPVPdz. 
• Interest rate r is constant: Pt(T)=(exp(r*T-t)))-1 
• Trading takes place on a continuous basis. 
• Financial markets are perfect. 
To get Vt we can do a DCF valuation (in case of distress we could do a liquidation value) of the company. 
To get σ we could use the weighted average of debt and stock volatility. Once we have Vt and Et we can 
back out our market value of Dt. 
It is quite obvious that the amount of assumptions to carry out this method makes it very time unrealistic. 
Therefore, in practice it is barely used and only provides a rough approximation for the value of the equity 
and hence the value of debt. We will only use it as a marginal approach in our empirical project in section 
3.  
70 
 
However, it is worth mentioning that under this approach where we are deriving our market value of debt 
by subtracting the value of the firm and the equity and in a distress scenario, the equity is worth more 
than the difference between the firm and the book value of debt. This is due to the fact that the 
stockholders enjoy the option to default the company and hence the market value of debt is always lower 
than its book value. 
In the next section we go about our WACC analysis and we start breaking down each of the components 
of the WACC under the CAPM framework, the theoretical cornerstone of our empirical project.  
2 Cost of debt (COD) 
The cost of debt is the effective rate that the firm pays for holding debt in the balance sheet. Given that 
the interest bearing debt is tax deductible, the after tax cost of debt is mostly used in the WACC.  
There are two ways to calculate the cost the cost of debt: 
2.1 Bond approach 
This approach is useful for public bond funded companies with little bank debt in their balance sheet. We 
treat all debt as a coupon bond and we back out the cost of debt (Kd) by using the formula for valuing a 
bond: 
where 
Vb = Value of the bond 
C = Coupon 
Kd = Cost of debt 
FV = Face value at maturity 
N = Maturity 
Note that the interest expense is tax deductible so our Kd is: 
 
2.2 CAPM style approach 
The after tax cost of debt is calculated as follows: 
(Risk Free Asset + Debt spread)*(1-T) 
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This is the CAPM type of cost of equity calculation bringing the return above the RFA (Risk Free Asset) 
into the cost of debt. We break out the formula to understand each moving par. 
2.2.1 Risk Free Asset (RFA) 
The Risk Free Asset (RFA) in an investment is what the investors should earn in the long term on a risk 
free basis. The 10yr Treasury bond of the country where the company operates is the most common RFA 
given: 
o The sovereign likelihood of default is usually low and supposedly lower than that of a corporate21
o The 10tr Treasury bond is more liquid than the 30yr T bond and best matches the discounted 
cash flows analysis in any valuation exercise.  
. 
o It is less susceptible to unexpected changes in inflation and the liquidity premium, which may 
affect more yields on longer term bonds. 
If the company operated in the different countries/markets, the RFA should be the weighted average of 
the 10yr Treasury bonds (in terms of revenues, Ebitda, or assets) of the countries where the company 
has presence on.  
Please note that risk free asset should be consistent with the cash flows, therefore if we discount nominal 
/ real cash flows we should use the nominal / real risk free rate.  
2.2.2 Debt Spread  
The debt spread is the effective margin above the RFA that a company pays for not being risk free and 
use debt financing. There are three ways to estimate the debt spread: 
• Use the book values in the balance sheet and P&L: divide the cash and non cash interest items 
in the P&L by the on and off balance sheet debt including securitization, operating leases, etc. 
• Use the credit default spread (CDS) of the company that trades in the market22
• If the company is not rated, calculate the synthetic rating of the company and assign the spread 
of the rating.  
. 
The first method allows to quickly estimating the current spread that the company pays for its current debt 
holding. This is the current cost of financing. However, the spread might not properly account for the 
current credit status of the company as the debt could have been recorded in the balance sheet long23
                                                          
21  We emphasize “supposedly” as many sovereigns have defaulted over the last 20 yrs (Argentina, Colombia, etc) undermining the 
thesis of the risk free nature of the sovereign bonds. 
 
before the company’s credit health weakened. This is the historical interest cost, the book value cost of 
the debt financing. 
22  Which effectively shows the price of insuring debt in the event of a default?. 
23  Fixed long term interest bearing debt is not easy to be repriced up if the company’s credit health worsens as it was set upon the 
inception of the debt contract between the lenders and the borrower so lenders sometime enjoy limited power to revise up their 
loans/bonds spreads if the loan documentation does not provide it for. 
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The second method gives the current market perception of the credit risk of the company and the price 
that the company should pay for its debt. It effectively shows the recovery of the debt in the event of a 
default. It is a market price for insuring the debt of an issuer and therefore accurately reflects the market 
perception of the financial risk of the issuer. The main constraint here is that some companies do not 
have CDS trading in the market and there are some other forms of debt (in general secured debt such as 
covered bonds, commercial paper, etc) which have no CDS24
The third method is the fundamentally credit driven approach which allows to constantly gauge the credit 
health of the company based on its credit metrics and the fair price that the company should pay for 
taking on debt. It also allows validating or completing the other methods which either lack up to date fair 
prices, or fail to capture the fundamental credit health of the company.  
. Additionally, the CDS, as a derivative, is 
driven by technical or macro factors that sometimes stray from the fundamental credit quality of the 
company. Therefore, to rely on the CDS to estimate the spread means to constantly assess the pricing of 
a derivative and its components which is in some instances turns out difficult and subjective (Goldman 
Sachs 2011). 
In our empirical analysis and for comparison purposes we use the first and third methods. The former 
shows the current market spread at the time of distress or post restructuring25
2.2.2.1 Synthetic rating method 
. The latter allows to 
estimating the fair spread that the company should pay on the basis of its credit metrics. We will also refer 
to the absolute difference between both approaches to account for the market premium/discount 
embedded in the cost of debt. 
This method seeks to estimate the credit rating of a company based on several key credit metrics and as 
a result, assign a fair spread above the RFA for the cost of debt. 
The process is as follows: 
1. Estimation of the implied rating of the company based on key credit metrics. We use the S&P main 
credit metrics to assess the credit health of the company. Below, the average credit metric levels for 
industrial companies over the last 20 years. We use these levels as a reference to estimate the potential 
credit rating. 
 
          Source: S&P and author 
                                                          
24  There are usually two types of corporate CDS: senior unsecured CDS and subordinated CDS. 
25  However, it could be different from the fair cost of debt based on the current credit metrics at the time (approach 3) as the interest 
cost might have not changed for the company for a long time (for example fixed interest loans/bonds). 
Credit 
Rating
Ebit interest  
overage
Ebitda 
interest  
overage
FFO/total 
debt Debt/Ebitda
Return on 
capital
Total 
debt/total 
capital
Free 
operating 
cash flow
Free 
operating 
cash flow
AAA 23,8 25,05 203,3% 0,4 27,6% 12,4% 127,6% 127,6%
AA 19,5 24,6 79,9% 0,9 27,0% 28,3% 44,5% 44,5%
A 8 10,2 48,0% 1,6 17,5% 37,5% 25,0% 25,0%
BBB 4,7 6,5 35,9% 2,2 13,4% 42,5% 17,3% 17,3%
BB 2,5 3,5 22,4% 3,5 11,3% 53,7% 8,3% 8,3%
B 1,2 1,9 11,5% 5,3 8,7% 75,9% 2,8% 2,8%
CCC 0,4 0,9 5,0% 7,9 3,2% 113,5% -2,1% -2,1%
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• Ebit interest coverage: EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes) divided by the total interest 
expense . Ebit is adjusted for non recurring items such as extraordinaries and exceptionals and 
should exclude the operating leases rent which are capitalized (Adjusted Ebit). Interest should 
include cash, non cash and capitalized operating leases rent.  
◦ Objective: assess the ability of the company to pay its interest expense through operating 
income. 
• Ebitda interest coverage: EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and 
Amortization) dividend by the total interest expense. Ebitda is adjusted for non recurring items 
such as extraordinaries and exceptionals and should exclude the operating leases rent which are 
capitalized (Adjusted Ebitda). Interest should include cash, non cash and capitalized operating 
leases rent.  
◦ Objective: assess the ability of the company to pay its interest expense through its cash 
operating income. 
• FFO / Debt:  FFO (Funds From Operations = net income + taxes + nonrecurring items + 
depreciation and amortization) divided by total debt. This ratio compares the profitability of the 
company after interests, taxes and dividends versus its debt. This ratio is a semi cash proxy as it 
does not include cash items such as capital expenditures and change in working capital so it 
might turn out misleading or inaccurate if the company is capital intensive business or fast 
growing. Debt should include all long and short financial debt, capital leases, capitalized 
operating leases and any other off balance sheet financing minus the cash “cushion” after 
subtracting the necessary cash for the daily business of the company.  
◦ Objective: assess the profitability of the company relative to its debt holdings. 
• Debt / Adjusted Ebitda: This ratio shows the leverage of the company in terms of its cash 
operating income.  
◦ Objective: asses the gearing of the company and its operating income generating capacity to 
increase/decrease its debt. 
• Return on Capital: Adjusted Ebit / (Debt + Equity).  This ratio shows the return for the capital 
suppliers of the company before interest, taxes and dividends.  
◦ Objective: asses the return rate for the capital contributors of the company. 
• Total Debt / Total Capital → Debt / (Debt + equity). 
◦ Objective: asses the book gearing in relation to the overall capital of the company.. 
• Free operating cash flows / Total Debt: free operating cash flow (free cash flow before debt 
service, dividends/ stock buybacks and capital raises but after capex, working capital and other 
cash inflow/outflow items). Debt Service includes interest and debt repayments.  
◦ Objective: asses the cash flow generation capacity of the company before the debt and 
equity service. The aim is twofold: evaluate the capability of the firm to cope with the capital 
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service through internal money generation or through additional external capital and the pace 
of deleveraging given its free cash flow generation. 
2. Assign a weighted average rating given the key fundamental credit metrics. We assign a weight to the 
different credit metrics to come up with a blended rating credit for the company. 
 
We assign weightings in terms of its relevance. To our mind and in order of preference, FFO / Debt as the 
cash flow based ratio and Debt / Ebitda as the leverage ratio are the most important ratios. We exclude 
the Free Operating Cash Flow / Debt ratio due to the lack of reliable data to calculate the ratio. 
   3. Assign a spread over RFA on the basis of the blended credit metric. We use the 30 yr median spreads 
from Bloomberg to come up with the spread per rating. 
2.2.3 Taxes 
We use the marginal tax rate instead of the effective tax rate for comparison purposes. The different 
between both stems from some temporary or permanent accountancy deductions which can be regular or 
just one offs and hence difficult to evaluate. If there are some tax losses carried forward we account for 
them in the tax rate 
3 Cost of Equity 
The cost of equity is the theoretical return that the firm should pay to its shareholders to obtain capital 
from them. While the cost of debt for a company is somewhat observable in the market by looking at the 
yield of a bond for example, the cost of equity is not easily observable and must be estimated. There are 
two main approaches: the Gordon model and the CAPM. 
3.1 Gordon model 
It is a version of the popular Gordon / Constant Dividend model. It assumes that the dividend (D) of a 
company grows at constant pace (g).  
where 
Ke = Cost of equity 
Do = Dividend day 0 
D1 = Dividend day 1 
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g = dividend growth rate 
Ve = Market value of equity 
As the dividends are not tax deductible, there is no tax adjustment needed to determine the cost of equity. 
3.2 CAPM 
There are several models to estimate the cost of equity. The choice between them hinges on data 
reliability, model complexity and the treatment of the Equity Risk Premium (ERP).  
Below we show the most common models used by Corporate Finance professional and academics to 
estimate the cost of capital. It is worth noting that they all follow common views about risk and return 
(Damodaran 2008). First, risk is defined in terms of variance in current returns to the expected return. 
Second, risk is also assessed in terms of a  marginal investor who happens to be a diversified one. 26
                
Source: Damodaran (2008) 
 
Third, they all require the same inputs: risk free asset, beta (CAPM or betas in the APM) and the risk 
premiums for a portfolio of non-riskless assets (CAPM or factor risk premiums for the market risk factors 
in the APM and the multi-factor models). All these models are commonly used by financial investors and 
practitioners and all exhibit their own merits and limitations (Fama 1970). For the purpose of our empirical 
exercise and as we will explain later, we will stick to the CAPM model to carry out our WACC project.  
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is often used to estimate a theoretical required rate of return of a 
particular asset, in this case the equity. The model takes into consideration the sensitivity of the asset to 
the non-systematic or market risk (non-diversifiable risk) which is represented by the Beta (β), the 
expected return of the Risk Free Asset (rf) and the Equity Risk Premium (EM). 
 
 
                                                          
26 This allows for the popular risk breakdown between diversifiable (idisioncratyc) and non diversifiable (systemic) risk.  
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To use the CAPM formula in practice we need to figure out the Risk Free Asset (RFA), the market 
portfolio, the expected return (ERP) on the market portfolio and then estimate the beta. 
We undertake the same approach as we have done for the CAPM related cost of debt. We break out the 
formula to walk through the different components of the CAPM 
3.2.1 Equity Risk Premium (ERP) 
The equity risk premium (ERP) is the return above the risk free asset (RFA) that investors demand for 
investing in equities. The estimation of the ERP hinges on the risk aversion of the investors and the 
market risk perception of the equities market.  
In the equities world, any perception of the true and fair value of the stock is a manifestation of the 
prevailing ERP so the ERP cannot be taken for granted or otherwise the estimation of the cost of equity, 
WACC and ultimately the value of a firm can be seriously distorted.  
Under the CAPM and security portfolio theory, how shall we identify the market portfolio?. Again, theory 
and practice at odds: theory states that we should select the basket of all assets that investors can invest 
in. Practitioners advocates for a leading equity index such as S&P 500, or FTSE 100 given we only have 
reliable return data on large stocks to do any analysis and firms themselves own enough of other assets 
(real estate, gold, oil, etc) to argue that the equity index is really a good proxy for the entire market. This 
is suitable for companies with a worldwide footprint. If the company only operates in Spain for example, 
then we would rely on the IBEX 35. 
Before examining the different analytical approaches to estimate the ERP, it is worth discussing the 
determinants of the ERP. Following Damodaran (2008), the main factors are: 
1. Risk aversion: investor age and preference for current consumptions are the key variables.  
2. Economic risk: the health and predictability (inflation, interest rates etc) of the economy are the 
major determinants.  
3. Information: transparency, accuracy and thoroughness in information tends to lower the ERP.  
4. Liquidity: large discounts on equity holdings and transactions costs on holding/trading equity is a 
key driver of ERPs.  
5. Catastrophic risk: event that rarely occurs but could have devastating effects (1929 Great 
Depression, 2008 Credit Crunch, etc).  
3.2.1.1 Estimation of the ERP 
Following Damodaran (2005), there are three main methods to estimate the ERP: 
1. Surveys: consists on surveying multiples investors to ascertain their desired risk premium and 
calculate the averaged premium. This method has a number of limitations: it is not viable to be 
able to survey all investors in the market. Furthermore, there are no limits on reasonability as we 
could find ERP below 0% or as large as 50% and they are very volatile. Ultimately, these surveys 
are usually very short dated so not very representative of the average ERP of a particular period. 
2. Historical premiums: this is the premium that has historically been earned above the RFA. 
Academic and practitioners do not seem to agree on the basics of the historical period; the use of 
Treasury bill or bond rates; the use of the geometric or arithmetic averages. 
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This is the most widely used approach to estimate the equity risk premium. Nonetheless, it usually yields 
different absolute levels as there is no standardized framework for that with numbers ranging from 11% at 
the upper level to 3% at the lower one. Following Damodaran (2008), there are three reasons for that: 
1. Time Period: there is no general agreement about how far in the past the equity risk premium 
should be estimated upon. Below we can observe the standard errors in Historical ERPs: 
 
              Source: Damodaran (2008) 
2. Risk Free Security and Market Index: also, there is no general consensus as to whether compare 
the expected return on equity with treasury bills (short term government bonds) or treasury bonds 
(long term government bonds)27
 
.  
3. Averaging Approach: this refers to whether use the arithmetic or geometric average. This is a 
very sensitive approach as arithmetic average will deliver higher ERPs than geometric 
averages28
As underscored above, the choice between different time periods, risk free and averaging has a 
meaningful impact on the ERP. To prove that, we can observe below the return data on US equities, 
treasury bills and bonds between 1928-2007.  
.  
 
                                                          
27 The fact that the yield curve has been upward sloping in US, the range of ERP values would be very large.  
28 Practitioners tend to use the arithmetic average (if annual returns are no correlated through time and the goal would be to 
estimate the ERP for the following year, it could be best and a less biased estimate) rather than the geometric one. However, there 
are strong arguments to choose the latter according to Damodaran: empirical research indicates that equity returns are negatively 
correlated and hence the arithmetic average return will probably overstate the ERP. On top of that, to use arithmetic averages 
premiums to estimate discount rates which are compounded overtime seems inconsistent. 
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                 Source: Damodaran (2008) 
As one can see, returns and volatilities are very different among the three instruments: 
 
                                      Source: Damodaran (2008) 
From the table, one can back out the ERP by subtracting the arithmetic average return on equities from 
the average return on bills (7.78%) or bonds (6.43%). We can also observe the ERPs running different 
scenarios of time period, risk free and averaging approaches.  
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Source: Damodaran (2008) 
One can quickly note that the premium’s range hovers between 1.51% and 7.78% under the different 
scenarios, supporting the difficulties of correctly estimating the ERP.  
If the process of coming up with a reliable US ERP is not an obvious one, it becomes far more intricate 
when looking at other markets that exhibit more volatility and lack enough long term data. While  
economies such as Germany, France or Italy are regarded as mature countries, their equity markets have 
been traditionally different and fairly thin  compared to that of US29
Dimson, March and Staunton (2006) estimated the ERP for 17 markets between 1900-2005. As it can be 
observed below the geometric average ERP is 4.04%, 48bps lower than that of US. This emphasizes that 
using the historical US ERP for other mature markets will result in a higher cost of capital, all things being 
equal.  
.  
 
 
                                                          
29 These markets have been traditionally comprised by few large companies and many private owned firms.  
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Source: Damodaran (2008) 
However, we cannot forget the dangers of relying on the past. Even if we take a long historical series, the 
ERP will command a significant error. Additionally, using the US equity markets as a reference to 
estimate the ERP for other markets can bias the analysis as it has traditionally been one of the most 
successful equity markets. Thus, it is necessary to account for the country risk premium when we aim to 
estimate the ERP outside US.   
Following Damodaran (2007), there are two main ways to estimate the Country Equity Risk 
Premium (CERP) for other countries outside US: 
o The CERP is the default spread of the 10 yr sovereign bond (CDS – Credit Default Swap) 
or the implied default spread based on the sovereign rating for the country. 
o The CERP is set on the basis of the volatility of the market versus to the US market 
following the formula. 
o CERP = Total Equity Risk Premium (TERP) – US Risk Premium (USRP) 
 TERP=USRP*σ Country Equity / σ US Equity 
o Country ratings: this method is based on the use of the country rating as a measure of 
the default risk. The correlation between the credit (default) risk premium and the ERP is 
very high then it is common that the equity spreads tend to be much higher than those of 
the credit.   Another way to go about it would be to link the bond default spread to the 
volatility of the bond and stock prices in the market.  
o CERP = Default spread on the country bond * σ Country Equity / σ Country Bond 
Now we attempt to estimate the Corporate Equity Risk Premium (CERP2) from the 
Country Equity Risk Premium (CERP). Following Damodaran, there are three main 
approaches 
o Every firm in the country displays equal exposure to the country risk 
 E (Return) = Riskfree Rate + CERP + β (US Premium) 
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o The company is equally exposed to the country risk and to the risk of other 
markets.  
 E (Return) = Riskfree Rate + CERP + Beta (US Premium + CERP) 
o The company is differently exposed to country risk 30
 E (Return) = Riskfree Rate + β (US Premium) + ʎ (CERP)  
 
3. Implied Equity Premiums31
o Implied Equity Risk Premium (IERP) = Expected return on stocks – 10yr RFA  
: this method assumes that the stocks in a market are well priced and 
we can easily back out the expected cash flows (stock buybacks and dividends) and hence, by 
using the internal rate of return, we can estimate the expected rate of return. The main advantage 
of this approach is that it can be updated as often as one wants as the implied equity premium is 
a forward looking number.  
In our empirical exercise, we use historical premiums rather than surveys (which we have not conducted) 
or implied equity risk premiums as this is a back looking forward analysis so the latter will not be very 
useful within the framework of our market based WACC analysis.  
Considering the ERP as a key fundamental and critical parameter in the WACC analysis, we have 
decided to use a standard 5%32 (which is the 4% for the average US ERP using different approaches 
according to Damodaran plus 100bps to account for an extra risk premium under distress) the across US 
and our mature European markets to avoid more bias and subjectivity in an already controversial 
exercise33
                                                          
30  For ʎ we use a weighting based on revenues, Ebitda, assets, etc. 
.  
31 See Appendix 2 for further details.  
32 Interesting is the risk premium exercise conducted by Welch (2008) that gathers a sample of 400 finance professors. They 
estimate one year ERP and the thirty year geometric ERP to be about 5% as of 2007. The typical range recommended in their 
classes is usually 6% (range between 4%-7%). He also shows in his paper that 75% of finance professors stick to the CAPM for 
WACC purposes; 10% uses the Fame French model and 5% the APT model.  
33 Appendix 3 also shows the currently implied ERP and CRP for the S&P and the main European indices as of November 2011. 
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Source: Damodaran (2008) 
Notwithstanding that, we will run sensitivities on our WACC based on different levels of ERP according to 
Damodaran’s findings to evaluate the impact of the ERP absolute level on the WACC.  
3.2.1.2 The importance of the ERP 
In general, practitioners including investment bankers, corporate finance professionals or strategic 
consultants tend to use the arithmetic average of historical risk premiums to calculate the cost of equity to 
derive to the WACC. Notwithstanding that, we should make several caveats to understand the peril of an 
excessive reliance on the historical ERP. 
Generally speaking practitioners use the ERP estimated by well-known services such as Bloomberg or 
Reuters instead of calculating their own ERP as the collection of raw data and the “cleaning up” process 
is tough. Additionally, to rely on this ERP allows using the same ERP across the entire organization and 
thus encouraging consistency in their valuation assessments. However, this approach has disadvantages 
including our lack of knowledge or understanding about the assumptions and estimates to come up with 
the historical ERP (Graham 2005). 
Secondly, it is necessary to estimate an adequate ERP. There are both costs to being too aggressive or 
conservative with calculating the ERP and reason why practitioners tend to use an ERP between 4% to 
6% for the US and developed countries. A too high ERP will render a high cost of equity and WACC and 
consequently a low company’s valuation (under the DCF approach) which could distort the truthful value 
of the future cash flows of the company34
Thirdly, markets stick to the same ERP year after year for both inertia and for the wrongful assumption 
that the ERP does not change significantly through the years. However, this is a perilous assumption as 
.  
                                                          
34  Since the asset’s value is the PV of the future cash flows and the ERP mostly affects the cash flow further out in time so a high 
ERP will render low value on the cash flows of companies with highly potential growth versus companies with more mature assets.  
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ERP changes given the risk aversion of investors and the ongoing developments in the market (turmoil, 
wars, etc) so the ERP has to be constantly up to date to avoid inflating or deflating the WACC.  
3.2.2 Beta 
Beta (β) is the measure of the sensitivity of the asset return to the market return. It measures the 
systematic or non-diversifiable risk or in general the market risk. Generally speaking, a positive (or 
negative) asset’s beta implies that the returns of the assets follow (move negative to) that of the market 
return. 
The formula for the asset’s beta within a portfolio is: 
, 
being 
ra = rate of return on the asset 
rp=rate of return of the portfolio 
cov(ra,rp)= covariance between both rates of returns 
Var(rp)= variance of the portfolio 
Below, we can see the relation between the β, rp ,RFA, and the ra trough the SML (Security Market 
Line).This line represents the expected return rate of an asset as a function of the systematic and non- 
systematic risk (β). 
Figure 14: SML Line 
 
                                                         Source: Author 
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Generally speaking, the company has four different betas: the asset beta when the company is debt free, 
the asset beta when the company is indebted, the equity beta and the debt beta. It is obvious that that the 
asset beta is the same as the liabilities beta and therefore when the company is debt-free the asset beta 
is equal to the equity beta. On the other hand, when the company carries debt, the equity beta must 
match the liability beta. The latter is estimated through the weighted average of the equity and debt betas.  
We follow Mascareñas (2007) rationale to estimate our levered equity beta. 
In order to get to the equity beta of a indebted company, we start from these two statements: 
• According to Modigliani and Miller (MM), the value of a company (VL) is equal to the values of its 
assets when the company is debt free plus (Vu) the present value of the tax shield (td). Therefore, 
the value of an indebted company is VL=Vu+td. 
• On the other hand if we contemplate the company from the liabilities standpoint, its value is equal 
to the market value of the debt (D) and the equity (E). 
If we map both formulas together we can observe that the equity (E) is equal to E= Vu-D(1-t) ie the value 
of the equity is equal to the value of the debt free company minus the value of the debt plus the PV of the 
tax shield.  As we mentioned above, the asset beta of an indebted company (βL) is equal to the weighted 
average of the equity (βe) and debt betas (βd):  
 
 
If we use the value of the company by MM we get to another value of the asset beta of an indebted 
company by assuming that VL breaks down in two parts with their betas and weightings.  
 
 
 
If we map both formulas across to each other we can get to the equity beta (βd): 
 
 
 
 
And, as E= Vu-D(1-t)-> Vu= E+D(1-t), then, 
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,meaning that the systematic risk of the equity is equal to that of the debt free company plus the 
difference between the systematic risk of the debt free company and the debt times the leverage ratio 
(D/E) factored in the tax shield. If we assume that the debt is negligible (βd=0), then, 
  
 
 
On the other hand, the asset beta of an indebted company (βL) can be expressed in terms of the 
unlevered beta (βu). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2.1 Debt Beta 
Following Mascareñas (2007), we can use two methods to calculate the cost of capital: the weighted 
average cost of capital and the CAPM.  
The weighted average cost of capital (ko) is calculated by estimating the average cost of the equity (ke) 
and the debt (ki) after taxes, weighted by value of both financial resources in the capital structure leading 
us to the popular expression:  
 
 
where ki*(1-t) is the post-tax cost of debt 
On the other hand, using CAPM we can calculate the cost of capital by using the following expression:  
 
 
which is a way to estimate the return demanded by the market on the basis of the systematic risk of the 
company's assets. It is obvious that both formulas are to match each other and to do so, 
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then  
and it can be inferred that, 
 
 
which is a key formula for the following reasons: 
• If a company had a cost of debt before taxes equal to the return of the risk free asset , the debt 
beta would be: 
 
 
in other words, a company that pays an interest close to the nominal risk free asset will have a negative 
debt beta35
• On the other hand for the debt beta to be null the cost of that before taxes should be equal to 
. 
 
 
Through this analytical process, It can be inferred that some companies will have negative debt betas but 
a positive leverage ratios and, needless to say, a BB o lower rated companies will have positive debt 
betas and a significant leverage ratio. In both cases, the generic expression and not the simplified version 
has to be used when calculating the unlevered asset beta.  
3.2.2.2 Determinants of the beta 
The beta is mostly driven by these three factors: 
o The nature of the products or service offered by the company: other things equal, the more 
discretionary the product or service of the company, the higher the betas as the earnings become 
more volatile. Therefore, the beta of the:  
o Cyclical businesses > non-cyclical businesses. 
o Luxury goods firms > basic goods firms. 
                                                          
35  As long as the company is profitable. 
87 
 
o High priced goods firms > low priced goods firms. 
o Growth firms > mature firms. 
o Operating leverage 36
o Rigid costs structure and high capex intensive firms > flexible costs and low capex 
intensive firms. 
: other things equal, the higher the fixed costs of the company, the higher 
the beta. Therefore, the beta of: 
o High growth and young companies >  low growth and mature firms. 
o Smaller firms > larger firms. 
o Financial leverage: other things equal, the higher the level of indebtness, the higher the equity 
beta. 
3.2.2.3 Estimation of the equity beta 
The estimation of the Beta is the one of the most sensitive exercise when calculating the WACC at 
market prices. There are in general three ways to estimate beta: 
o Relying on well-established softwares such as Bloomberg provide daily, weekly, monthly and 
annually raw and adjusted betas. 
o Running a regression on past returns of the asset. 
o Estimating the industry betas. 
The first approach means to rely on reputable market softwares that provide up to date data on the 
companies' betas. This is the source that most practitioners use as it allows to quickly gather betas for 
companies across different time frames. The main shortcoming of this source of data is that we ignore the 
quality of the data first and second the beta is fairly “raw” and should undergo a “clean up” process by 
delevering and relevering itself through the industry beta and a the D/E target ratio. 
The second approach implies to run a regression on the returns of the asset over the course of a specific 
period.  We lay out the following model: 
o rt is the realized return of a stock over the period t including the dividends. 
o rmt is the realized return of a particular market index over period t including dividends. 
o rf is the risk free asset over period t. 
and we run the regression using excel or some other softwares.  
                                                          
36  Fixed costs as a percentage of total costs. 
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where  
 
We estimate the beta following these three steps: 
Figure 14: Beta Regression 
 
                        Source: Author  
To estimate the beta we need to choose the period of data, the returns’ frequency (daily, monthly, 
quarterly, etc) and the stock market index. For instance, Banco Popular should use five years of monthly 
data and the IBEX 35 as 95% of its profits come from its Spanish operations.  
To come up with a reasonable regression, we need at least 50 observations; hence if we use monthly 
data we need at least 4 years. The shorter the period the more likely the beta reflects the current 
business. The main drawback of daily/weekly data is that it captures microstructures effects from trading 
and bid ask spreads that distort the beta estimation, which is exacerbated in small/mid cap companies.  
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This model yields a beta which is considered to be “raw”. Several academic research (Blume 1975) have 
found that betas above one are likely to be overestimated on average and tend to revert towards one in 
the future whereas betas below one are more underestimated and prone to move towards one in the 
future. 
Beta services adjust for this by moving their “raw” beta estimates back towards one to give forecasts. The 
most common adjustment is to shift the estimates around one third of the way back to one37
Additionally, if the business of the firm is changing, it is necessary that the beta captures that by using the 
beta of the business the company is moving in. For instance, when M&S entered the food market, its beta 
should the weighted average of clothing retailing and food going forward.  
 
Another useful adjustment should be to account for period of turmoil or turbulences to weight certain 
periods or adjust for one off event (subprime crisis in 2008, crash of 1987, etc). This adjustment should 
only be made if the analyst thinks this would never occur again.  
3.2.2.3.1 Estimation of equity beta using industry averages and asset beta 
Generally speaking the beta for individual companies usually displays errors stemming from the need of 
historical prices and the standard errors embedded in the regression, so the reliance on individual betas 
to calculate the cost of equity could severely distort the WACC. 
The average of the industry betas where the company operates (bottom up beta) usually have much 
lower errors and this is what we should use if we are not experts at estimating betas. Furthermore, if the 
company is a non-traded asset (private company, division of a company or conglomerate of a firm) the 
bottom up beta using the industry average allows a close estimation of the company’s beta.  
To estimate the bottom up beta, we begin with the Modigliani and Miller formula: 
rA = (D/V)*rD + (E/V)*rE → rE = rA + (D/E)*(rA - rD) 
Similarly we have,  
βE = βASSET + (D/E)*( βASSET- βD) 
The equity beta of a company captures the fundamental risk of the assets of the firm (asset beta) and 
also accounts for the risk embedded in the financial leverage of the company. Therefore, we cannot just 
calculate the equity betas of the firms in the same sector with different capital structures.  
Likewise, the asset beta pertains to the assets, and thus it is the beta of the free cash flow coming from 
the assets.  
βASSET= βDEBT * (D/(D+E)) + (E/((D+E))*βEQUITY 
There is an important remark to be made. We are assuming that the leverage ratio of the firm is constant, 
and then the risk of the tax shield should be equal to the risk of the asset. Thus, 
βASSET= βTAX SHIELD 
                                                          
37  This is what Bloomberg for instance does – Adjusted Beta = 0.67*Raw Beta + (0.33)*1. 
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The asset beta of a company is the weighted average of the betas of the equity and debt. We rely on the 
cost of debt and equity to estimate the asset beta because they are observable but the asset beta holds 
the risk of the firm’s assets38
Thus, we can compare and average asset betas of firms in the same sector. The process is as follows: 
 and hence, it should not be affected by the capital structure of the firm but by 
the cash flows generated by the these assets. The asset beta is what can be calculated through an 
average of the similar assets across firms in the same industry.  
1. We first compute the asset betas of the comparable companies (peers). To do so, we delever the 
equity betas of the firm (A). 
               βASSET= βDEBT * (D/(D+E)) + (E/((D+E))*βEQUITY → = A Debt spread / (RM-RF) 
2. We compute the average industry asset beta weighted by either market cap or enterprise value. 
3. We derive our equity beta by relevering the industry beta using a D/E target. 
               βEQUITY= βINDUSTRY + (D/E) * (ββINDUSTRY -  βDEBT) 
This is the equity beta that we use to determine our cost of equity under CAPM 
See below a summary of the different steps to calculate the equity beta.  
Figure 14: Equity Beta Estimation 
 
                      Source: author 
                                                          
38  Modigliani and Miller (1963). 
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4. Cost of preferred equity 
We calculate the cost of preferred equity by dividing the preferred dividends by the market value of the 
preferred stock. 
 
where 
Kp = Cost of preferred equity 
D = Preferred dividend 
Vp = Market value of preferred equity 
It must be noted that the preferred dividends are not tax deductible so no adjustment is needed to 
calculate the cost of preferred equity.  
5 Flotation costs 
Companies in general but distress companies in particular are active in selling securities and they hire 
investment bankers or consultancies to undertake this job for them. The advisors provide several services 
including the setting of the issue price, or the sale to the public to name a few39
These flotation costs can be accounted for by reducing the proceeds from the issuance by the flotation 
costs (Fc) and then calculate again the cost of capital 
. These services are 
known as flotation costs and must be included in the WACC.  
Cost of debt with flotation costs 
 
Cost of equity with flotation costs 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 These services are even more common in distressed companies as the company seeks to refinance its debt or restructure its 
capital structure by hiring investment bank or consultancies with expertise in corporate restructuring. 
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Cost of preferred equity with flotation costs 
 
6 Cost of retained earnings 
This is often an overlooked item within the traditional cost of capital framework. The firm might use the 
retained earnings, its own internal funds, to invest in new projects. These funds are not cost free as they 
belong to the common stockholders. There is an opportunity cost of using these funds for organic 
purposes instead of paying them out as dividends to the shareholders. Therefore, the cost of retained 
earnings is equivalent to the cost of new common equity without any flotation cost at all. 
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SECTION 3 
In this section we undertake our empirical analysis on the distressed WACC for both an American and 
European sample. Section 1 and 2 are the fundamental underpinnings of our analytical exercise. This 
empirical exercise attempts to ascertain to what extent the WACC for distressed companies captures the 
efficiency of the restructuring proceeding one year ex and post the restructuring date.  
Our initial premise is that the WACC should account for the efficiency of the corporate restructuring 
mechanism as the WACC in distressed is not only driven by the cost and the expected recovery of the 
financing sources (effectively their market value) but also by the efficiency of the restructuring framework 
which seeks to rehabilitate the company as a going concern.  
Efficiency means the probability of rehabilitation under a restructuring proceeding to allow the company to 
emerge as a going concern and return to its ordinary business. As we highlighted in section 1, the value 
of a company is40 always higher as a going concern (restructuring) than as a gone concern (liquidation), 
reason why we advocate that, the WACC of any company facing a corporate restructuring that seeks its 
rehabilitation should capture that feature as opposed to more creditor friendly jurisdictions that seek to 
protect the interests of the creditors. Thus, the efficiency represents the likelihood of a well-rounded 
restructuring, the rate of success in terms of company's rehabilitation and the recovery rate for the 
investors as a whole. If a restructuring proceeding is efficient enough to ensure a reasonable rate of 
success41
o Pre restructuring efficiency: as the company enters a distressed stage and heads towards a 
corporate event (either a liquidation or a restructuring), the WACC should contemplate the 
likelihood of either of these two event happening. Additionally, it should also measure the 
soundness and thoroughness of the restructuring proceeding in boosting the value of the 
company as a going concern or otherwise the residual value of the company in the event of 
liquidation. Regardless of either corporate event, the WACC should also reflect the expected 
recovery for investors (debt and equity)
 for a company to emerge out of the process, the WACC of the company should be able to 
capture this efficiency. This efficiency should be picked up by the WACC on a pre and post restructuring 
basis: 
42
 
.  
o Post restructuring efficiency: this efficiency is only applicable to newly restructured companies. If 
the company has undergone a successfully restructuring to prop up the capital structure and 
emerge as a going concern with a high likelihood of meeting with success in the future, the 
WACC should capture that efficiency. Here the WACC represents the rate of success of a 
                                                          
40  We consider all investors, senior and junior, as a whole. The former usually receive the same proceeds under both liquidation 
and restructuring if the asset collateral is significant. However, junior’s recovery rate, under a winding up scenario, is usually low or 
even null. 
41  Rate of success meaning here that the restructuring leads to a corporate rehabilitation rather than to a liquidation. 
42  We must bear in mind that we should look at the WACC as a whole and not at the value of the individual components (cost of 
equity, cost of debt and capital structure weightings). The recovery rate for investors overall should always be higher as a going 
concern than as a gone concern as explained in section 1. Therefore, a restructuring proceeding that aims to protect the company 
and enhances its value should boost the recovery rate for the whole investor base as opposed to some other more creditor friendly 
jurisdictions that aim to protect the interests of the creditors in general and the senior in particular jeopardizing the recovery rate of 
other sub-investors. 
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restructuring with powerful and effective tools to grapple with the distress situation versus to a 
less structured or old fashioned proceeding which lacks the appropriate instruments to manage 
the company through the restructuring procedure.  
 
Note that the WACC is not only about debt but also about the equity. In many creditor friendly jurisdictions 
senior lenders are usually looked after at the expense of junior debt and equity holders. The lower cost of 
debt of the senior lenders whom enjoy the legal protection are fully offset by the higher cost of debt of the 
junior, let alone the cost of the equity, whose recovery rate is pretty much null. What we call efficiency in a 
restructuring is a legal framework that tends to purposely rehabilitate the company as a going concern 
and fairly manage the interests of the entire investor base.  
1 The empirical project 
1.1 Sample and the data collection 
Our sample includes public companies that came under distress, entered a restructuring process, 
emerged as going concern and were listed back again between 2000-2009 included. We only focus our 
analysis on publicly trading firms around the pre and post restructuring dates. The reasons are: 
o We undertake our analysis on a market based WACC approach so we need market data for our 
inputs.   
o We need financial statements pre and post-bankruptcy and this is only accessible for public 
companies with either debt or equity trading in the primary or secondary markets.  
 
Therefore we discard three types of companies: private or non-trading companies; publicly trading 
companies that were liquidated through the restructuring procedure; publicly trading companies that were 
privatized through the restructuring process. Thus, our initial sample of thousands of distressed 
companies that went through restructuring or liquidation through this period, narrows down to a small 
sample of 30-50 companies.  
To gather our sample we use Bloomberg and Thompson 1 database to screen all the public companies 
that filed for a restructuring through the period. Our second step is to filter the sample by removing all 
companies that were either private (not traded), were liquidated or privatized after the restructuring. This 
process leads us to our sample of publicly trading companies.  
We also use these two softwares to collect data on: risk free assets, raw betas, market capitalizations, 
trading levels for currently distressed market debt and some financial data of companies when the 
financial statements were not available. For fundamental company data we use the financial statements 
of the companies to gather key metrics such as Ebit, Ebitda, interest expense, debt, equity to name a few 
and to calculate the main credit ratios such as FFO/Debt, Debt/Ebitda, Ebitda/interests among others. 
See section 2 for more information. 
1.2 Main assumptions  
We set three dates for our WACC analysis: the filing date (WACCFY), one year before (WACCFY-1) and 
one year after (WACCFY1) the restructuring date to evaluate the absolute and relative levels of the cost of 
capital. One year of difference up and down the filing date enables the WACC to capture the likelihood of 
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a restructuring or liquidation (WACCFY-1) or the efficiency and success of the restructuring if the company 
emerges from it (WACCFY1). 
In theory we would expect either WACCFY-1 or WACCFY to reach the highest level at the point of maximum 
distress and WACCFY1 to display the lowest level as the company exits the restructuring procedure with a 
sounder capital structure. 
For the cost of equity we use the following assumptions: 
• Risk Free Asset (RFA): we use the 10 Yr Treasury bond at each point in time. 
• Beta: we use the Adjusted Beta after adjusting the raw beta as explained in section 243
• Equity Risk Premium (ERP): we use the standard 5%
.  
44
• Country Risk Premium (CRP): for the European companies, we use the 5 yr CDS at the time on 
top of the RFA to account for the additional risk of investing outside US. 
.  
 
1.3 Fundamental review of the samples 
Before digging into the WACC analysis, it is convenient to run through the fundamentals of the companies 
on an absolute and relative basis across the three periods. This will allow us to observe the improvement 
and deterioration of the financial, operating and credit metrics of the firms through the period to better 
understand the outcome of the WACC analysis. Note that the WACC is a blend of fundamental and 
technical features. The former is driven by the absolute performance of the company. The latter is driven 
by the market perception of the quality of the asset, the outlook of the company and its sector and the 
macro environment45
Please note that in the analysis below we are calculating averages for our samples so be aware of the 
impact that big companies can exert in the final output. We will see later on the dispersion and skewness 
of the WACC output due to the size and the distress levels of the companies given the disparity in 
industries, leverage periods, etc.  
 (fundamentals and technicals are usually at odds).  
As far as the European sample is concerned, we can observe a firm improvement in the operating 
(Ebitda, Ebit and FFO improving by 2x), and the financial (gross debt down by 18% and equity up by 
440%) metrics between FY and FY146
                                                          
43  We have not calculated the relevered industry beta for two reasons: we want to evaluate the market perceived beta at each point 
in time; it was difficult to gather reliable data of the group of closest comparable companies.  
. Also, credit metrics strongly improve between both periods with a 
leverage ratio down to 2.7x and a FFO ratio up to -1.1x from very negative level a year before. Interest 
coverage ratios also make headway from previous levels.  
44  We will run a sensitivity analysis on ERP to evaluate the WACC levels as the ERP is one of the main drivers of the WACC. 
45  We have witnessed over 2010 for example, the impact that a sovereign crisis has on equities and bonds with a massive sell-off 
during a sustained period of time regardless of the fundamental performance of the company. A market based WACC usually 
reflects this macro risk. 
46  Reasons are multiples: higher sales coupled with a cost-cutting program at both the gross margin and SG&A level boosting the 
positive effect of the operating leverage which is common in many the industries of our sample. 
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     Source: author 
As for the American sample, we also observe a strong improvement in fundamentals outpacing the 
performance of their European counterparts. This is due to the idiosyncrasy of the Chapter 11 ( which 
aims not only to fix the capital structure but also to impose a better income/cost rationalization to ensure 
the future viability of the company47
 
). Operating metrics improve mostly at the Ebit level with a 185% jump 
in FY1 vs FY. Gross debt is reduced by 38% and equity is replenished by 95% to shore up the capital 
structure. Consequently, credit metrics are reinforced with the D/E ratio falling from 658% to 209%, FFO 
ratio almost breakeven form a very negative number and leverage ratio markedly improving between FY 
and FY1.  
 
                                                          
47  Tools such as the stay on creditors, super senior financing or management in place provide for a quick recovery. 
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    Source: author 
In summary, the improvement in fundamentals between FY-1 and FY1 is, needless to say, a key driver of 
the absolute and relative value of the WACC between our two samples.  
2 The European sample: WACC analysis 
We have a thin sample of 26 companies down from more than 5,000 companies that experienced some 
sort of corporate distressed event since 2000. The sample is small but should not come as a surprise 
given the bank presence in the corporate capital structure and the absence of a subordinate bond market 
in Europe48. European Banks have traditionally been the main financing providers of the European 
corporates and been granted with significant collateral (real estate, mortgages, etc) meaning that their 
loans are usually well covered with a high recovery rate in the event of a liquidation. This preferential 
status has discouraged banks from accepting any restructuring of the company as a going concern that 
might jeopardize their preferential interests versus the junior lenders or equity holders. Moreover, banks 
are reluctant to transfer some value to junior lenders through a restructuring even if their recovery is at 
par.49
Our sample of companies includes a blend of major legal jurisdictions laid out in section 1 including 
France, Germany and Spain but others such as Italy, UK and Ireland mostly missing in our sample. This 
 This feature has prompted many liquidations or otherwise restructurings on the private side taking 
these companies through a mix of breakups, spinoffs or carveouts (Gilson 2000).  
                                                          
48  As opposed to US with a very prolific bond market 
49  For instance a new cash in form of equity or debt is required for an investment of a distressed company. The firm, the equity and 
the debt come to an agreement provided that the NPV of the investment is sufficiently large. If there is no agreement the result is 
likely to be under-investment (forego positive NPV investment) but could be over-investment (invest in negative NPV project). 
Where the result is under investment it is called the “debt overhang problem”. This is an interaction between restructuring and 
investments. It may be difficult to restructure public debt due to free riders or holdout problems but lack of coordination among public 
debt holders can be exploited by the bank lender. In general lenders especially senior are reluctant to transfer value to other more 
junior lenders or equity if their money is already secured on the assets. See Myers, 1977. 
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does not strike us very much either given the creditor friendly oriented profile of their legal proceedings 
and the presence of banking debt in the capital structure which saw many publicly distressed companies 
being wound up or otherwise privatized. Germany, and to a lesser extent France and Netherlands (which 
we have not described in section 1) are the bigger contributors to our sample owing to their more debtor 
friendly profile (but still very creditor friendly relative to Chapter 11) which seek company rehabilitation 
and company value enhancement. Therefore, our sample shows Finish or Austrian companies filing in 
Germany given the most favorable legal framework for corporate restructurings. 
The table below shows the sample of companies in our European universe, the country of residence, the 
country of filing, and the WACC dates.  
Source: author 
In the next sections we run through our cost of capital analysis by breaking down its main components 
that lead to our final output: the WACC 
2.1 Cost of equity  
We use the CAPM approach to estimate the cost of equity (COE).  
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Source: author 
Our COE comes in at 10.0% for the COEFY-1, 13.1% for the COEFY , and 10.5% for the COEFY1 .As 
expected, the COE at the filing day reaches its highest levels. However, our COEFY1 comes in higher than 
the COEFY-1 implying a higher return demanded by investors by holding equity in the newly restructured 
company. We will seek to interpret these results in our conclusions. As explained in section 2, we assume 
a 5% ERP as a default premium, but we will run different ERP scenarios to assess the impact on the COE 
and the WACC.  
2.2 Cost of debt 
We go about the cost of debt (COD) calculation by using Approach 1 and 3 described in section 2. By 
doing so we aim to compare the current cost of debt at the moment (what the company is effectively 
paying) based on its P&L and balance sheet static numbers versus its implied cost of debt based on its 
synthetic rating which is driven by its credit quality. For both approaches, we use the CAPM methodology. 
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2.2.1 Cost of debt under Approach 1 (P&L COD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author 
Our CODFY-1 comes in at 12.9%, 14.7% for the COEFY , and 13.6% for the COEFY1 .As expected, the COD 
at the filing day reaches its highest levels given the burdensome leverage  and  the rapid deterioration of 
the credit quality of the companies. It strikes us also the levels of the COEFY1 after restructuring. Despite 
the lower leverage ratio after a liability management which effectively brought gross indebteness down by 
18%, the interest cost is still high implying the investor demand for its holding of a risky asset. 
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2.2.2 Cost of debt under Approach 2 (Synthetic COD) 
 
Source: author 
Our CODFY-1 comes in at 13.7%, 13.4% for the COEFY, and 10.5% for the COEFY1. First remark we should 
make is that the CODFY-1 and CODFY  are not very different meaning that the credit quality of the firms one 
year before restructuring was already very poor leading to an inevitable restructuring. This is also 
underpinned by the high absolute levels of the COD. Our CODFY1 is much lower and in line with a 
supposedly better quality of a firm (with stronger credit metrics and ratios) that has just come out of a 
restructuring.  
The absolute levels between our COD in the first and second approach significantly differ despite the 
better credit quality of the new emerging firm. This is due to: 
• The excess over a fair cost of debt demanded by investors by holding a risky asset with an 
uncertain financial future ahead of it.  
• Common mispricing in this type of distressed situation with conflicts of interests throughout the 
capital structure rebalancing.  
 
Therefore, it is reasonable that the real and the implied COD differ from each other in such a way despite 
the significant improvement of the company in terms of credit quality and liquidity (and also leverage). 
The table below shows the difference between COD under approach 1 and 2.  On average, the difference 
between both methods significantly widens in FY1 by 314bps vs 121bps in FY as the debt investors price 
in a premium in their holdings of the company relative to the stronger credit profile of the emerging 
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company. In FY-1 the difference is small implying that the investors are correctly pricing the COD given 
the companies' outlook and the credit metrics.  
P&L based COD – Synthetic COD 
       Source: author 
Below a table with the scoring, blended rating and the spread attached under Approach 3. This should be 
the spread levels if the credit metrics were exclusively the main driver of the excess over the RFA. 
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Source: author 
In the table above we can observe the weakness of the credit scoring of the companies in FY-1 and FY 
as expected, boding well with a D rating given their poor credit metrics and the looming corporate event. 
The average spread in both periods stands at 14% under our synthetic rating framework given the weak 
credit quality of the firms. In FY1 the credit scoring significantly improves, mostly in terms of profitability 
(FFO/Debt) and leverage (Debt/Ebitda) bringing the scoring down to 5.8 boding well for a B average 
rating, a common credit rating50
Please refer to the appendix to see key credit metrics, rating per credit metric, the blended credit rating 
and the spread attached to it. 
 for a restructured company. The spread attached to this rating should be 
in the 10.5% region, still high as a consequence of the inherent risk, but markedly down from the 
distressed levels at around the restructuring time.  
 
 
 
                                                          
50  According to S&P, Moody's, Fitch. 
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2.3 Capital Structure weighting 
For the capital structure weighting (Debt and Equity to Capital) we use our market based approach   
which seeks to capture the market value of the capital sources at each point in time rather the book value 
oriented methodologies which is based on historical values. In a distressed company, to use book values 
can severely distort the analysis as these values might have been recorded in the balance sheet long 
before the company came under distress. By turning to the market values, we can ascertain the fair value 
of the financing sources (which can suggest the expected recovery) on a mark to market basis. 
As far as the equity is concerned, we use the market capitalization. This task is fairly straightforward as 
we look back to the market capitalization of the companies at the time, free of preference shares. As for 
the debt, it becomes a more intricate task as we lack publicly market prices of corporate debt through our 
period. Moreover some of the corporate debt itself does not usually trade in the past51 so it is difficult to 
estimate the market price of this debt. Notwithstanding that, we still go through to our market based 
WACC route and we use our approach 2 in the chapter 2.2.2 whereby we treat all the debt as a coupon 
bond with the average maturity of the entire debt pool of the balance sheet at the time. We value the bond 
by discounting it at the P&L based COD (approach 1). We make a very sensitive and arguable 
assumption for the market value of debt in FY1. We have converted the book value of debt in FY-1 and 
FY into a market coupon bond to factor the financial distress of the companies into the debt. By doing the 
same in FY1 we would be treating the debt pre and post distress under the same standards which 
arguably could be incorrect as we assume the company emerged from bankruptcy with a bolstered 
capital structure as proven by looking at the balance sheet. We could have applied some sort of “haircut” 
to the debt but given the P/B52
In the table below we can observe the moving parts of the weightings across the board (we have 
excluded Liberty Global given the mounting negative equity to avoid misrepresentation in our analysis). 
We see a fall in gross debt by 19% and an increase of equity by 86% between FY and FY1 suggesting 
the important liability management to shore up the capital structure. D/E falls to 4.6x from the highs of 
10.6x in FY. As a consequence, the market based D/E, which happens to be our weighting for the WACC, 
increases from 1.1x in FY-1 to 4.6x to come up to 7.0x in FY1. 
 is trading above 0.65x in both samples, we could infer the debt could be 
trading between 80c-100c so to avoid further assumptions in our model we take book value as a proxy.  
 
                                                          
51  We can think of revolving credit facilities, bilateral loans etc. 
52  P/B = Price to Book → Market capitalisation / book equity. Also called P/NAV (Net Asset Value). 
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              Source: author 
See appendix for more details per company. 
2.4 WACC 
Once we have estimated our COD, COE and the weightings, we then proceed to determine the individual 
and the global WACC for our sample.  
Source: author 
The outcome is as follows: 
o Approach 1 (P&L based WACC) 
o WACCFY-1 : 10.4% 
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o WACCFY :   12.4% 
o WACCFY1 :  12.8% 
  
o Approach 2 (Synthetic rating based WACC) 
o WACCFY-1 : 11.2% 
o WACCFY :   10.9% 
o WACCFY1 :  10.3% 
 
Under Approach 1, WACC reaches its highest levels after the restructuring. It might look odd as first sight 
as a new “clean” company is expected to emerge from restructuring and therefore boasts stronger credit 
and financial metrics with a more sound and viable capital structure. However, investors tend to factor in 
a premium for different reasons. These could be 
• Risk aversion in a new entity with an ongoing risk of failure. 
• Concerns on the outcome of the restructuring process (“non-manageable” capital structure, 
unsuitable management team, future business viability, etc) that calls for a premium. This bodes 
well with the “efficiency of the restructuring” thesis that we have highlighted before. We will 
discuss it at the end of this section. 
 
Under approach 2, WACCFY-1 and WACCFY stand at the highs of 11% which is consistent with a 
distressed company. However, our WACCFY1 falls below 10.5% in line with the theoretical cost of capital 
of a newly restructured company with stronger credit metrics. The difference between our WACCFY1  
under both scenarios is significant and account for the market premium required by the investors53
2.4.1 WACC sensitivity: the ERP as a key driver 
. This 
is an obvious explanation. Investors have to be compensated for holding a risky asset even after the 
restructuring as the likelihood of failure is again much higher than that of any other corporate. Even if the 
financial and credit quality of the companies have markedly improved, the market perception of the 
restructuring process in general and capital structure in particular might still cause concerns to investors. 
We will interpret these results at the end of the section 
We have highlighted throughout section 2 the relevance of the ERP and its powerful impact on the 
WACC. It is paramount to correctly choose a reliable ERP not to misinterpret the outcome. Since 
academics and practitioners still disagree on the best methodology to estimate the ERP, it has become a 
very subjective judgment and hence it could compromise the estimation of the cost of capital. As describe 
in section 2, one can estimate the ERP by using the historical average (4%-6% for the S&P 500 as the 
equity benchmark), by running a regression, or adjusting the ERP for the CRP. Notwithstanding that, the 
ERP will always incorporate some sort of personal judgment. Therefore, it is important to always provide 
for a range of potential values for the WACC (and not just a single value) to account for the powerful 
driving effect of the ERP.  
                                                          
53 The WACC shows here the average cost of capital but also the return demanded by investors. 
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  Source: author 
We have used a 5% ERP by default, the level that market practitioners tend to use, which is the 
arithmetic average of the S&P 500 between 1970-2009. 
We can observe how the WACC changes by 500bps-600bps (or by 1,000bps in FY) by shifting the ERP 
up and down by 100bps implying the need to correctly estimate the WACC. If we are not too confident 
about our ERP estimation, a sensitivity exercise on the WACC will allow us to gauge the accuracy of the 
cost of capital on the basis of our chosen ERP.  
3 American sample: WACC analysis 
In section 1 we have extensively discussed the merits of Chapter 11 as restructuring mechanism for 
distressed companies. Its powerful features such as the stay, cramdowns, super senior financing enable 
an efficient restructuring towards a full rehabilitation of the company through a comprehensive capital 
structure management. Thus, we are expecting a wider sample of companies than the European one 
supported by three facts: 
1. The long lasting tradition of corporate restructuring within US and the assumption that 
companies are worth more as a going concern than as a gone concern. 
2. The aversion of the American business culture to acknowledge failure. Liquidation implies 
failure, inability to resolve the problem, something which is heavily penalized by the markets and 
the public opinion. Management and investors are always scrutinized by the markets and when a 
failure occurs, the former is criticized by its inability to restore the business and the latter by its 
inability to envisage the fallout. This might give rise an irreversible social and professional stigma 
on both actors.   
3. The lack of bank related financing in the capital markets which are fundamentally led and 
governed by the bond market. The bond market is usually characterized by sophisticated 
investors “hunting” for yield who are willing to forego collateral or protection for a higher yield in 
their investments. These investors understand the risk reward of their investments and the 
benefits and perils of a corporate restructuring (Chapter 11) which actually become very helpful 
through the restructuring process as they are experienced in this type of distressed situations. 
Chapter 11 is a fairly debtor friendly framework that aims to protect the company through a 
comprehensive “tool kit” and enhance its value through a workout of the capital structure thanks to a 
profound interaction between all security holders in the firm. This fact coupled with the absence of banks 
in the capital financing prompts Chapter 11 as an effective and efficient restructuring proceeding to turn 
companies around. As pointed out in the section 3.1.3 banks are more prone to liquidation as they usually 
“sit” in the more senior layers of the capital structure enjoying valuable collateral ensuring them a high 
recovery rate under liquidation (James 1995).  
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Our American sample comes out at 46 publicly traded companies down from more than a thousand 
companies that filed for a corporate restructuring/liquidation. As per the European sample, we have 
removed all companies that were privatized over the restructuring process or otherwise were liquidated. 
Likewise, we have left small companies that remained public after emerging from Chapter 11 out of the 
sample as the size of the companies and the quality of the financial data was not reliable. The purpose is 
to avoid potential flaws (biases or skews) that could compromise the outcome.  
Our sample comprises firms across various industries including cyclical and non cyclical, 
telecommunications, or industrial companies. These are sectors used to frequently undergoing corporate 
restructurings54 which have naturally changed the business model and the capital structure of their 
corporate incumbents. The latter have witnessed an array of sophisticated subordinated investors55
Below our sample of distressed American companies: 
 
coming into the capital that understand the restructuring process and their risk and rewards. It is the 
sophistication and the pragmatism of Chapter 11 through the interaction of high caliber investors that 
makes it so efficient in terms of outcome and timing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54  Not only distressed restructuring but LBO, MBOs, spin offs, mergers, carve outs, etc are quite common in the American corporate 
space (Rosenbaum 2008).  
55  Hedge Fund, Private Equities etc. 
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Source: Author 
Source: Author 
As per the European sample, we undertake the same process to estimate our WACC for the American 
sample.  We first look at the cost of equity and debt to later calibrate the weightings and finally evaluate 
the WACC and its sensitivity to the ERP. 
3.1 Cost of equity 
We follow the CAPM model to come up with the COE for our sample. 
110 
 
Source: Author 
Our COE comes in at 11.0% for the COEFY-1, 13.4% for the COEFY, and 10.5% for the COEFY1 .As 
expected, the COE at the filing day reaches its highest levels. Our COEFY1 comes in significantly lower 
than the COEFY due to a full workaround on the capital structure that sees the D/E ratio markedly down 
from the 600%ish to the 200%ish, releasing some of the risk from the equity holders.  
3.2 Cost of debt 
As we have done for the European sample, we conduct the cost of debt analysis under approach 1 (P&L 
method) and 2 (Synthetic method).  
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3.2.1 Cost of debt under Approach 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
Our CODFY-1 comes in at 9.1%, 9.3% for the CODFY, and 10.8% for the CODFY1. The COD at the filing day 
is only slightly above from CODFY-1 implying the latter already captures most of the looming distress 
ahead of the companies and the likelihood of the restructuring.   It strikes us also the levels of the COEFY1 
after the restructuring standing well above CODFY-1 and CODFY. Despite the lower gearing of the 
companies in FY1 on average, the interest spread is 11.7%, well above the 9.3% in FY implying the high 
financing cost that the restructuring brings about for these companies.56
3.2.2 Cost of debt under Approach 2 
 
Here, we look at the COD given the credit metrics at each point in time. 
                                                          
56  This is common in Chapter 11. Debt-holders endure a significant “haircut” on their securities to bring down leverage but they are 
compensated through higher interests in the new restructured debt.  
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Source: Author 
Our CODFY-1 comes in at 11.4%, 12.2% for the CODFY, and 10.3% for the CODFY1.First remark we should 
make is that the CODFY is higher than CODFY -1 underlining the sharp deterioration of the credit metrics of 
the companies that finally led to the restructuring. Our CODFY1 comes in at 10.3% down from 12.2% as of 
FY which is still a high level for a restructured company with an average interest spread of 10.9%.    
In the table below we can see the difference in COD between approach 1 and 2. The difference is 
positively skewed to approach 1 in both FY-1 and FY suggesting that the debt market is pricing in a lower 
COD than what fundamentals reveal as the company head towards a restructuring process, underpinning 
the “Chapter 11 efficiency” thesis57
                                                          
57  As if the P&L based COD (which is the effective COD at the time) already anticipates an upcoming corporate restructuring. 
. It seems that the market is already anticipating a “next door” 
restructuring and the market COD deviates from its fundamental value which is given by the synthetic 
COD. Only 51bps on average separate the COD under both approaches between FY and FY1 
suggesting that the COD is fairly priced and investors seem to be comfortable with the debt risk level.  
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  Source: Author 
Below the credit scoring, blended rating and the spread attached to the rating for our American sample 
under the synthetic rating approach. 
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Source: Author 
In the table above we can observe the weakness of the credit scoring of the companies in FY-1 and FY 
as expected which bodes perfectly with a D/CCC rating given their poor credit metrics. The average 
spread in FY rises to 14.1% from 12.7% in FY-1 under our synthetic rating framework but the 
fundamentals remain unchanged as credit scoring suggests (6.4 in FY-1 and 6.7 in FY). In FY1 the credit 
scoring significantly improves, both in terms of leverage and profitability as indicated in our fundamental 
review of the American sample bringing the scoring down to 6.2 which commensurate well for a B- rating. 
The spread in FY1 comes out at 11.4%, a very high level for a newly restructured company. The 
improvement in the capital structure and the drop in leverage is partially offset by the very weak financial 
and operating metrics of these companies (albeit better than their European counterparts) leaving the 
spread cumbersomely at 11.4% 
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Please refer to appendix for a full detail of the credit metrics per company. 
3.3 Capital Structure weighting 
For the capital structure weighting (Debt and Equity to Capital) we use the same rationale as for the 
European universe.  
        Source: Author 
We see a fall in gross debt by 38% and an increase of equity by 95% between FY and FY1 suggesting 
the important liability management carried out to shore up the capital structure. D/E falls to 2.1x in FY1 
from the highs of 6.6x in FY. As a consequence, the market based D/E, which happens to be our 
weighting for the WACC, falls from 10.3x in FY to 3.3x in FY1. This suggests two ideas when comparing 
the American versus the European samples: 
• The high gearing of the US corporates due to the lack of banking financing and a proliferating 
bond market with a high leverage tolerance to pursue high yields. 
• The huge liability management efforts through the American restructurings to prop up the capital 
structure of the firms. 
 
3.4 WACC 
Below a table with the outcome of the WACC for the American sample. 
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Source: Author 
The outcome is as follows: 
o Approach 1 (P&L based WACC) 
o WACCFY-1 : 10.0% 
o WACCFY :   10.7% 
o WACCFY1 :  10.6% 
 
o Approach 2 (Synthetic rating based WACC) 
o WACCFY-1 : 11.2% 
o WACCFY :   11.5% 
o WACCFY1 :  10.5% 
 
Under Approach 1, WACC does not change significantly through the distress period remaining below 
11% throughout. This can be partially explained by the market belief in the restructuring process ex and 
post. The fact that the WACC only changes by 100bps between FY and FY1 implies the comfort that 
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Chapter 11 conveys to investors that seek the rehabilitation of the company and enhances the recovery 
value of their investments. 
Under approach 2, the drop in WACC between FY and FY1 is more obvious given the sharp improvement 
in the financial leverage and in the fundamentals of the companies. It is also worth mentioning that the 
WACCFY1 under both methods comes out at 10.5% suggesting the ability of the market to correctly price 
in the WACC the operating and financial improvements in the companies. This fact supports even more 
the “Chapter 11 efficiency thesis” that we have theoretically discussed in section 1 and empirically tested 
in this section. We will dwell on the absolute and relative values of the WACC at the end of this section. 
3.4.1 WACC sensitivity: the ERP as a key driver 
As carried out for the European sample, we evaluate the WACC levels under different ERP assumptions. 
The absolute level of WACC shifts up and down by 400bps-600bps according to the level of ERP 
underscoring the importance of fairly estimating the right level of premium to avoid overpricing or 
underpricing the cost of equity.   
Source: Author 
4 Recovery rates: US vs Europe 
Before venturing into the WACC comparison analysis we would like to briefly comment on the debt 
recovery rates in US and Europe. We can observe that the recovery rate for the debt across the board 
(senior and junior) is higher in US than in Europe despite being the bond market (US) more dispersed 
and difficult to coordinate versus the bank debt (Europe)58
 
. However, the powerful tools of Chapter 11 as 
discussed in section 1 plus the long track record of restructuring (as opposed to liquidation in Europe) 
help boosting the recovery rates of the debt-holders.  
Source: Moody’s (2007) and author 
                                                          
58 This lack of coordination may cause an under-investment or over-investment problem as we have mentioned before. 
ISSUER-WEIGHTED RECOVERY RATES FOR EUROEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN ISSUERS
2006 2005 1982-2006 2006 2005 1982-2006
Sr Secured Bonds 39.6% na 44.5% 86.3% 71.9% 53.8%
Sr. Unsecured Bonds 58.4% na 27.0% 54.3% 55.4% 38.0%
Sr. Subordinated Bonds na na 33.5% 43.6% 31.0% 32.5%
Subordinated Bonds na na 30.7% 56.1% 51.3% 31.2%
Bonds jr. Subordinated na na na na na 23.9%
Europe US
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There is a stark difference between the recovery rate for the Senior Secured and Unsecured bondholders 
between Europe and US by about 20% while the latter maintaining a 30% or above recovery rate for the 
junior tranches. 
Below a more recent evidence of the recovery rates in US vs Europe. US boasts a higher recovery rate 
(76.7 c/$ versus 62.9 c/$ in Europe), a lower time for its restructuring programs to complete (1.5 years vs 
1.7 years in Europe)59
 
 and a lower cost (7% of estate versus 9.7% in Europe) of the restructuring.  
            Source: Economist (2007) and author 
We are confident that all these evidences drive the mindset of the investors in US companies and they 
are probably factored in the cost of capital of the distressed companies as they make their way into the 
restructuring. 
5 Relative WACC analysis US vs Europe 
This section has a threefold mission: we seek to understand the absolute levels of the outcome. 
Secondly, we shed some light on the relative value of the WACC and its components between the 
American and the European sample. Lastly, we draw some conclusions by comparing the outcome of the 
empirical project with the theoretical underpinnings of the major restructuring regimes laid out in section 
1. 
We would like to make a quick remark on the European sample. Recall that the European sample is not 
entirely representative because of its small size, its skew to Germany60
                                                          
59  We have discussed in section 1 how the recovery rate for investors drops as the restructuring is delayed due to the lofty 
restructuring related fees (judges, trustees, lawyers, etc). 
 and the lack of more creditor 
friendly jurisdictions such as UK and Ireland. Its size is small enough to venture into drawing convincing 
conclusions but the reality is that most of the public companies that filed for restructuring were finally 
wound up or taken private; The German code is a more debtor friendly proceeding (mostly with the new 
legislation) relative to the rest of Western European codes with similarities to the US restructuring 
60  A more debtor friendly jurisdiction from our view but still very investor friendly relative to US as it lacks efficient restructuring tools. 
Default values (2008)
Recovery rate 
(cents in $)
Average time 
to complete
Cost (% of 
estate)
France 44.7 1.9 9
Switzerland 46.8 3.0 4
Germany 52.2 1.4 8
Italy 56.6 1.8 22
Spain 73.2 1.0 15
US 76.7 1.5 7
Netherlands 82.7 1.1 4
UK 84.2 1.0 6
Western Europe 62.9 1.6 9.7
US 76.7 1.5 7.0
Difference 22% -6% -28%
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procedure. Hence, our sample is slightly biased to the German; lastly, the absence of some relevant legal 
jurisdictions such as UK or Italy in our sample coupled with the dominance of Germany in our list of 
companies prevents our two samples to be fairly compared. 
Below the absolute levels of COE, COD and WACC for both the European and the American samples. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Source: Author 
We conduct our analysis by commenting first on the absolute and relative values of the WACC 
components that will help us to explain the purpose of this empirical project: distressed WACC between 
US and Europe. We lay out potential explanations of the outcome based on the results of the project and 
our thoughts on the merits and demerits of each regime. Needless to say, there could well be other 
reasons out of our reasoning61
P&L COD 
 but this is our best approximation. 
The US P&L COD is lower on absolute terms than that of Europe though the period. There could potential 
explanations for that: 
• The better financial and credit metrics of the US firms relative to those of their European 
counterparts after the restructuring. Chapter 1 seeks to rehabilitate the company through powerful 
tools (debtor retains control, automatic stay, debtor’s exclusive right to propose reorganization 
plan, non-unanimity rules for approving reorganization plan, cost rationalization to bolster the 
financials of the company, super senior financing etc) to guarantee a successful emersion form 
the restructuring process. The company is encouraged through the restructuring process to keep 
up with these tools by improving its financial and credit metrics.  
• Despite the poor credit quality and liquidity of the US metrics in FY-1, COD is overall very low on 
absolute terms for a distressed company. This low level could be driven by the debt market 
perception of a looming restructuring (Chapter 11) which will help the company through a 
rehabilitation exercise boosting the company value and hence the recovery rate for the debtor 
                                                          
61  The WACC of a company in our sample could be driven by the general decline of its industry, sovereign concerns etc. 
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investor base as a whole62 (reinforcing the “Chapter 11 efficiency thesis”). In Europe, COD does 
not seem to capture that potential efficiency given the uptick in COD between FY-1 and FY 
implying a market concern on the restructuring. FY COD in US ticked up to 9.3% (from 9.1% in 
FY-1) but lower than the European FY COD that creeps up from 12.9% in FY-1 to 14.7% in FY. 
At first sight US investors seems to be more comfortable with the restructuring event than their 
European counterparts suggesting some confidence in the efficiency of the Chapter 11. Likewise, 
the recovery rate for the debt holder as a whole63
• After the restructuring, COD in US goes up to 10.8% versus a drop to 13.6% in Europe, 
underlying the cost that US debtor investor bears after such a tedious liability management 
process. However, still the COD remains low versus Europe underscoring the confidence in the 
US restructuring process.  
 has been traditionally much higher in US than 
in Europe shoring up the confidence of the debt investors in the Chapter 11.  
 
Synthetic COD 
The US Synthetic COD is lower on absolute terms than that of Europe though the period. The same 
reasons apply here. US distressed companies have better credit and operating metrics both ex and post 
restructuring. The synthetic COD is a more fundamentally driven cost of debt (as opposed to the P&L one 
which is more book value based) and objectively picks the fair credit spread given the underlying credit 
metrics. 
COE 
US COE is higher than Europe's COE in FY-1 but similar in FY and FY1. It is clear than in Chapter 11 
equity holders usually get severely impaired or severely diluted through equity-debt swaps or in some 
instances absolutely wiped out64. This is a consequence of thorough liability process management (see 
the drop in gross debt and the increase in book equity in 3.1.3). We can observe that by looking at the 
P/B multiples in the appendix where the equity trades at deep discounts to NAV. However, we are not 
very surprised by the absolute level of the US FY-1 COE given the low expected recovery of the equity 
holders in a distressed scenario65
It strikes us the low level of the European FY-1 COE
. 
66
                                                          
62  In liquidation, junior debtors usually get very impaired. In Chapter 11, though also getting impaired (or fully impaired  ie 
cramdown), they have a chance to negotiate better terms by getting actively involved in the process. 
 relative to the US one whose restructuring regimes 
are more creditor-friendly. Therefore we were expecting lower a FY-1 COE in the US than in Europe due 
to active role that equity holders play in the US restructuring process. FY COE soars in Europe and to a 
lesser extent in US implying concerns on the recovery of the equity holders in Europe. FY1 COE 
stabilizes afterwards in both Europe and US at 10.5%, the latter significantly down from FY. This could be 
63  Recall the deviation from the strict absolute rule that sees the recovery of supposedly impaired junior holders rising in an 
otherwise null recovery scenario pushing up the recovery rate of the debt-holders as a whole. 
64  However deviations from the absolute priority rule are common increasing their expected recovery. 
65  But still higher than a liquidation or in a creditor friendly style of restructuring where the equity holders are absolutely “sidelined” 
during the process. In Chapter 11 equity holders usually enjoy a say in the process and become active parts of it. 
66 Partially explained by the dominance of Germany in our sample with a more Chapter 11 style of restructuring. 
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due to a successful outcome for equity holders either through a positive liability management for them or 
through deviations from the strict absolute priority rule (DSAP). The DSAP refers to the fact that the “pie” 
is not share according to the SAP (Absolute Priority Rule) in the restructuring process. For instance in 
Chapter 11 the restructuring plan must be approved by all creditor classes and equity with each class 
requiring majority vote of creditors within each class and two thirds by value67
 
. This could lead to a 
recovery for equity holders that would have never been possible under the SAP. Below we can see the 
deviations from absolute priority in US and UK expressed as a % of the face value of the claims over the 
last 10 years. Deviations have declined significantly in US because of changes to the bankruptcy code 
which are more creditor oriented.  
              Source: Franks and Torous (1994), Olsen (1996) and the author 
WACC 
We finally get to our WACC comparison between both samples, our ultimate goal in our empirical model. 
Above we have put forward some potential explanations for the COD and COE levels on an absolute and 
relative basis.  However, the WACC has to be evaluated on its own, regardless of the individual value of 
its main components. This is due to the fact that capital structure (D/E) powerfully drives the cost of 
capital, mostly on a mark to market basis. The market price of the capital structure dramatically changes 
the value of the WACC relative to the level derived by using book value. Therefore, it is the WACC itself 
which tells the “true” meaning of the changes experienced by the company.  
On average, the distressed WACC is lower in US than in Europe across our three periods. What are the 
potential explanations for that? We walk through each period to come into terms with it. 
FY-1 and FY 
When the company’s profitability rapidly erodes, free cash flows are weak for debt service and liquidity 
fades then the company enters a distressed face. The market and investors start to anticipate a potential 
restructuring or liquidation ahead of them if a workout is not feasible. Investors think in terms of recovery 
rate whereas the company (management) thinks in terms of survival and value protection. Then the 
bankruptcy code comes into play. The code affects in three ways: the pricing of debt and interest rate 
spreads; the management of the financial distress; how the pie is dividend among creditors, shareholders 
and the debtor. If the restructuring is inevitable and the liquidation is ruled out (as the company is worth 
more as a going concern) then the investors think in terms of the instruments that the restructuring code 
has to protect the value of the company. The table below is a quick summary of these instruments that 
the reader should have in mind to understand our reasoning: 
                                                          
67  Recall that deviations from strict absolute priority always sum to zero. 
Creditor Class
UK Workouts Chapter 11
US Distressed 
Exchanges
Secured -12.0% -4.0% -7.0%
Unsecured 6.0% 1.0% -1.0%
Equity 6.0% 3.0% 8.0%
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          Source: Franks (2008) and the author 
It comes as no surprise that the recovery rate is higher in US than in Europe. It is the combination of: 
• Control rights between the debtor and the creditors supervised by a court that facilitates the 
protection of the company’s value (the company itself and indirectly its shareholders) and the 
creditor’s interests.  
• Automatic stay: aims at shielding the value of the company from the secured creditors that seeks 
to enforce their collateral. This instruments allows to protect the value of the company and hence 
the recovery rate of the unsecured and ultimately of the equity holders. 
• Supra-financing: this instrument also helps the company through the restructuring process if the 
cash is needed to make a mandatory payment or invest in a newly positive NPV project. As it is 
always easier to raise money internally than externally in a distressed situation, this loan allows 
the company to carry on its operations without undermining the current and future business of the 
company. Likewise, it helps to protect the value of the company and hence the recovery rate of 
the entire investor base. 
• Dilution of secured claims: we have seen the deviations from the strict absolute priority rule 
(DSAP). This is usually damaging for secured investors that witness value transfer from their 
claims to more junior lenders. In US given the relevance of the unsecured bond market within the 
capital structure of the companies, DSAP allows to enhance the recovery value of unsecured 
investors and potentially the equity holders.  
• Creditor’s right score: Chapter 11 would score low at first sight given its debtor oriented profile. 
However, all these value enhancing instruments of Chapter 11 translate into company’s value 
protection that consequently increases the recovery rate of the entire investor base. 
 
Therefore, the lower FY-1 and FY WACC level (in particular the P&L based WACC) in US versus 
Europe reinforces the “Chapter 11 efficiency thesis” that we highlighted in section 1, which is also 
supported by the higher historical recovery rate for investors in US distressed companies. When the 
restructuring is looming, investors in general feel more comfortable with a value enhancing legal 
framework with powerful protective instruments as opposed to more credit friendly jurisdictions that 
aim to just protect the interest of the secured creditors (the kind of market in Europe).   
UK France Germany US
Main bankruptcy procedure
Administrative 
Receivership
Redressment 
judiciaire
Insolvency Act Chapter 11
Control rights Secured creditors
Court appointed 
administrator
Creditors under 
court supervision
Debtor, creditors 
collectively under 
court supervision
Automatic stay None
Yes (up to 20 
months)
Possible (3 months)
180 days but 
unlimited period of 
renewal
Supra-priority financing None Yes 
Only if creditors 
approve
Yes
Dilution of secured claims None High Limited Limited
Creditor's rights score (max=4) 4 0 3 1
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FY1 
From our point of view the lower FY1 WACC in US is lower than in Europe for two reasons: 
• The better credit and financial metrics of the newly restructured companies as we have seen 
previously. Chapter 11, as a debtor friendly code, aims not only to conduct a aggressive liability 
management to shore up the capital structure but forces the company to improve its profitability 
and cash flows to restore its business flow before exiting the restructuring process. Chapter 11 
does not conceive a comprehensive restructuring without a solid improvement in fundamentals or 
otherwise the restructuring will never meet with success.  
• The successful rate of the Chapter 11 emerging countries. Such a thorough and comprehensive 
code encompassing both lender concessions (debt forgiveness, debt for equity swaps, extension 
of maturity & expansion of new bank debt) and borrower concessions (sale of assets, new equity 
infusion, repayment of debt) boost the successful rate of companies emerging from Chapter 11. A 
newly sound capital structure with strong credit and financial metrics undoubtedly warrants a 
lower WACC.  
◦ Undoubtedly investors, regardless of their recovery rate68
◦ Therefore the lower WACC in FY1 in US vs Europe is a combination of better 
fundamentals, better recovery rates for investors, and confidence in the 
restructuring by the market. 
, should feel more 
comfortable sitting in a newly rehabilitated company which has undergone a 
significant overhaul of the capital structure through very powerful and effective 
tools. All these tools aim to protect the value of the company: by avoiding 
collateral seizure (stay); by allowing cash flows streams and financing (super 
financing loans); by getting all investors involved in the process, etc.  
 
In summary, our theoretical preference (section 1) over Chapter 11 in terms of efficiency, 
comprehensiveness, and effectiveness might69
6 Limitations of our empirical analysis 
 be finally supported by the empirical results on the 
WACC. If Chapter 11 takes pride of its efficiency to successfully turn a distressed company around, will 
the WACC be able to capture that? 
There are several limitations in our analysis that we would like to discuss. These limitations stem from the 
size, the nature and the statistical dispersion of the sample; the lack of market data for some key inputs; 
and the input assumptions. 
The sample 
As we described at the beginning the section we have gone about the empirical analysis with a very small 
sample. This empirical project aims to estimate the market value of the WACC for distressed companies 
and thus, we need market data for publicly trading companies. Therefore, we leave out from the sample 
                                                          
68 Which is also higher in US  than in Europe. 
69  We highlight “might” as the outcome of the WACC is not as accurate as we would have liked, rendering the results “open to 
debate”.  
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all private distressed companies or otherwise trading companies that went private after the restructuring, 
which limits the size of our sample. 
Second, the profile of the sample is not ideal as we are putting together companies from different sectors 
with different market dynamics, balance sheets, financial and credit metrics and so on. As a 
consequence, we are not comparing “apples” to “apples” and the size or the losses of a company for 
example could severely drive the final output. Even though we have been very diligent through the 
filtering process of the sample to discard small companies or rather unreliable data, we still have a 
sample with stark disparities amongst the different firms. Since we are calculating averages for the 
sample, the output is affected by the weights of some companies within the sample.  
Thirdly, and in line with the previous one, our two samples display significant dispersion, skewness and 
range as we can observe in the table below. This is the consequence of a having a small and 
heterogeneous sample. 
Europe sample statistics 
                         Source: Author 
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US sample statistics 
         Source: Author 
Market data 
If our goal is to estimate the market value of the WACC, by all means we need market data. This is even 
more relevant when we talk about distressed companies whose capital structure at market prices strongly 
deviates from their book value. However, it is a difficult and sometimes an impossible mission to get hold 
of market prices for the debt. Either there is no historical market data or otherwise it is not reliable. 
Furthermore, these firms hold plenty of bilateral or revolving credit loans in the balance sheets that never 
trade in the market so we have to estimate their market value. You can count on the book value but 
historical values are seldom realistic and let alone up to date as they do not reflect the financial and credit 
health of the company at each point in time. This difference between market and book values is more 
acute in distressed companies. We only have to look at the P/B multiples to observe the deep discount 
embedded in the book equity (Sweeny 2001).  
In summary our analysis attempts to estimate a fair market price for the debt given the absence of market 
prices through the sample period. This inevitably entails a subjective (but empirical in our case) judgment.  
Inputs and assumptions 
Broadly speaking, the estimation of the WACC under the CAPM framework is a very subjective exercise 
due to the underlying assumptions. This is far more obvious when estimating the WACC in “distress”. The 
most controversial assumptions of our empirical project are: 
• Beta: we have used the adjusted beta but not the relevered industry beta for each company.  This 
was our initial aim but we had to compromise on that after struggling to gather a reliable trading 
comparable company group for each of our firms in the samples. Likewise, to envisage the target 
D/E for each company across our three periods would have turned out to be a very challenging 
exercise. However, the adjusted beta is giving us the market perception of the company’s risk so 
it is not such a bad estimation.   
• Equity Risk Premium: we have used the standard 5% ERP in our calculations. We could have 
relied on Bloomberg's, Damodaran, Reuters or otherwise our own estimation at each point in time 
for our companies. However, again this is a very subjective exercise and given the fact that these 
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three data sources are very reliable and tend to suggest an ERP between 4%-6% between 1970-
2009, we use the averaged mid-point at 5% through the sample period. We also provide for an 
ERP related sensitivity table in our WACC to assess the levels in a changing ERP environment. 
Our own estimations of ERP are also pointing to a mid-point of 5%, in line with these 
databases70
• Estimation of market debt: as we pointed out above, this is our most controversial assumption. 
The lack of market data did not discourage us from pursuing our goal and we came up with the 
bond approach. To our surprise, the outcome was in line with the trading levels of distressed debt 
nowadays. We have also looked at the P/B to evaluate the consistency between the market value 
of debt and equity and we found very encouraging results.  
.  
 
WACC dates 
We have selected three WACC dates as outlined above. We have decided to choose at least one year 
before and after the event to allow the market to anticipate the potential restructuring/liquidation in the 
former and to evaluate the merits of the restructuring in the latter. We could have gone two years after the 
restructuring but we wanted to focus on the merits of the restructuring on the WACC rather than the 
fundamental improvement or deterioration of the company’s financials.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
70 The outstanding work of Damodaran on the ERP supports even more our standardized 5% for the period. 
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APPENDIX 1 – European sample – Main Financial metrics 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average Debt Age 
In millions per currency EBIT Interest cost Gross Debt Market Value Debt (years) Book Equity
Name FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1
MICROLOGICA AG (2.64) (2.07) (3.27) 0.00 0.22 0.26 0.69 4.25 4.13 0.62 2.39 4.13 1.70 1.70 1.70 15.11 4.76 (5.19) 19.05 27.93 2.39###
PERFECT HOLDING SA (8.94) (22.07) (27.70) 1.00 1.99 1.67 24.96 49.65 41.76 10.26 20.79 41.76 1.80 1.80 1.80 120.30 35.60 21.25 393.40 21.28 136.00###
SAUNALAHTI GROUP OYJ (0.09) (42.56) 0.63 0.49 0.60 0.96 12.21 7.20 23.99 2.32 (4.07) 23.99 2.40 2.40 2.40 30.76 (7.18) (5.41) 227.37 31.56 27.55###
ALVERN NORWAY ASA (1.27) (5.66) 1.20 0.16 0.16 0.16 92.37 72.34 58.00 80.51 62.30 58.00 1.90 1.90 1.90 (89.03) (83.05) 15.00 13.80 4.99 2.94###
COMPLETEL (18.00) (20.97) (7.90) 8.00 7.46 0.09 225.00 232.35 5.00 94.18 108.06 5.00 1.90 1.90 1.90 125.00 94.65 280.36 125.00 94.65 51.11###
TELE2 NETHERLANDS HOLDING NV (55.63) (31.76) (13.99) 46.16 47.61 0.91 1,762.26 1,765.92 42.57 314.80 282.30 42.57 3.40 3.40 3.40 107.66 (114.29) 503.56 300.62 45.67 516.98###
SER SYSTEMS AG (10.92) (131.80) (28.00) 1.71 1.60 1.12 42.70 39.94 28.00 9.72 9.04 28.00 2.30 2.30 2.30 170.47 7.71 7.71 77.24 1.82 2.80###
JAZZTEL PLC (38.27) (34.33) (21.97) 20.27 26.93 3.00 862.88 807.65 119.44 484.60 347.36 119.44 2.00 2.00 2.00 26.79 (105.17) 333.69 204.33 109.04 202.66###
WWL INTERNET AG (1.54) (1.43) (0.20) 0.02 0.02 0.02 1.20 0.98 0.98 0.85 0.58 0.98 2.10 2.10 2.10 13.55 7.19 7.19 12.50 1.33 0.54###
BAEURER AG (10.48) (0.75) (0.75) 0.61 0.06 0.06 25.33 12.10 12.10 8.10 9.04 12.10 3.10 3.10 3.10 12.07 6.76 6.76 13.86 4.19 3.31###
ASPIRO AB (48.52) (15.24) (6.30) 0.26 0.50 0.05 6.31 5.80 1.30 0.07 (5.51) 1.30 2.80 2.80 2.80 191.45 29.90 43.99 80.04 15.68 95.41###
LIBERTY GLOBAL EUROPE-A (43.68) (116.96) (63.24) 231.40 213.95 78.04 9,744.93 8,915.75 8,095.84 4,538.67 4,119.11 8,095.84 2.40 2.40 2.40 (2,688.89) (3,109.12) 100.00 230.58 26.61 44.34###
JOMED NV 8.37 2.96 2.96 0.51 0.94 0.94 32.53 69.03 55.00 22.88 50.41 55.00 1.80 1.80 1.80 406.62 417.87 417.87 1,229.22 347.42 1.42###
AGIPLAN TECHNOSOFT AG (0.24) (0.12) 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.08 0.11 1.80 1.80 1.80 14.42 14.23 14.23 27.90 1.08 0.78###
GEOSENTRIC OYJ (3.70) (2.00) (0.75) 0.08 0.08 0.29 1.90 1.10 7.20 0.45 (0.23) 7.20 2.25 2.25 2.25 9.40 (6.40) 2.42 13.20 6.34 6.50###
GARANT SCHUH & MODE AG-VORZU 2.81 4.28 4.20 1.98 1.98 1.98 110.97 191.95 191.95 69.35 142.87 191.95 2.20 2.20 2.20 35.97 28.75 28.75 23.69 23.42 16.47
PGAM ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES 1.41 1.23 0.80 1.52 1.51 1.28 37.88 37.79 32.00 11.60 11.90 32.00 2.10 2.10 2.10 31.57 36.42 36.42 48.82 21.95 1.08
NOVEMBER AG (0.30) (1.33) (1.94) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.35 0.23 0.28 0.14 0.09 0.28 1.90 1.90 1.90 23.98 21.43 10.00 24.05 20.54 9.61
WCM BETEILIGUNGS & GRUND AG (14.69) (1.87) (1.87) 34.17 36.50 30.00 396.57 381.99 381.99 125.50 96.17 381.99 1.10 1.10 1.10 191.02 168.15 168.15 135.75 58.92 20.80
SCANMINING AB (44.85) (37.21) (37.21) 10.22 11.00 7.79 255.51 194.78 194.78 92.87 28.67 194.78 1.90 1.90 1.90 440.09 420.84 420.84 2,031.05 383.00 386.83
INKU AG (0.17) (0.64) (0.64) 0.35 0.01 0.01 6.34 0.19 0.19 1.17 0.05 0.19 1.85 1.85 1.85 (0.81) 2.33 2.33 3.90 5.42 2.71
EAG-BETEILIGUNGS AG (6.18) (30.52) (12.00) 4.94 4.94 4.94 109.27 60.68 40.00 69.44 24.77 40.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 41.87 6.20 7.00 39.60 11.49 3.14
KAMPA AG (8.68) (3.85) 1.50 0.47 0.15 0.15 8.01 8.94 7.00 1.83 6.62 7.00 1.70 1.70 1.70 35.91 36.14 30.00 43.56 37.26 3.18
ORCO PROPERTY GROUP 2.00 (137.85) 4.90 20.04 13.45 25.03 1,473.76 1,565.76 1,558.70 1,014.53 1,232.68 1,558.70 2.25 2.25 2.25 940.53 425.85 95.79 615.10 70.81 82.08
ARCANDOR AG (147.01) (18.70) (18.70) 77.76 147.19 147.19 2,866.39 3,932.77 3,932.77 1,687.56 1,877.50 3,932.77 1.70 1.70 1.70 2,053.38 727.43 727.43 1,687.41 415.29 45.83
EDOB ABWICKLUNGS AG (4.50) (12.10) (12.10) 10.17 19.64 19.64 203.30 212.70 212.70 106.88 43.89 212.70 1.20 1.20 1.20 118.10 (16.90) (16.90) 231.06 53.09 7.55
MarketCap
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In millions per currency Price to Book EBITDA Net Income FFO Net Debt Cash
Name FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1
MICROLOGICA AG 19.05 27.93 2.39### 1.3x 5.9x (0.5x) -2.14 -1.85 -2.54 (2.60) (2.17) (2.80) (2.10) (1.95) (2.07) (3.78) 3.09 0.83 4.47 1.17 3.30
PERFECT HOLDING SA 393.40 21.28 136.00### 3.3x 0.6x 6.4x -8.24 -18.63 -25.29 (8.15) (12.30) 0.50 (7.44) (8.86) 2.91 16.22 42.44 39.68 8.74 7.22 2.08
SAUNALAHTI GROUP OYJ 227.37 31.56 27.55### 7.4x (4.4x) (5.1x) -0.09 -42.56 0.63 0.18 (47.32) (1.80) 0.18 (47.32) (1.80) 7.12 5.39 21.43 5.09 1.82 2.56
ALVERN NORWAY ASA 13.80 4.99 2.94### (0.2x) (0.1x) 0.2x -1.27 -5.66 1.20 (1.49) (6.14) (6.14) (1.49) (6.14) (6.14) 89.45 68.29 53.95 2.92 4.05 4.05
COMPLETEL 125.00 94.65 51.11### 1.0x 1.0x 0.2x -18.00 -20.97 -0.30 (40.63) (28.03) (7.79) (40.63) (28.03) (0.20) 225.00 176.18 (50.31) 56.17 55.31
TELE2 NETHERLANDS HOLDING NV 300.62 45.67 516.98### 2.8x (0.4x) 1.0x -20.54 -0.92 22.22 (108.10) (84.85) (11.51) (73.01) (54.01) 24.70 805.12 1,132.35 (110.99) 957.14 633.57 153.56
SER SYSTEMS AG 77.24 1.82 2.80### 0.5x 0.2x 0.4x -4.26 -41.49 62.32 (6.60) (155.21) (155.21) 0.06 (64.89) (64.89) 37.66 34.10 22.15 5.04 5.85 5.85
JAZZTEL PLC 204.33 109.04 202.66### 7.6x (1.0x) 0.6x -20.90 -14.92 -3.99 (3.28) (45.20) (21.39) 14.09 (25.78) (3.42) 623.84 719.84 99.97 239.03 87.81 19.47
WWL INTERNET AG 12.50 1.33 0.54### 0.9x 0.2x 0.1x -0.74 -0.81 0.43 (1.53) (6.37) (6.37) (0.74) (5.74) (5.74) (0.13) 0.35 0.35 1.33 0.64 0.64
BAEURER AG 13.86 4.19 3.31### 1.1x 0.6x 0.5x -0.75 0.39 0.39 (14.68) (2.24) (2.24) (4.95) (1.10) (1.10) 23.66 10.10 10.10 1.66 1.99 1.99
ASPIRO AB 80.04 15.68 95.41### 0.4x 0.5x 2.2x -45.26 -3.94 -4.23 (37.02) (53.68) (7.67) (33.76) (42.38) (5.59) (10.23) (13.75) (3.87) 16.54 19.55 5.17
LIBERTY GLOBAL EUROPE-A 230.58 26.61 44.34### (0.1x) (0.0x) 0.4x 323.57 72.82 107.41 (2,289.80) (364.32) 75.16 (1,922.55) (174.54) 245.81 8,889.93 8,614.65 7,917.34 855.00 301.09 178.50
JOMED NV 1,229.22 347.42 1.42### 3.0x 0.8x 0.0x 8.37 2.96 2.96 9.26 1.86 1.86 9.26 1.86 1.86 17.07 52.03 38.01 15.46 16.99 16.99
AGIPLAN TECHNOSOFT AG 27.90 1.08 0.78### 1.9x 0.1x 0.1x -0.04 0.10 1.01 (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) 0.07 0.12 0.12 (2.53) (0.52) (0.52) 2.73 0.63 0.63
GEOSENTRIC OYJ 13.20 6.34 6.50### 1.4x (1.0x) 2.7x -3.70 -2.00 -0.63 (4.30) (10.30) 11.74 (4.30) (10.30) 11.85 1.00 0.80 6.17 0.90 0.30 1.03
GARANT SCHUH & MODE AG-VORZU 23.69 23.42 16.47 0.7x 0.8x 0.6x 5.09 10.17 10.09 1.87 0.93 0.93 4.15 6.82 6.82 102.10 177.43 177.43 8.87 14.53 14.53
PGAM ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES 48.82 21.95 1.08 1.5x 0.6x 0.0x 3.03 2.89 2.46 0.83 0.11 0.11 2.45 1.77 1.77 35.58 34.65 28.86 2.30 3.14 3.14
NOVEMBER AG 24.05 20.54 9.61 1.0x 1.0x 1.0x -0.35 -1.18 2.60 (0.21) (1.42) (2.48) (0.26) (1.27) 2.06 (2.84) (1.65) (0.96) 3.19 1.89 1.24
WCM BETEILIGUNGS & GRUND AG 135.75 58.92 20.80 0.7x 0.4x 0.1x -8.89 -1.79 -1.79 (21.28) (9.83) (9.83) (15.47) (9.75) (9.75) 300.38 307.91 307.91 96.19 74.09 74.09
SCANMINING AB 2,031.05 383.00 386.83 4.6x 0.9x 0.9x -29.76 -22.12 -22.12 (48.06) (41.32) (41.32) (32.97) (26.23) (26.23) 224.27 186.68 186.68 31.23 8.10 8.10
INKU AG 3.90 5.42 2.71 (4.8x) 2.3x 1.2x -0.03 -0.53 -0.53 (0.35) (0.70) (0.70) (0.21) (0.58) (0.58) 5.98 (0.03) (0.03) 0.36 0.22 0.22
EAG-BETEILIGUNGS AG 39.60 11.49 3.14 0.9x 1.9x 0.4x -0.87 -25.58 -7.06 (9.94) (36.01) (36.01) (4.64) (31.07) (31.07) 92.53 46.51 25.83 16.74 14.17 14.17
KAMPA AG 43.56 37.26 3.18 1.2x 1.0x 0.1x -7.81 -3.01 2.34 (8.79) (3.86) (3.86) (7.92) (3.02) (3.02) 6.82 7.89 5.95 1.19 1.05 1.05
ORCO PROPERTY GROUP 615.10 70.81 82.08 0.7x 0.2x 0.9x 2.00 -137.85 4.90 (13.09) (360.78) (15.60) (13.09) (360.78) (15.60) 1,292.21 1,499.06 1,510.23 181.55 66.70 48.46
ARCANDOR AG 1,687.41 415.29 45.83 0.8x 0.6x 0.1x -38.87 90.28 90.28 (119.26) (57.97) (57.97) (11.12) 51.01 51.01 1,731.38 3,157.77 3,157.77 1,135.01 775.00 775.00
EDOB ABWICKLUNGS AG 231.06 53.09 7.55 2.0x (3.1x) (0.4x) 1.90 -5.40 -5.40 (11.30) (82.60) (82.60) (4.90) (75.90) (75.90) 160.30 194.70 194.70 43.00 18.00 18.00
MarketCap
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APPENDIX 1 – European sample – Main credit metrics 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
 
 
FFO/Debt ROCE
Name FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1
MICROLOGICA AG (12.1x) (1.8x) (2.0x) (0.1x) (0.6x) (0.4x) (2,136.0x) (8.5x) (9.9x) (2,637.0x) (9.5x) (12.8x) (65.7%) (96.3%) -
PERFECT HOLDING SA (1.2x) (0.7x) 0.3x (0.8x) (0.7x) (0.4x) (8.2x) (9.4x) (15.1x) (9.0x) (11.1x) (16.6x) (22.4%) (57.7%) 3.2%
SAUNALAHTI GROUP OYJ 0.1x (26.3x) (0.3x) (33.9x) (0.0x) 9.5x (0.2x) (70.9x) 0.7x (0.2x) (70.9x) 0.7x 1.7% - -
ALVERN NORWAY ASA (0.1x) (0.3x) (0.4x) (18.2x) (3.2x) 12.1x (8.2x) (36.5x) 7.7x (8.2x) (36.5x) 7.7x - - (33.6%)
COMPLETEL (0.7x) (0.5x) (0.2x) (3.1x) (2.8x) (4.2x) (2.3x) (2.8x) (3.3x) (2.3x) (2.8x) (85.8x) (46.4%) (34.3%) (10.9%)
TELE2 NETHERLANDS HOLDING NV (0.2x) (0.1x) 2.3x (21.4x) (477.8x) 0.5x (0.4x) (0.0x) 24.4x (1.2x) (0.7x) (15.4x) (23.1%) - (8.4%)
SER SYSTEMS AG 0.0x (6.5x) (9.3x) (2.5x) (0.2x) 0.1x (2.5x) (26.0x) 55.6x (6.4x) (82.5x) (25.0x) (12.4%) (1,302.9%) (1,738.7%)
JAZZTEL PLC 0.1x (0.1x) (0.1x) (10.3x) (13.5x) (7.5x) (1.0x) (0.6x) (1.3x) (1.9x) (1.3x) (7.3x) (1.5%) - (18.9%)
WWL INTERNET AG (2.5x) (23.4x) (23.4x) (0.4x) (0.3x) 0.6x (46.1x) (40.3x) 21.3x (95.9x) (71.5x) (10.0x) (41.6%) (311.5%) (311.5%)
BAEURER AG (0.8x) (0.4x) (0.4x) (8.5x) 7.7x 7.7x (1.2x) 6.1x 6.1x (17.1x) (11.7x) (11.7x) (157.0%) (47.5%) (47.5%)
ASPIRO AB (21.4x) (29.2x) (17.2x) (0.0x) (0.4x) (0.1x) (171.4x) (7.9x) (84.6x) (183.8x) (30.5x) (126.1x) (74.9%) (601.5%) (67.7%)
LIBERTY GLOBAL EUROPE-A (0.8x) (0.1x) 0.1x 7.5x 30.6x 18.8x 1.4x 0.3x 1.4x (0.2x) (0.5x) (0.8x) - - 3.7%
JOMED NV 1.1x 0.1x 0.1x 1.0x 5.8x 4.7x 16.5x 3.1x 3.1x 16.5x 3.1x 3.1x 8.4% 1.5% 1.6%
AGIPLAN TECHNOSOFT AG 1.4x 4.2x 4.2x (1.3x) 0.3x 0.0x (20.0x) 48.0x 506.0x (120.5x) (58.0x) 400.0x (3.6%) (2.6%) (2.6%)
GEOSENTRIC OYJ (9.1x) (37.5x) 6.6x (0.1x) (0.1x) (2.9x) (48.7x) (26.3x) (2.2x) (48.7x) (26.3x) (2.6x) (152.2%) - 488.4%
GARANT SCHUH & MODE AG-VORZU 0.1x 0.1x 0.1x 5.4x 4.7x 4.8x 2.6x 5.1x 5.1x 1.4x 2.2x 2.1x 5.1% 1.7% 1.7%
PGAM ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES 0.3x 0.2x 0.2x 3.1x 3.3x 3.3x 2.0x 1.9x 1.9x 0.9x 0.8x 0.6x 4.8% 0.6% 0.6%
NOVEMBER AG (3.0x) (21.9x) 29.9x (0.3x) (0.0x) 0.0x (25.0x) (127.7x) 173.3x (21.0x) (144.2x) (129.3x) (3.4%) (26.2%) (96.4%)
WCM BETEILIGUNGS & GRUND AG (0.2x) (0.1x) (0.1x) (11.1x) (53.4x) (53.4x) (0.3x) (0.0x) (0.1x) (0.4x) (0.1x) (0.1x) (14.5%) (7.1%) (7.1%)
SCANMINING AB (0.5x) (0.5x) (0.5x) (2.1x) (2.2x) (2.2x) (2.9x) (2.0x) (2.8x) (4.4x) (3.4x) (4.8x) (27.6%) (26.8%) (26.8%)
INKU AG (0.1x) (12.1x) (12.1x) (58.7x) (0.1x) (0.1x) (0.1x) (52.8x) (52.8x) (0.5x) (64.4x) (64.4x) - (110.9%) (110.9%)
EAG-BETEILIGUNGS AG (0.2x) (2.0x) (3.1x) (31.3x) (0.6x) (1.4x) (0.2x) (5.2x) (1.4x) (1.3x) (6.2x) (2.4x) (26.3%) (215.4%) (306.5%)
KAMPA AG (4.0x) (1.3x) (1.7x) (0.3x) (0.7x) 0.7x (16.7x) (20.6x) 16.1x (18.5x) (26.4x) 10.3x (80.0%) (34.2%) (41.7%)
ORCO PROPERTY GROUP (0.0x) (0.9x) (0.0x) 183.9x (2.8x) 79.5x 0.1x (10.2x) 0.2x 0.1x (10.2x) 0.2x (2.2%) (72.5%) (3.8%)
ARCANDOR AG (0.0x) 0.1x 0.1x (18.4x) 10.9x 10.9x (0.5x) 0.6x 0.6x (1.9x) (0.1x) (0.1x) (9.7%) (5.0%) (5.0%)
EDOB ABWICKLUNGS AG (0.1x) (1.4x) (1.4x) 26.8x (9.8x) (9.8x) 0.2x (0.3x) (0.3x) (0.4x) (0.6x) (0.6x) (14.1%) - -
Debt/Ebitda Ebitda/Interest Ebit/Interest
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APPENDIX 1 – European sample – Credit metric ratings and synthetic spreads 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FFO/Net Debt ROCE Scoring Blended rating Spread
Name FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1
MICROLOGICA AG CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
PERFECT HOLDING SA CCC CCC BB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 6.2 D D CCC- 16.0% 16.0% 9.0%
SAUNALAHTI GROUP OYJ CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
ALVERN NORWAY ASA CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC BBB CCC CCC BBB CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 6.3 D D CCC- 16.0% 16.0% 9.0%
COMPLETEL CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
TELE2 NETHERLANDS HOLDING NV CCC CCC AAA CCC CCC AA CCC CCC A CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 2.6 D D A- 16.0% 16.0% 1.5%
SER SYSTEMS AG CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC AAA CCC CCC AAA CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 4.5 D D BB+ 16.0% 16.0% 3.5%
JAZZTEL PLC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
WWL INTERNET AG CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC AA CCC CCC A CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 5.0 D D B+ 16.0% 16.0% 4.3%
BAEURER AG CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC BB BB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 6.8 6.8 D C C 16.0% 5.5% 14.0%
ASPIRO AB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
LIBERTY GLOBAL EUROPE-A CCC CCC B CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 6.6 D D C+ 16.0% 16.0% 13.0%
JOMED NV AA CCC B A CCC B A B B A BB BB CCC CCC CCC 2.8 6.6 5.9 A- C+ B- 1.5% 13.0% 5.5%
AGIPLAN TECHNOSOFT AG AA AAA AAA CCC AAA AAA CCC AAA AAA CCC CCC AAA CCC CCC CCC 5.0 2.1 1.4 B+ A+ AA+ 1.5% 1.0% 0.6%
GEOSENTRIC OYJ CCC CCC AAA CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC AAA 7.0 7.0 4.2 D D BB+ 16.0% 16.0% 3.5%
GARANT SCHUH & MODE AG-VORZU B B B CCC B B B BB BB B B B CCC CCC CCC 6.4 5.9 5.9 CC+ B- B- 10.0% 5.5% 5.5%
PGAM ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES BB B B BB BB BB B B B CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 5.5 5.9 5.9 B+ B- B- 4.3% 5.5% 5.5%
NOVEMBER AG CCC CCC AAA CCC CCC AAA CCC CCC AAA CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 2.1 D D A+ 16.0% 16.0% 1.0%
WCM BETEILIGUNGS & GRUND AG CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
SCANMINING AB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
INKU AG CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
EAG-BETEILIGUNGS AG CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
KAMPA AG CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC AA CCC CCC A CCC CCC A CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 4.5 D D BB 16.0% 16.0% 4.0%
ORCO PROPERTY GROUP CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
ARCANDOR AG CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
EDOB ABWICKLUNGS AG CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
Net Debt/Ebitda Ebitda/Interest Ebit/Interest
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APPENDIX 1 – American sample – Main Financial metrics 
 
Source: Author 
EBIT Interest Cost Gross Debt Market  value debt Average Debt Age (years)
Name FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1
SMC VENTURES INC (0.92) (3.28) (0.19) 0.13 0.07 4.00 3.80 2.50 1.19 2.08 2.50 2.5 2.5 2.5
CYTOMEDIX INC (3.35) (2.38) (0.54) 0.00 0.00 0.22 3.98 0.80 0.15 3.19 0.80 2.1 2.1 2.1
USG CORP 184.00 32.00 50.00 13.00 14.00 701.00 786.00 450.00 459.96 532.62 450.00 1.8 1.8 1.8
FRIEDE GOLDMAN HALTER INC (11.53) (63.25) (60.49) 8.39 8.67 310.64 286.70 109.24 169.59 148.08 109.24 1.8 1.8 1.8
PROTEONOMIX INC (0.63) (0.66) (0.17) 0.13 0.06 5.63 4.95 3.08 2.79 3.40 3.08 2.2 2.2 2.2
RADNET INC (0.19) 3.32 1.08 3.93 4.47 174.88 170.11 169.29 108.10 94.55 169.29 1.9 1.9 1.9
AMERICAN WAGERING INCORP 0.15 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.04 1.81 1.73 1.95 1.27 1.32 1.95 1.2 1.2 1.2
AMERCO (12.25) 14.26 (1.03) 28.70 35.00 1,487.17 1,543.88 857.78 903.17 892.82 857.78 2.1 2.1 2.1
WEIRTON STEEL CORP (36.42) (21.50) (29.66) 11.30 4.96 427.62 438.96 188.73 139.71 294.11 188.73 2.8 2.8 2.8
RAHAXI INC (2.07) (0.62) (2.77) 0.01 0.01 0.85 1.00 0.50 0.71 0.82 0.50 1.8 1.8 1.8
PRESIDENT CASINOS INC (0.90) 1.24 0.49 3.81 3.72 108.94 107.21 30.00 49.59 50.08 30.00 1.8 1.8 1.8
NATIONAL STEEL CORP-CL B (60.20) (171.20) 7.50 15.50 19.30 695.50 939.00 96.70 346.15 493.41 96.70 2.4 2.4 2.4
ZAP (1.02) (2.47) (0.51) 0.01 0.01 0.28 1.70 2.30 0.12 1.39 2.30 1.9 1.9 1.9
SOFTLOCK.COM INC (3.63) (0.66) 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.90 0.77 0.45 0.17 0.06 0.45 2.9 2.9 2.9
HERBORIUM GROUP INC (0.22) (0.81) 1.00 0.04 0.05 4.13 3.09 4.50 2.89 1.83 4.50 2.5 2.5 2.5
COMPOSITE TECHNOLOGY CORPORA (3.09) (3.44) (4.13) 0.01 0.01 0.90 1.04 8.87 0.66 0.78 8.87 1.8 1.8 1.8
INTELLIGENT COMMUNICATION EN (5.03) (2.54) (0.04) 0.14 0.19 9.40 7.80 1.50 6.95 5.09 1.50 1.6 1.6 1.6
EPICUS COMMUNICATIONS GROUP (0.12) (1.71) (0.55) 0.05 0.06 2.49 3.02 10.31 1.34 1.55 10.31 2.5 2.5 2.5
AIR INDUSTRIES GROUP INC 0.08 (0.86) (0.15) 0.01 0.02 0.28 0.53 13.86 0.05 0.04 13.86 3.4 3.4 3.4
NEWTON ENERGY CORP (0.28) (0.36) (0.09) 0.23 0.18 14.13 10.46 8.80 7.55 5.36 8.80 2.9 2.9 2.9
MEDIA 100 INC (0.94) (1.86) (1.86) 0.63 0.50 25.00 22.00 20.00 13.41 12.66 20.00 2.1 2.1 2.1
INTL THOROUGHBRED BREEDERS (1.31) (0.79) 0.22 1.78 2.43 55.14 40.44 76.48 23.02 0.28 76.48 2.1 2.1 2.1
MEDICAL STAFFING SOLUTIONS I 2.84 2.84 (0.35) 0.18 0.09 3.13 2.77 4.73 0.09 1.07 4.73 2.1 2.1 2.1
U.S. ENERGY SYSTEMS INC 2.94 (0.93) (11.22) 2.70 5.77 89.16 258.64 206.60 44.62 157.09 206.60 1.9 1.9 1.9
PILGRIM'S PRIDE CORP 136.78 (39.08) 129.13 9.03 9.42 481.27 482.78 175.00 361.36 365.79 175.00 1.4 1.4 1.4
GBO INC (1.25) 1.43 (3.57) 1.35 1.07 48.21 45.60 16.34 19.19 20.81 16.34 2.5 2.5 2.5
PROLOGIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (0.94) (0.54) (0.04) 0.17 0.12 8.60 9.73 1.13 5.83 7.46 1.13 1.8 1.8 1.8
FACTORY 2-U STORES INC (4.77) (3.92) (3.77) 0.16 0.16 15.75 17.00 35.00 10.72 11.82 35.00 2.8 2.8 2.8
SIRICOMM INC (0.65) (0.17) (0.15) 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.90 2.20 0.00 (1.74) 2.20 2.4 2.4 2.4
CHESAPEAKE CORP 11.50 11.70 12.90 11.60 12.30 515.30 557.40 386.40 325.50 370.07 386.40 1.8 1.8 1.8
TELEMETRIX INC (0.27) (0.17) (0.41) 0.23 0.30 7.00 8.28 3.79 3.08 3.41 3.79 2.0 2.0 2.0
PFF BANCORP INC 14.34 16.16 24.06 21.23 39.27 772.03 1,256.63 1,023.15 382.23 575.88 1,023.15 2.1 2.1 2.1
INTROGEN THERAPEUTICS INC (7.16) (4.62) (7.82) 0.16 0.16 7.74 7.41 7.98 4.71 4.57 7.98 2.1 2.1 2.1
BUTLER INTL INC 0.27 (0.12) 2.26 1.73 1.73 67.49 67.49 64.57 29.25 29.60 64.57 2.5 2.5 2.5
MOTORS LIQUIDATION CO 2,083.00 1,257.00 2,045.00 721.00 1,230.00 43,211.00 54,402.00 27,402.00 26,450.43 27,937.63 27,402.00 2.4 2.4 2.4
VISTEON CORP 127.00 (15.00) 50.00 57.00 55.00 2,844.00 2,715.00 1,930.00 1,886.14 1,809.61 1,930.00 1.8 1.8 1.8
CAPITAL CORP OF THE WEST - - - - - 403.76 347.41 139.40 295.76 257.31 139.40 3.1 3.1 3.1
CIB MARINE BANCSHARES INC - - - - - 177.12 95.96 21.00 136.76 73.83 21.00 2.9 2.9 2.9
WALKING CO HOLDINGS INC/THE 1.44 (4.41) 2.22 1.03 1.03 62.09 62.09 45.00 40.11 38.69 45.00 2.4 2.4 2.4
COOPER-STANDARD HOLDING 41.04 (0.50) 42.65 20.00 21.10 1,124.32 1,150.51 473.10 773.12 759.83 473.10 2.0 2.0 2.0
LUNA INNOVATIONS INC (1.76) (2.25) (0.47) 0.14 0.14 10.01 9.30 7.07 7.71 6.86 7.07 1.8 1.8 1.8
MEDCOM USA (0.03) (0.13) (0.13) 0.03 0.03 0.96 0.96 0.25 0.52 0.54 0.25 1.8 1.8 1.8
ASYST TECHNOLOGIES INC (15.17) (2.12) (2.12) 1.95 2.65 155.85 158.99 158.99 112.16 98.89 158.99 2.4 2.4 2.4
ABITIBIBOWATER INC (162.00) (46.00) (114.00) 129.00 192.00 5,957.00 6,150.00 1,266.00 3,426.06 2,426.25 1,266.00 2.3 2.3 2.3
GENERAL GROWTH PROPERTIES (7.04) (92.83) (53.00) 342.01 343.99 24,365.83 24,702.81 24,641.40 18,423.38 18,250.82 24,641.40 1.9 1.9 1.9
HOWARD HUGHES CORP/THE (80.00) (125.00) (5.21) 0.98 1.20 255.00 209.00 205.00 227.61 175.52 205.00 2.1 2.1 2.1
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Source: Author 
Equity P/BV EBITDA Net Debt
Name FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1
SMC VENTURES INC 24.66 14.41 (17.38) 33.65 8.41 10.51 ### 1.36 0.58 (0.60) (0.35) (3.00) 0.13 (5.91) 2.23 (0.78)
CYTOMEDIX INC 4.45 (0.47) 1.72 78.10 6.09 5.11 ### 17.54 (12.97) 2.97 (3.34) (2.17) (0.33) (1.90) 3.91 (0.15)
USG CORP 882.00 513.00 527.00 1,422.40 161.92 309.24 ### 1.61 0.32 0.59 209.00 59.00 75.00 680.00 391.00 (146.00)
FRIEDE GOLDMAN HALTER INC 94.98 209.79 (193.35) 247.33 9.74 4.63 ### 2.60 0.05 (0.02) (1.76) (53.42) (56.53) 240.09 276.74 99.61
PROTEONOMIX INC 2.66 (2.88) (6.35) 6.49 2.00 3.00 ### 2.44 (0.69) (0.47) (0.63) (0.65) (0.17) 5.63 4.84 3.06
RADNET INC (48.74) (52.19) (60.70) 32.80 8.22 17.68 ### (0.67) (0.16) (0.29) 3.93 7.54 5.55 174.84 170.08 169.25
AMERICAN WAGERING INCORP 4.38 2.99 1.93 2.66 1.41 2.59 ### 0.61 0.47 1.34 0.25 0.21 0.13 0.21 0.22 (0.21)
AMERCO 662.77 520.76 401.84 316.27 83.70 503.60 ### 0.48 0.16 1.25 15.07 41.59 27.35 1,478.11 1,499.81 819.57
WEIRTON STEEL CORP (514.18) (732.78) (904.24) 35.98 2.00 0.08 ### (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (20.50) (7.02) (14.06) 327.54 393.32 178.24
RAHAXI INC (0.14) 0.02 3.28 8.14 9.01 53.58 ### (56.91) 563.12 16.36 (2.06) (0.56) (2.62) 0.75 1.00 0.30
PRESIDENT CASINOS INC (12.40) (40.54) (49.61) 2.52 3.27 2.21 ### (0.20) (0.08) (0.04) 1.20 3.36 2.58 97.80 98.65 20.55
NATIONAL STEEL CORP-CL B 717.70 (310.70) (392.20) 44.32 19.76 0.77 ### 0.06 (0.06) (0.00) (18.30) (129.40) 47.30 648.90 935.30 81.50
ZAP 11.01 3.75 5.30 8.31 1.56 6.64 ### 0.75 0.42 1.25 (0.85) (2.20) (0.44) (2.38) 0.16 1.80
SOFTLOCK.COM INC 4.24 1.39 (0.00) 9.92 0.03 0.01 ### 2.34 0.02 (6.11) (3.35) (0.51) 0.10 (3.38) (2.39) (2.80)
HERBORIUM GROUP INC 1.57 0.64 1.10 0.42 0.52 0.37 ### 0.27 0.83 0.33 (0.15) (0.75) 1.06 (0.71) (0.63) 2.39
COMPOSITE TECHNOLOGY CORPORA (0.22) (0.93) (9.13) 168.06 51.54 156.98 ### (767.40) (55.60) (17.19) (3.07) (3.32) (3.93) (2.03) 0.23 6.29
INTELLIGENT COMMUNICATION EN 5.22 (9.82) (7.93) 45.58 2.56 7.05 ### 8.73 (0.26) (0.89) (4.55) (2.30) (0.04) (2.43) 4.71 1.20
EPICUS COMMUNICATIONS GROUP (8.67) (9.28) (16.95) 6.21 0.33 2.51 (0.72) (0.04) (0.15) (0.12) (1.71) (0.53) 2.21 2.90 10.02
AIR INDUSTRIES GROUP INC (0.61) (1.01) 0.11 1.34 0.23 0.42 (2.19) (0.23) 3.71 0.08 (0.86) (0.15) 0.28 0.53 13.86
NEWTON ENERGY CORP 5.64 6.85 1.40 5.64 6.85 1.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 (0.28) (0.36) (0.09) 14.13 10.46 8.80
MEDIA 100 INC 2.60 0.35 0.35 15.18 0.40 0.05 ### 5.84 1.13 0.15 (0.58) (1.57) (1.57) 19.20 10.39 6.83
INTL THOROUGHBRED BREEDERS 57.92 15.78 (0.57) 27.58 0.80 0.03 ### 0.48 0.05 (0.06) (0.53) (0.20) 0.82 54.54 39.83 75.88
MEDICAL STAFFING SOLUTIONS I (0.38) (0.38) (9.53) 4.56 1.08 0.16 ### (11.96) (2.84) (0.02) 2.84 3.01 (0.16) 2.83 2.75 3.73
U.S. ENERGY SYSTEMS INC 30.60 12.37 32.37 21.59 70.12 7.60 ### 0.71 5.67 0.23 4.04 0.72 (9.05) 88.97 253.21 195.95
PILGRIM'S PRIDE CORP 1,130.03 1,147.05 150.92 1,926.79 46.18 647.99 ### 1.71 0.04 4.29 154.59 (20.14) 158.25 473.46 466.12 138.16
GBO INC 1.93 2.71 23.33 47.02 9.95 22.22 ### 24.43 3.67 0.95 (0.51) 2.23 (2.85) 45.83 45.55 14.76
PROLOGIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (10.13) (11.49) (4.06) 1.31 0.44 0.15 ### (0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.88) (0.54) (0.04) 8.15 9.42 1.05
FACTORY 2-U STORES INC 59.10 49.78 (37.28) 35.28 9.69 0.14 ### 0.60 0.19 (0.00) (2.89) (0.19) (0.24) 12.17 12.26 26.64
SIRICOMM INC (1.45) (2.64) 0.01 21.28 0.61 0.25 ### (14.72) (0.23) 36.19 (0.64) (0.17) (0.15) (0.08) 1.85 1.54
CHESAPEAKE CORP 481.50 519.70 654.70 103.07 1.27 0.10 ### 0.21 0.00 0.00 30.90 23.10 25.90 496.30 543.10 378.70
TELEMETRIX INC (4.55) (4.55) (11.49) 0.90 0.20 1.36 ### (0.20) (0.04) (0.12) 0.19 0.30 0.06 3.00 8.27 3.68
PFF BANCORP INC 289.21 286.13 330.42 272.40 0.19 0.14 ### 0.94 0.00 0.00 16.38 18.17 26.64 718.20 1,216.12 977.89
INTROGEN THERAPEUTICS INC 30.51 22.21 18.57 128.56 10.59 0.62 ### 4.21 0.48 0.03 (6.53) (4.00) (7.45) (3.14) (19.24) (7.04)
BUTLER INTL INC 39.24 16.57 18.20 7.70 0.45 0.08 ### 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.76 0.27 2.73 65.79 64.84 64.16
MOTORS LIQUIDATION CO 21,479.00 10,795.00 27,779.00 6,510.78 457.92 263.46 ### 0.30 0.04 0.01 5,595.00 4,812.00 4,866.00 24,848.00 30,382.00 (2,499.00)
VISTEON CORP 149.00 (750.00) (408.00) 528.55 9.78 192.87 ### 3.55 (0.01) (0.47) 293.00 161.00 152.00 1,231.00 2,111.00 966.00
CAPITAL CORP OF THE WEST 75.82 89.14 95.17 63.02 0.42 0.05 ### 0.83 0.00 0.00 2.07 1.85 1.77 363.42 314.21 91.42
CIB MARINE BANCSHARES INC 26.00 (10.00) 76.87 9.17 0.55 2.94 ### 0.35 (0.06) 0.04 10.14 (0.32) (1.13) 82.12 53.96 (71.64)
WALKING CO HOLDINGS INC/THE 26.58 29.23 37.42 19.08 2.39 11.00 ### 0.72 0.08 0.29 2.08 (3.46) 3.54 61.33 60.95 43.75
COOPER-STANDARD HOLDING 334.22 (376.04) 606.46 765.00 185.00 568.44 2.29 (0.49) 0.94 41.04 (0.50) 75.12 1,092.11 1,063.75 284.36
LUNA INNOVATIONS INC 15.44 (27.39) 8.52 50.39 5.59 28.37 3.26 (0.20) 3.33 (1.76) (2.25) (0.47) (5.24) (2.81) 0.80
MEDCOM USA (5.05) (6.06) (6.06) 16.09 2.57 3.08 (3.18) (0.42) (0.51) 0.35 0.23 0.45 0.94 0.92 0.21
ASYST TECHNOLOGIES INC 87.73 (42.10) (42.10) 173.93 14.19 0.35 1.98 (0.34) (0.01) (8.87) 5.04 4.46 60.18 82.44 82.44
ABITIBIBOWATER INC 1,765.00 (579.00) (2,478.00) 679.24 29.28 11.49 0.38 (0.05) (0.00) (162.00) (46.00) (114.00) 5,665.00 5,969.00 516.00
GENERAL GROWTH PROPERTIES 2,539.23 1,952.96 1,160.17 9,337.68 222.64 5,105.42 3.68 0.11 4.40 47.58 (16.59) 133.12 24,109.37 24,507.07 24,068.28
HOWARD HUGHES CORP/THE 1,985.00 1,503.00 1,520.00 1,985.00 1,503.00 1,291.00 1.00 1.00 0.85 (80.00) (125.00) (5.21) 251.80 204.04 202.02
MarketCap
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APPENDIX 1 – American sample – Main Financial metrics 
 
                                          Source: Author 
NET INCOME FFO Cash
Name FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1
SMC VENTURES INC (0.12) (3.34) (2.36) 0.46 (3.07) (2.05) 9.91 1.58 3.28
CYTOMEDIX INC (1.01) (7.99) 8.30 (1.00) (7.78) 8.51 2.12 0.08 0.95
USG CORP 33.00 11.00 48.00 58.00 38.00 73.00 21.00 395.00 596.00
FRIEDE GOLDMAN HALTER INC 15.74 (73.20) (9.01) 25.52 (63.37) (5.05) 70.55 9.96 9.63
PROTEONOMIX INC (1.96) (3.00) (0.53) (1.96) (2.99) (0.53) 0.01 0.10 0.03
RADNET INC 2.44 (0.81) (6.86) 6.56 3.41 (2.39) 0.04 0.03 0.04
AMERICAN WAGERING INCORP (0.15) (0.99) (0.05) (0.05) (0.91) 0.04 1.59 1.51 2.16
AMERCO 60.01 (25.11) 44.42 87.33 2.22 72.80 9.06 44.07 38.20
WEIRTON STEEL CORP (27.93) (74.81) (9.70) (12.02) (60.33) 5.90 100.08 45.65 10.48
RAHAXI INC (0.04) (4.97) (1.27) (0.04) (4.91) (1.12) 0.10 - 0.20
PRESIDENT CASINOS INC (4.22) (11.26) 0.36 (2.12) (9.14) 2.44 11.14 8.56 9.45
NATIONAL STEEL CORP-CL B (59.10) (280.30) (65.00) (17.20) (238.50) (25.20) 46.60 3.70 15.20
ZAP (1.10) (3.47) (0.44) (0.93) (3.19) (0.37) 2.66 1.54 0.50
SOFTLOCK.COM INC (3.27) (0.66) - (2.99) (0.52) - 4.28 3.16 3.25
HERBORIUM GROUP INC (1.50) (1.01) (1.01) (1.42) (0.95) (0.95) 4.84 3.71 2.11
COMPOSITE TECHNOLOGY CORPORA (2.81) (4.62) (6.52) (2.79) (4.50) (6.32) 2.93 0.81 2.58
INTELLIGENT COMMUNICATION EN (2.94) (2.68) (0.04) (2.46) (2.44) (0.04) 11.83 3.10 0.30
EPICUS COMMUNICATIONS GROUP (0.68) - - (0.67) 0.28 0.12 0.29
AIR INDUSTRIES GROUP INC - - -
NEWTON ENERGY CORP - - -
MEDIA 100 INC (0.99) (1.97) (1.97) (0.63) (1.68) (1.68) 5.80 11.61 13.18
INTL THOROUGHBRED BREEDERS (0.47) (3.58) (3.09) 0.31 (3.00) (2.49) 0.60 0.60 0.60
MEDICAL STAFFING SOLUTIONS I (0.59) (0.49) 0.55 (0.59) (0.31) 0.73 0.30 0.02 1.00
U.S. ENERGY SYSTEMS INC (2.00) 12.45 (35.13) (0.90) 14.10 (32.96) 0.20 5.44 10.66
PILGRIM'S PRIDE CORP 25.08 17.44 9.81 42.89 36.38 38.94 7.81 16.67 36.84
GBO INC 0.03 (3.15) (0.53) 0.77 (2.35) 0.19 2.38 0.05 1.58
PROLOGIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (0.50) (0.31) (0.04) (0.44) (0.31) (0.04) 0.45 0.31 0.08
FACTORY 2-U STORES INC (1.63) (16.02) (74.74) 0.25 (12.28) (71.22) 3.57 4.74 8.36
SIRICOMM INC (0.16) (0.38) (0.68) (0.16) (0.38) (0.67) 0.08 0.06 0.66
CHESAPEAKE CORP 21.60 (0.30) 9.40 41.00 11.10 22.40 19.00 14.30 7.70
TELEMETRIX INC (0.38) (7.24) (0.10) 0.08 (6.77) 0.36 4.00 0.01 0.11
PFF BANCORP INC 9.55 9.42 2.03 11.56 11.99 53.83 40.51 45.26
INTROGEN THERAPEUTICS INC (2.87) (7.15) (5.44) (2.24) (6.53) (5.06) 10.88 26.66 15.02
BUTLER INTL INC 2.29 0.79 0.11 2.78 1.18 0.58 1.71 2.65 0.41
MOTORS LIQUIDATION CO 950.00 (987.00) (3,383.00) 4,462.00 2,568.00 (562.00) 18,363.00 24,020.00 29,901.00
VISTEON CORP 280.00 (163.00) 3.00 446.00 13.00 105.00 1,613.00 604.00 964.00
CAPITAL CORP OF THE WEST 4.99 5.56 2.07 6.83 7.33 40.34 33.20 47.98
CIB MARINE BANCSHARES INC (5.19) (3.86) 10.14 (5.51) (4.99) 95.00 42.00 92.64
WALKING CO HOLDINGS INC/THE (3.83) (2.41) (3.16) (3.19) (1.46) (1.84) 0.76 1.14 1.25
COOPER-STANDARD HOLDING 5.48 - - 37.95 32.21 86.76 188.74
LUNA INNOVATIONS INC - - - 15.25 12.11 6.27
MEDCOM USA (0.53) (1.25) (1.85) (0.15) (0.89) (1.27) 0.02 0.04 0.04
ASYST TECHNOLOGIES INC (7.22) (1.83) (1.64) (0.92) 5.33 4.95 95.67 76.55 76.55
ABITIBIBOWATER INC - - - 292.00 181.00 750.00
GENERAL GROWTH PROPERTIES 59.12 2.65 54.62 135.36 188.77 256.46 195.75 573.12
HOWARD HUGHES CORP/THE - - - 3.20 4.96 2.98
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APPENDIX 1 – American sample – Main credit metrics 
 
FFO/Debt ROCE
Name FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1
SMC VENTURES INC 0.5x (3.2x) (3.3x) (2.9x) (0.3x) 4.8x (2.7x) (43.3x) 1.9x (7.2x) (47.3x) (2.6x) (1.6%) (73.4%) -
CYTOMEDIX INC (18.4x) (7.8x) 42.6x (0.0x) (0.5x) (0.6x) (1,112.3x) (724.3x) (16.4x) (1,117.0x) (794.3x) (26.9x) (86.8%) - 1,317.6%
USG CORP 0.3x 0.2x 0.6x 0.8x 3.3x 1.5x 16.1x 4.2x 6.3x 14.2x 2.3x 4.2x 8.3% 3.4% 19.7%
FRIEDE GOLDMAN HALTER INC 0.3x (0.9x) (0.2x) (44.2x) (1.3x) (0.5x) (0.2x) (6.2x) (14.7x) (1.4x) (7.3x) (15.8x) 15.5% (59.0%) -
PROTEONOMIX INC (1.4x) (2.4x) (0.7x) (2.2x) (1.9x) (4.7x) (4.7x) (10.3x) (2.1x) (4.7x) (10.5x) (2.1x) (94.4%) - -
RADNET INC 0.1x 0.1x (0.1x) 11.1x 5.6x 7.6x 1.0x 1.7x 1.3x (0.0x) 0.7x 0.3x - - -
AMERICAN WAGERING INCORP (0.1x) (2.1x) 0.1x 1.8x 2.0x 3.7x 4.9x 5.8x 3.9x 2.9x 3.5x 1.2x (9.9%) (83.9%) (5.0%)
AMERCO 0.2x 0.0x 0.3x 24.7x 9.3x 7.8x 0.5x 1.2x 1.4x (0.4x) 0.4x (0.1x) 11.2% (4.9%) 14.1%
WEIRTON STEEL CORP (0.1x) (0.5x) 0.1x (5.2x) (15.6x) (3.4x) (1.8x) (1.4x) (3.2x) (3.2x) (4.3x) (6.7x) - - -
RAHAXI INC (0.2x) (19.6x) (8.9x) (0.1x) (0.4x) (0.0x) (412.8x) (69.6x) (163.9x) (413.2x) (77.6x) (173.4x) - (1,957.1%) (134.5%)
PRESIDENT CASINOS INC (0.1x) (0.3x) 0.3x 22.7x 8.0x 2.9x 0.3x 0.9x 2.3x (0.2x) 0.3x 0.4x - - -
NATIONAL STEEL CORP-CL B (0.1x) (1.0x) (1.0x) (9.5x) (1.8x) 0.5x (1.2x) (6.7x) 15.3x (3.9x) (8.9x) 2.4x (16.7%) - -
ZAP (13.3x) (7.5x) (0.6x) (0.1x) (0.2x) (1.3x) (85.3x) (199.7x) (22.1x) (102.2x) (224.5x) (25.5x) (39.0%) (254.5%) (23.2%)
SOFTLOCK.COM INC (13.3x) (2.7x) - (0.1x) (0.4x) 1.1x (117.5x) (18.1x) 11.1x (127.2x) (23.1x) 11.1x (254.3%) (121.6%) -
HERBORIUM GROUP INC (1.4x) (1.2x) (0.8x) (7.1x) (1.0x) 1.1x (3.4x) (14.7x) 20.6x (5.3x) (15.8x) 19.5x (105.1%) (108.6%) (72.2%)
COMPOSITE TECHNOLOGY CORPORA (12.4x) (17.3x) (2.8x) (0.1x) (0.1x) (0.6x) (239.8x) (245.6x) (15.9x) (241.6x) (254.8x) (16.7x) - - -
INTELLIGENT COMMUNICATION EN (1.0x) (1.3x) (0.1x) (0.5x) (0.8x) (10.7x) (31.8x) (12.1x) (1.8x) (35.2x) (13.4x) (1.8x) (80.6%) - -
EPICUS COMMUNICATIONS GROUP - - (0.3x) (5.4x) (0.4x) (4.8x) (2.4x) (26.6x) (3.2x) (2.4x) (26.6x) (3.3x) - - -
AIR INDUSTRIES GROUP INC - - - 0.9x (0.2x) (23.9x) 10.0x (51.7x) (0.5x) 10.0x (51.7x) (0.5x) - - -
NEWTON ENERGY CORP - - - (12.8x) (7.2x) (23.7x) (1.2x) (2.0x) (0.8x) (1.2x) (2.0x) (0.8x) - - -
MEDIA 100 INC (0.1x) (0.3x) (0.3x) (10.8x) (3.5x) (3.2x) (0.9x) (3.2x) (3.7x) (1.5x) (3.8x) (4.4x) (14.3%) (35.3%) (38.8%)
INTL THOROUGHBRED BREEDERS 0.0x (0.3x) (0.1x) (25.9x) (49.9x) 23.3x (0.3x) (0.1x) 0.3x (0.7x) (0.3x) 0.1x (1.7%) (25.5%) -
MEDICAL STAFFING SOLUTIONS I (0.8x) (0.5x) 0.6x 0.3x 0.2x (7.2x) 15.5x 31.9x (2.6x) 15.5x 30.0x (5.4x) - - -
U.S. ENERGY SYSTEMS INC (0.0x) 0.2x (0.6x) 5.5x 89.8x (5.7x) 1.5x 0.1x (0.8x) 1.1x (0.2x) (1.0x) (6.7%) 18.4% (58.8%)
PILGRIM'S PRIDE CORP 0.4x 0.3x 0.9x 0.8x (6.0x) 0.3x 17.1x (2.1x) 10.8x 15.1x (4.1x) 8.8x 6.2% 4.3% 12.0%
GBO INC 0.1x (0.2x) 0.0x (23.7x) 5.1x (1.4x) (0.4x) 2.1x (15.2x) (0.9x) 1.3x (19.1x) 0.2% (26.1%) (5.4%)
PROLOGIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (0.2x) (0.1x) (0.1x) (2.4x) (4.5x) (7.1x) (5.3x) (4.6x) (4.8x) (5.7x) (4.6x) (4.8x) - - -
FACTORY 2-U STORES INC 0.1x (2.9x) (8.1x) (1.4x) (22.7x) (36.0x) (17.9x) (1.2x) (0.6x) (29.5x) (24.2x) (10.0x) (8.7%) (95.9%) -
SIRICOMM INC (141.3x) (0.8x) (1.2x) (0.0x) (2.9x) (3.7x) (6,440.0x) (0.9x) (0.8x) (6,460.0x) (0.9x) (0.8x) - - (122.7%)
CHESAPEAKE CORP 0.3x 0.1x 0.2x 4.2x 6.0x 3.7x 2.7x 1.9x 2.1x 1.0x 1.0x 1.0x 8.7% (0.1%) 3.6%
TELEMETRIX INC 0.0x (3.3x) 0.4x 9.1x 7.0x 16.6x 0.8x 1.0x 0.2x (1.2x) (0.5x) (1.3x) - - -
PFF BANCORP INC 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 11.8x 17.3x 9.6x 0.8x 0.5x 1.3x 0.7x 0.4x 1.2x - 2.5% 2.8%
INTROGEN THERAPEUTICS INC (1.2x) (3.5x) (2.5x) (0.3x) (0.5x) (0.3x) (42.1x) (25.8x) (28.9x) (46.2x) (29.8x) (30.3x) (30.0%) (96.6%) (81.9%)
BUTLER INTL INC 0.2x 0.1x 0.0x 22.1x 62.7x 5.9x 0.4x 0.2x 1.6x 0.2x (0.1x) 1.3x 8.6% 3.8% 0.5%
MOTORS LIQUIDATION CO 0.4x 0.2x (0.1x) 1.9x 2.8x 1.4x 7.8x 3.9x 4.0x 2.9x 1.0x 1.7x 5.9% (6.1%) (24.5%)
VISTEON CORP 0.6x 0.0x 0.2x 2.4x 4.2x 3.2x 5.1x 2.9x 25.3x 2.2x (0.3x) 8.3x 37.4% - -
CAPITAL CORP OF THE WEST
CIB MARINE BANCSHARES INC
WALKING CO HOLDINGS INC/THE (0.2x) (0.1x) (0.2x) 7.5x (4.5x) 3.2x 2.0x (3.3x) 3.4x 1.4x (4.3x) 2.2x (17.3%) (10.6%) (15.3%)
COOPER-STANDARD HOLDING - - 0.3x 6.8x (581.1x) 1.6x 2.1x (0.0x) 5.0x 2.1x (0.0x) 2.8x - - 2.0%
LUNA INNOVATIONS INC - - - (1.4x) (1.0x) (3.7x) (12.6x) (16.1x) (3.3x) (12.6x) (16.1x) (3.3x) - - -
MEDCOM USA (0.6x) (3.7x) (20.7x) 0.7x 1.0x 0.1x 11.6x 8.4x 163.5x (1.0x) (4.6x) (46.3x) - - -
ASYST TECHNOLOGIES INC (0.0x) 0.1x 0.1x (4.4x) 7.9x 8.9x (4.5x) 1.9x 1.7x (7.8x) (0.8x) (0.8x) (11.8%) - -
ABITIBIBOWATER INC - - - (9.2x) (33.4x) (2.8x) (1.3x) (0.2x) (0.6x) (1.3x) (0.2x) (0.6x) - - -
GENERAL GROWTH PROPERTIES 0.0x 0.0x 0.0x 128.0x (372.2x) 46.3x 0.1x (0.0x) 0.4x (0.0x) (0.3x) (0.2x) - 0.9% 0.0%
HOWARD HUGHES CORP/THE - - - (0.8x) (0.4x) (9.8x) (81.6x) (104.2x) (5.3x) (81.6x) (104.2x) (5.3x) - - -
Debt/Ebitda Ebitda/Interest Ebit/Interest
135 
 
APPENDIX 1 – American sample – Credit metric ratings and synthetic spreads 
 
Source: Author 
FFO/Net Debt ROCE Scoring Blended rating Spread
Name FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1 FY-1 FY FY1
SMC VENTURES INC BBB CCC CCC CCC CCC B CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 5.8 7.0 6.7 B- D C 5.5% 16.0% 5.5%
CYTOMEDIX INC CCC CCC AAA CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC AAA 7.0 7.0 4.2 D D BB+ 16.0% 16.0% 3.5%
USG CORP BB B A AA BB A A BB BB A B BB CCC CCC A 3.7 5.6 3.5 BBB- B- BBB+ 2.8% 5.5% 1.8%
FRIEDE GOLDMAN HALTER INC BB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC BBB CCC CCC 6.0 7.0 7.0 CCC+ D D 7.0% 16.0% 16.0%
PROTEONOMIX INC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
RADNET INC B CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 6.6 7.0 7.0 C+ D D 13.0% 16.0% 16.0%
AMERICAN WAGERING INCORP CCC CCC CCC BBB BBB B BB BB BB BB BB B CCC CCC CCC 5.6 5.6 6.3 B- B- CC+ 5.5% 5.5% 10.0%
AMERCO BB CCC BB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC B CCC BBB 6.1 7.0 6.0 CCC D CCC+ 8.5% 16.0% 7.0%
WEIRTON STEEL CORP CCC CCC B CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 6.6 D D C+ 16.0% 16.0% 13.0%
RAHAXI INC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
PRESIDENT CASINOS INC CCC CCC BB CCC CCC BB CCC CCC B CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 5.5 D D B+ 16.0% 16.0% 4.3%
NATIONAL STEEL CORP-CL B CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC AA CCC CCC A CCC CCC B CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 4.9 D D BB- 16.0% 16.0% 4.1%
ZAP CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
SOFTLOCK.COM INC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC A CCC CCC A CCC CCC A CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 4.8 D D BB- 16.0% 16.0% 4.1%
HERBORIUM GROUP INC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC A CCC CCC A CCC CCC A CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 4.8 D D BB- 16.0% 16.0% 4.1%
COMPOSITE TECHNOLOGY CORPORA CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
INTELLIGENT COMMUNICATION EN CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
EPICUS COMMUNICATIONS GROUP CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
AIR INDUSTRIES GROUP INC CCC CCC CCC A CCC CCC BBB CCC CCC A CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 5.0 7.0 7.0 BB- D D 4.1% 16.0% 16.0%
NEWTON ENERGY CORP CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
MEDIA 100 INC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
INTL THOROUGHBRED BREEDERS CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
MEDICAL STAFFING SOLUTIONS I CCC CCC A AAA AAA CCC A AAA CCC A AAA CCC CCC CCC CCC 4.2 3.8 5.4 BB+ BBB- B+ 3.5% 2.8% 4.3%
U.S. ENERGY SYSTEMS INC CCC B CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC A CCC 7.0 6.4 7.0 D CC+ D 16.0% 10.0% 16.0%
PILGRIM'S PRIDE CORP BB BB AA AA CCC AAA A CCC A A CCC A CCC CCC BB 3.7 6.2 2.1 BBB- CCC- A+ 2.8% 9.0% 1.0%
GBO INC CCC CCC CCC CCC B CCC CCC B CCC CCC B CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 6.5 7.0 D CC D 16.0% 11.0% 16.0%
PROLOGIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
FACTORY 2-U STORES INC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
SIRICOMM INC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
CHESAPEAKE CORP BB CCC BB B CCC B B CCC B CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 5.8 7.0 5.8 B- D B- 5.5% 16.0% 5.5%
TELEMETRIX INC CCC CCC BBB CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 5.8 D D B- 16.0% 16.0% 5.5%
PFF BANCORP INC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
INTROGEN THERAPEUTICS INC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
BUTLER INTL INC B CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC B CCC CCC CCC 6.6 7.0 6.9 C+ D C- 13.0% 16.0% 15.0%
MOTORS LIQUIDATION CO BBB B CCC BBB BB A BBB BB BB BB CCC B CCC CCC CCC 4.3 5.8 5.4 BB+ B- B+ 3.5% 5.5% 13.0%
VISTEON CORP A CCC B BB B BB BB B AAA B CCC A AAA CCC CCC 4.1 6.6 4.8 BB+ CC- BB- 3.5% 12.0% 4.1%
CAPITAL CORP OF THE WEST
CIB MARINE BANCSHARES INC
WALKING CO HOLDINGS INC/THE CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC BB B CCC B B CCC B CCC CCC CCC 6.8 7.0 6.2 C D CCC 14.0% 16.0% 8.5%
COOPER-STANDARD HOLDING CCC CCC BB CCC CCC A B CCC BB B CCC BB CCC CCC CCC 6.8 7.0 4.5 C D BB 14.0% 16.0% 4.0%
LUNA INNOVATIONS INC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
MEDCOM USA CCC CCC CCC AA A AAA A BBB AAA CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 5.0 5.4 4.5 B+ B+ BB+ 4.3% 4.3% 3.5%
ASYST TECHNOLOGIES INC CCC B B CCC CCC CCC CCC B CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 6.5 6.6 D CC C+ 16.0% 11.0% 13.0%
ABITIBIBOWATER INC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
GENERAL GROWTH PROPERTIES CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
HOWARD HUGHES CORP/THE CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC 7.0 7.0 7.0 D D D 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
Net Debt/Ebitda Ebitda/Interest Ebit/Interest
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Appendix 2.  Implied ERP 
We have used the historical ERP approach for our empirical model as it is backward looking. For an 
estimation of a forward looking ERP (to be used in any Discount Cash Flow Analysis) it would not be 
sensible to use historical data and mean reversion. In this section, we introduce the Implied ERP 
approach for estimating forward looking ERPs. We briefly introduce 2 methods (Damodaran 2010): 
DCF model based premiums  
This model aims to estimate the ERP using a DDM model (Dividend Discount Model). In this model, 
the value of the equity is the PV of the future dividends. In the basic case where dividends grow at a 
constant rate, we derive to the popular Stable Gordon Growth Model (SGGM):  
 
In this formula, the very unknown is the Required Return on Equity as the other values are a given. 
Hence, we can back out the Equity Risk Premium by subtracting the ROE from the RFA.  
Another option to this method would be to use earning instead of dividends. To facilitate the transition, 
we follow Damodaran (2008) by stating the future growth rate in terms of the ROE and the payout 
ratio:  
 
We then substitute back into the SGGM and we derive to:  
 
By assuming the ROE is equity to the COE (Cost of Equity) meaning there is no excess return, the 
equation comes down to: 
 
And hence, the required ROE would be: 
 
As Damodaran points out, this is the inverse of the PE ratio and it becomes the required return on 
equity for companies in stable growth earnings. Again, we can infer the ERP by taking the RFA off the 
required ROE:  
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Default Spread Based ERP 
This method attempts to quantify the ERP in terms of default spread on corporate bonds. If we follow 
Damodaran (2008) and we track the Baa default spread over the RFA and the US ERP since 1960, 
the ERP would be 2.x the default spread (2.2% and 4.4% respectively). The median works out at 
2.02x approximately. Then the ERP could be calculated as:  
 
 
Appendix 3. ERP Analysis: main US and European indices 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
DDM Model - No CRP S&P FTSE CAC DAX IBEX
Dividends 
+ 
Buybacks Growth %
Dividends 
+ 
Buybacks Growth %
Dividends 
+ 
Buybacks Growth %
Dividends 
+ 
Buybacks Growth %
Dividends 
+ 
Buybacks Growth %
Year
2011 50 321 206 351 635
2012 50 0.5% 328 2.2% 211 2.2% 356 1.4% 770 21.1%
2013 52 4.9% 346 5.7% 222 5.4% 372 4.6% 800 3.9%
2014 55 4.8% 368 6.2% 235 5.6% 393 5.5% 818 2.3%
Terminal value - >2014 56 2.0% 375 2.0% 239 2.0% 401 2.0% 835 2.0%
Index -Current level 1,162        5,171        2,871        5,545        7,850        
Expected ROE 9.2% 12.7% 14.5% 12.9% 16.9%
Current RFA (US) 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Implied ERP 7.2% 10.7% 12.5% 10.9% 14.9%
DDM Model - CRP S&P FTSE CAC DAX IBEX
Std Dev Index 06/11 11.6% 11.8% 16.8% 14.4% 22.0%
Std Dev US / Std Dev Country 1.0x 1.4x 1.2x 1.9x
Implied ERP 7.2% 7.3% 15.4% 15.6% 20.6%
US RFA 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2%
Country Risk Premium (CRP) 0.1% 8.2% 8.4% 13.4%
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SECTION 1 
1 Introduction  
The aftermath of the “credit crunch” in 2008, the biggest credit crisis since the Last Depression, 
prompted regulators to adopt new measures to avoid another fall out of the financial system and 
hence of the entire world economy. During the financial turmoil, governments across the world 
deployed mounting public funds to rescue (“bail-out”) the so called “too big to fail (TBTF)” banks to 
avoid the systematic risk71 that the failure of a financial institution could trigger across the globe. The 
failure of Lehman Brother and the subsequent collapse of the financial system and the world trade 
proved the need to prop up TBTF to minimize the market panic and shore up the financial system. 
When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, capital markets seized up and the interbank market dried 
up preventing banks from relying on the short term funding, the common funding for investment 
banks, consequently creating a significant shortfall of cash that forced banks such as Merrill Lynch, or 
Bear Stearns to be rescued to big commercial banks such as Bank of America or JP Morgan. Others 
such as Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley were forced to seek the rescue from the government72
In Western Europe we witnessed big subprime and real estate intensive banks such as HBOS, 
Lloyds, RBS, Rabobank, West LB or ING seeking government support after big losses coming from 
their investment banking units. The “bail-out” of these banks was financed through public money (or 
let us say through tax payers’ money). The governments were forced to deploy thousands of billions 
for these banks to avoid the collapse of their local financial system and the knock-on effects on the 
global financial system.  
, 
temporarily becoming commercial banks. 
The TBTF’s “bail-out” has given rise to significant criticism due to the intrinsic moral hazard of the 
banking business. Banks are highly levered holding structures that have traditionally taken on a fair 
amount of risk to boost the return on equity and meet shareholders’ expectations through investments 
in high risky instruments73
But this has to come to an end. The regulators cannot afford to let the system collapse again. There is 
so much at stake. During the last three years we have witnessed the pernicious effects of a banking 
crisis in terms of failing banks and companies, job destructions, or house repossessions that has 
taken the developed economies to a severe period of recession and sluggish growth. The risk reward 
in the banking sector has been traditionally unbalanced as bankers have always relied on the 
government as the last resort in the event of a shortfall of liquidity or solvency. In the meantime, 
bankers go on with their risky investments as they take the governments support for granted
. A short period of credit widening, equity markets sell-off, or a drop in 
housing prices to name a few can bring down a highly levered and weak capitalized bank if the capital 
structure is non-loss absorbing enough to withstand these events. If banks face any serious liquidity 
or solvency problem, they are confident that the governments will step in and recapitalize them to 
avoid the systematic risk of a bank fall-out.  
74
Going forward, any investor in a bank will run the risk of losing money. Basel III is here to make sure 
of that. There will be “burden sharing” between equity and debt holders or, in other words, across the 
.  
                                                          
71 And intensifying the “moral hazard” in banking. 
72 Through the TARP funds. 
73 Subprime mortgages, LBO financing, real estate developers, etc 
74 The fall of TBTF institutions such as Lehman has devastating effects on the economy and on the financial banking system 
and the regulator has learned the lesson.  
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entire capital structure. Bankers will decide where to invest but if they seek high yields through high 
risky investments, solvency rules will be stringent with them and they will have to allocate more capital 
to support these investments. Basel III’s goal is to rationalize the banking system and do away with 
the intrinsic flaws of the banks: high leverage, duration mismatch due to its yield curve strategy75
The most important implementation of Basel III is the loss absorbing capital structure. The Basel II 
capital structure has proved to be weak to absorb short term shocks due to the lack of dilution/write 
down features. Only the common equity has been used to absorb losses. Basel II capital structure is 
made up of “hybrids” instruments, equity like instruments which have actually played out more as debt 
instruments given their lacking of “going concern”
, 
reliance on short term liquidity, excessive risk and the absence of a loss absorbing capital structure 
beyond the common equity.  
76
Basel III aims for a “bail-in” (losses taken up by debt and equity holders) rather than “bail out” (losses 
taken up by taxpayers) capital structure. Basel III seeks for “burden sharing” across the entire capital 
structure (including senior debt and deposits) on a “going concern” basis rather than on a “gone 
concern” basis. Public money will only be available once the bank has reached the point of non-
viability and the entire capital structure has been written down (“haircut”) but the bank is still viable. 
Enough “bail-in” instruments in the capital should avoid the need of public funds. Probably, a bank 
that reaches a point of non-viability due to significant losses will be wounded up so no public money 
will ever be needed again. 
 features in the event of losses.  
The new Basel III hybrids instruments will probably display a CoCo (Contingent Conversion) style of 
characteristics through either principal write down or equity conversion.77
Basel III endeavors to instill solvency discipline across the banking system. To address the solvency 
ratio, Basel III aims to force the banks to increase and bolster their Core Tier 1 ratios to higher levels 
to beef up the amount of tangible equity in the balance sheet. Additionally, to shore up the rest of the 
capital structure, Tier 1 ratios
 This is the contractual way 
to impose losses in the capital structure. However, it is possible through Special Resolution Regimes 
that regulators could “haircut” some layers of the capital structure via statutory rules even though 
these instruments do not have loss absorbing features in the bond documentation.  
78
Basel III is also concerned with the liquidity and the duration mismatch, It has proposed several key 
ratios to make sure banks are liquid in both the short and the long run: 
 should have compliant loss absorbing instruments according to a 
specified trigger to backstop losses and avoid the so called point of non-viability where the regulators 
steps in, impair (“haircut”) the capital structure through a liability management process to fix the 
balance sheet and leave the bank on a “going concern” basis.  
• Liquidity Coverage Ratio to ensure that the banks hold a sufficient buffer of unencumbered 
high-quality assets to survive an acute stress scenario lasting for one month. 
                                                          
75 Borrowing in the short end of the curve and lending on the long end. 
76  We will elaborate on that but Basel III aims to have a ”going concern” capital whereby a viable bank experiencing losses 
might impose writedowns or dilution on debt holders on a “going concern” basis rather than on a “gone concern " basis (most of 
current hybrids instruments are only written down on a winding up scenario). 
77 After a particular trigger (a minimum Core Tier 1 is breached), a CoCo should experience a writedown of 20% or converted 
into equity at a price already set in advance. 
78 Core Tier 1 + preferences shares and hybrid instruments. 
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• Net Stable Funding Ratio establishes a minimum amount of stable funding based on the 
liquidity characteristics of an institution’s assets and activities over a one-year horizon79
Overall, the new Basel III rules will have a strong impact of the cost of capital in banks (Ineke 2011). 
Under the “burden sharing” framework, the capital structure will become loss absorbing. This will 
increase the price of the instruments as the banking debt investors will be exposed to potential losses. 
This will increase the risk premium demanded by the investors which will feed through to the entire 
capital structure boosting the overall cost of capital of the banks (WACC). The WACC of the banks 
has always been overlooked
.  
80
Additionally, investors should calibrate the impact of potential losses in a bank that bring solvency 
below a threshold that trigger the loss absorption through the capital structure. This is our second 
goal: assess the cost of the capital structure pre and post regulatory event that triggers the CoCos 
(Contingent Conversion)
 by the market due to the easy and cheap accessibility of funding for 
the banks and hence the market has been more inclined to focus on the COE as the equity was the 
only loss absorbing layer in the capital structure. From our view, going forward both the market and 
the banks will have to pay more attention to the overall cost of capital of the bank due to the sharp 
upward repricing of the capital structure. This is one of our first goal in our empirical analysis. We aim 
to measure the impact of the new regulatory framework on the overall cost of capital in the banks. 
81
Thirdly, we conduct a valuation exercise by looking at the evolution of the share price, shares count, 
ROE and equity multiples per bank on a pre and post conversion basis. Through this exercise, we will 
observe the movements in the equity valuation across the CoCos conversion period. 
 into equity. 
2. Capital adequacy in banks 
The bank related solvency regulation is currently articulated through the Basel II rules even though 
the banking industry is now gearing up to meet the new Basel III rules. Basel III, has already 
published several guidelines that lays down the potential capital structure for banks and the minimum 
solvency ratios.  
The goal of bank regulators is to protect the depositor and provide a stable environment for banks to 
operate in. In order to be authorized as a bank and take deposits, an institution has to hold adequate 
capital. The regulator places limits on the proportions and type of capital allowed to make up a bank’s 
capital base. A weighting framework is used to quantify various kinds of risk and a required capital 
ratio is set, which may be higher than the minimum ratio.  
2.1 Basel II capital structure 
Capital adequacy requires not just a certain quantity of capital but certain types in relationship to the 
nature of a bank’s assets. Under Basel II, these types are called Tier 1, Tier 2 (Upper and  Lower) and 
Tier 3 Capital along with the Core Tier Equity that form the regulatory capital structure of the banks. 
We describe each capital layer to understand the nature of the solvency ratios. 
                                                          
79 See appendix 5 for a better understanding.  
80 Or at least not taken into account when pricing the equity of the banks (as opposed to corporates where WACC is a key 
driver in valuation). 
81 We use CoCos as our preferred loss absorbing Basel III instrument. 
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• Core Tier Equity or Core Tier 1 (CT1): It is the purest equity layer in the capital structure. It is 
made up of the ordinary shareholders’ equity + retained earnings + reserves and share 
premium account + available for sale reserves (AFS) + minorities82
 
.  
• Tier 1 (T1): CT1 + perpetual non-cumulative preferred stock / bonds (known as “Tier 1”). The 
main characteristics of T1 bonds are:  
o Perpetual and senior only to equity. 
o Coupons are deferrable and non-cumulative. 
o Interests and principal can be written down. 
 
• Tier  2 (T2): T1 + perpetual deferrable subordinated debt (Upper Tier 2 bonds-UT2) + 
revaluation reserves from fixed assets and fixed asset investments + general provisions up to 
a maximum of 1.25% of risk weighted assets + dated subordinated debt with a minimum 
maturity of five years (Lower Tier 2 bonds-LT2) + any perpetual debt with no loss absorbency 
features or interest deferral provision. Tier II cannot exceed 50% of Tier I (and hence Tier 
II<Tier I). The main features of the UT2 and LT2 are: 
o UT2: 
 Perpetual and senior to Tier 1 and equity. 
 Coupons are deferrable and cumulative. 
 Interests and principal can be written down. 
o LT2: 
 Subordinated only to senior debt. 
 No deferral of coupons and no write down of principal and interest. 
 Dated with minimum maturity of 5 years. 
 
• Tier 3 (T3): Tier 1 + Tier 2 + dated subordinated debt with a minimum of two years. The main 
characteristics of Tier 3 are: 
o Dated with a minimum maturity of 2 years. 
o Rank pari passu with LT2. 
o Both interest and principal can be deferred due to regulatory “lock in” clause if the 
capital ratios fall below a threshold. 
 
• Capital ratio (BIS ratio) is the overall capital ratio and is the sum of CT1+T1+T2+T3 
Banks must make some deductions to their total levels of capital in order to avoid regulatory pitfalls 
such as double counting of capital (Morgan Stanley 2010). The main deductions are: 
• Core Tier 1 and Tier 1: goodwill83
• Tier 2: investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and associates; connected lending of a 
capital nature, including guarantees; all holdings of another bank’s capital over a maximum of 
the equivalent of 10% of a bank’s eligible Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital base.  
 and intangibles; treasury stock 
The solvency ratios are set as a ratio of capital to risk weighted assets (RWA). The RWA scales the 
notional of the risk position. It is intended to proxy the riskiness of the underlying position. The RWAs 
are computed in three components (the so called “three pillars”): 
                                                          
82 These arise when a bank has a subsidiary that it does not wholly own.  
83 It arises when a bank buy another company for a price above its book value. 
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• Credit risk: capital held against the risk of entity specific losses on positions (equities and 
credit) held in the banking book and or the counterparty (CP) risk84
• Market risk: risk of losses arising from movements in the market prices of positions held in the 
trading book. 
. 
• Operational risk: capital held against the risk from failed internal processes, people, systems, 
or external events. 
The capital ratio defines how much capital has to back each unit of RWA. 
Under current Basel II regulations, the capital ratio is set at 8% and the majority of this capital (at least 
4%) must be Tier 1 capital. These ratios just represent the regulatory minimum. In reality, banks 
usually manage much higher ratios85
However, Basel II has proven to be weak to withstand big shocks and this weakness has been 
highlighted by the crisis. Following Goldman Sachs, the main critics are: 
. 
• Capital base too small and Tier 1 bonds have not proven to be very loss absorbing. 
• Pro-cyclicality of the economic cycle not addressed. 
• Systemic risk not appropriately captured. 
• Significant jurisdictional differences exist in the capital definition. 
2.2 Basel III capital structure 
As we have pointed out above, Basel III seeks to force banks to bolster solvency by holding “purer” 
equity and larger capital buffers going forward. The capital structure will be more transparent and 
uniform across the different jurisdictions. Basel III recalibrates to three capital ratios: 
• A minimum common equity (CT1) ratio of 4.5%. 
• A minimum Tier 1 capital ratio (T1) of 6%. 
• A minimum total capital ratio (BIS) of 8%. 
Nonetheless, as we will discuss below, these ratios will come in at higher levels due to additional 
buffers and market standards.  
Following Goldman Sachs (2010), the new Basel III rules aim at: 
• Dampen cyclicality by building  up capital buffers in periods of growth. 
• Protect the banking sector from periods of excess credit growth. 
• Potential additional benefit moderating loan growth during bubbles. 
• Decreased systematic risk in the banking system. 
• Build up capital buffers before distributed earnings. 
• Make the capital structure more loss absorbing / “bail-in” oriented. 
Some capital instruments (particularly the T1 bonds) have been found to be insufficiently loss 
absorbent during the crisis and the opaque capital base of the banks coupled with large discretion left 
to individual jurisdictions prompted the “bail-out” of banks by the states.  
                                                          
84 That effectively covers the counterparty risk of derivative positions. 
85 In fact, in the aftermath of the crisis, market turned to the Core Tier 1 as opposed to the Tier 1 to calibrate the solvency 
position of the banks and the market standards guided to the a minimum Core Tier 1 between 8%-10%. 
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Therefore, the new rules seek to improve the quality of the capital base, instil better loss absorption 
characteristics for Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments and increase the reporting and disclosure. Thus,  
• CT1 will be made up of common equity and retained earnings but certain regulatory 
adjustments will be substracted86
• T1 instruments must be loss absorbing on a “going concern” basis
. 
87
• T2 is harmonized into a single bucket meaning no distinction between UP2 and LT2. 
. 
• T3 is removed from the capital structure. 
Below the Minimum Basel III Capital ratios (including the buffers) laid out by the Basel Press  Release 
(12 Sep 2010) and the mandatory capital structure issued by the Commission of Experts (FINMA) for 
the Swiss Banks .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
86 See appendix III but these include goodwill and other intangibles, defined pension fund assets, some minority interests, 
investments in other financial institutions above certain limits, some deferred tax assets above certain limits and mortgage 
servicing rights above certain limits. 
87 Meaning the bank does not go into liquidation. 
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Figure 1: Basel III vs Swiss Capital Structure 
 
Source: author  
As far as Basel III is concerned, the minimum requirement for common equity will be raised from the 
current 2% level, before the application of regulatory adjustments, to 4.5% after the application of 
stricter adjustments. The Tier 1 capital requirement, which includes common equity and other 
qualifying financial instruments, will increase from 4% to 6%. The capital conservation buffer above 
the regulatory minimum requirement be calibrated at 2.5% and be met with common equity88
As for FINMA, the Swiss regulator imposes higher requirements than those of Basel III due to the 
“Too Big to Fail” problem given the size of UBS and CS ’assets versus the Swiss GDP (600% Assets / 
GDP) . In summary, the Swiss regime will require the large banks to have a minimum Core Tier 1 ratio 
. A 
countercyclical buffer within a range of 0% –2.5% of common equity or other fully loss absorbing 
capital will be implemented according to national circumstances. This buffer will only be in effect when 
there is excess credit growth that is resulting in a system wide buildup of risk. The countercyclical 
buffer, when in effect, would be introduced as an extension of the conservation buffer range. 
Systemically important banks (SiFi) should have loss absorbing capacity beyond the standards 
announced. The Basel Committee is developing a well-integrated approach to systemically important 
financial institutions which could include combinations of capital surcharges, contingent capital and 
“bail-in” debt. Therefore, the total capital ratio could go as high as 15% for the main core European 
banks (Henriques 2010). 
                                                          
88 Restrict discretionary distributions (dividends and bonuses) when the bank’s capital level is close to a minimum. 
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(CT1) of 10% (4.5% minimum common equity and 5.5% of conservation buffer). On top of this, the 
Swiss banks should hold an additional capital cushion of 9.0% of contingent convertible securities 
(3% of RWAs with a 7% CT1 trigger and 6.0% of RWAs with a 5% CT1 trigger89
Basel III has explicitly given strong emphasis to the core equity relative to the hybrids instruments 
(even more the Swiss regulator). However, we believe that the hybrids will definitely contribute to 
meet higher regulatory capital requirements. We are confident that the Basel III hybrids can turn out to 
be very cost effective in terms of loss absorption and a non-dilutive way to comply with the minimum 
Basel III capital standards. The introduction of additional buffers to the minimum required capital will 
increase the importance of the loss absorbing hybrid instruments in the overall capital structure of the 
banks. As mentioned above, there are basically three capital buffers set at the discretion of the 
regulator and in line with the proportion of the bank’s assets relative to the GDP: 
). The total capital 
ratio amounts to 19%, roughly 400bps higher than the highest potential capital ratio under Basel III. 
• The Capital Conservation buffer (CC) to build up capital outside periods of stress that can be 
drawn upon as losses are incurred. 
• The counter cyclical buffer (C-C) which could be in the region between 0%-2.5% to build up 
in periods of excess credit growth.  
• The SIFI (Systematic Important Financial Institutions) between 0%-2%. 
We believe that these two buffers could be filled through “loss absorbing” Basel III compliant 
instruments. This will definitely raise interest among the bank community to tap these instruments as 
they will allow not only to meet the minimum capital requirements but they will turn out a cost-effective 
and non dilutive way to support shareholder returns.  
Below, we compare three different capital structure namely Basel II, Basic Basel III and 
Comprehensive Basel III. The latter includes our estimation of the three aforementioned buffers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
89 In practice, we would regard the 3.0% of high trigger securities as a form of “going concern” capital and the 6.0% of low 
trigger securities as a form of “gone concern” capital.  
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Figure 2: Basel Capital Structure Comparison 
 
                        Source: author  
On that basis, the proportion of non-Core Tier 1 instruments (effectively Basel III compliant 
instruments) could increase from 33% to 53% by adding loss absorbing hybrid capital to meet the 
regulatory buffers. We can observe that despite the proportion of non-Core Tier 1 instruments being 
lower than the maximum levels of Basel II (75%), on absolute terms the 8% level of non-Core Tier 1 
would be higher than that of Basel II. Therefore and contrary to market perception, the overall amount 
of hybrids in Basel III could much higher than in Basel II, even though it will depend on the levels of 
additional buffers imposed by the regulators.  
 
                  Source: author  
2.2.1 Grandfathering: managing the capital structure 
Basel III will have a meaningful impact in the capital structure of the banks. The new rules promote 
“bail-in” mechanisms (as opposed to “bail-out” or tax payers rescue money) whereby the capital 
structure of the banks has to hold instruments with loss absorption features, no incentives to call, no 
step up coupons etc.  Basel III aims to make the CoCos type of instrument more equity than debt like. 
Below a summary of the new requirement for both Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments: 
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                           Source: author  
According to Basel III Committee guidelines, hybrid instruments that no longer qualify as Tier 1 or Tier 
2 will be phased out from January 1st 2013. This is implemented by determining the overall amount of 
non-eligible instruments outstanding as of January 1st 2013, which serves as a starting point to 
estimate the maximum grandfathering threshold for such instruments. Grandfathering means that for 
a period of time, non-compliant regulatory hybrids instruments will still be accounted for as regulatory 
capital but they progressively lose out their eligibility until they are finally phased out. 
The maximum threshold for the grandfathering of non-eligible instruments is set at 90% for 2013 and 
then is progressively reduced by 10% each year (Calamaro 2011).  
Figure 3 : Basic of grandfarthering 
 
                             Source: author  
For example, this T1 bond will be 100% accounted for regulatory capital in 2012 to decrease by 10% ( 
ie 90%) in 2013 and so on until it is phased out in 2022.  
It must be noted that Lower Tier II hybrids have a different amortization profile given the fact that 
these instruments are subject to specific regulatory amortization through the last 5 years to maturity. 
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From January 2013 on until first call date90
 Figure 4: LT2 Grandfathering and Regulatory Amortisation 
, these instruments will fall within the bucket of non-
compliant instruments and they will be amortized by 10% annually until their first call date. Once the 
call date is passed, these instruments will become eligible again but become subject to their own 
specific guidelines on regulatory amortization, which is usually 20% annually over the next 5 years to 
maturity.  
Lower Tier II: from grandfathering to regulatory amortization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      Source: author  
Below the grandfathering rules under Basel III for the stock of hybrids bonds (Citigroup 2010). 
 
Source: author  
                                                          
90 Call date means that the bond can be redeemed at the discretion of the issuer at a par or make whole at a specified date 
contractually set out. 
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We do not aim to extend on this topic as it is out of the scope of this thesis but we would like to make 
a few remarks. Basel III entails a thorough revision of the capital structure by banks. The latter will 
have to manage the capital accordingly to benefit from the grandfathering period but also to keep their 
solvency ratios (CT1, TI and TII) in line with the required buffers set out by Basel III. Since non-
compliant hybrids instruments will progressively phase out, banks will have to evaluate their options in 
terms of grandfathering, calls, new CoCos issuances etc. There are not only capital costs but also 
opportunity costs embedded in this process (Ineke 2011): 
• Between Tier I and Tier II as the former have more stringent rules, banks can leave Tier I as 
Tier II outstanding if the coupon of the Tier I is lower than what the bank could be paying for 
a new style of Basel III-compliant Tier II bonds. 91
• Between using or not the existing stock of hybrids to access the new Basel III hybrid market. 
Bank should start levering off the existing investor base to avoid being the last in the queue 
when the market ramps up. 
 
• Lastly, the opportunity cost of greater premiums on future hybrids issuances if issuers do not 
meet investor’s expectations in terms of calling the existing instruments. 92
2.2.2 Special Resolution Regimes 
 
These are currently country regulatory frameworks whereby the regulator can impose losses on 
banking debt securities even if the bond documentation does not include any loss absorbing feature 
via write down or equity conversion93. At the moment, there are only fully operational resolution 
regimes in UK, Ireland, and Denmark but European Commission is striving to implement them across 
the entire European space. Therefore, there are two ways to impose losses on debt holders: either 
through contractual clauses (the bond documentation contemplates loss absorption in the event of a 
particular trigger94
For example, a low coupon non loss absorbing Tier 1 hybrid of a bank domiciled in a special 
resolution regime country might be left outstanding as Tier II after the call date (call not exercised) as 
the requirements of Tier II under Basel III are laxer than those of Tier 1 (see table above): 
subordination, minimum initial maturity of 5 years and have additional loss absorbency features which 
will be provided by the special resolution regime.  
) or through statutory powers (regulator imposes losses at the point of non-viability 
or when the solvency is stretched). This has a significant impact on non-loss absorbing hybrids 
instruments which were supposed to phase out owing to their lack of write down features. Through 
resolution regimes, these instruments become “burden sharing” with the equity holders in the event of 
losses by statutory rules even though the documentation does not state so. Therefore, the banks will 
manage their capital structure under the assumption that resolution regimes are implemented which 
will have a significant impact on the banks ‘call strategies.  
3. Theoretical framework for the average cost of regulatory capital for banks 
The following framework of minimum capital requirements allows us to estimate the impact of the new 
Basel III on the average cost of regulatory capital in banks. An increase in the cost of capital is the 
                                                          
91 As long as the Tier I bond is still compliant with other Basel III criteria (non step up, loss absorption or there is a resolution 
regime in this country). See next section. 
92 There are reputational purposes at stake as banks have traditionally call the bonds at first date and reason why bonds 
usually trade on call in the secondary market.  
93 As it has happened in Ireland with the three major banks: Bank of Ireland, AIB and Anglo Irish bank.  
94 Core Tier 1 falling below a particular level; the bank approaching the point of non-viability, etc. 
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most immediate impact for the European banking sector given the requirement to maintaining a 
higher proportion of core equity in the capital structure as well as loss absorbing capital instruments. 
To quantify the impact on the cost of capital of a solvent bank, we use the phasing in of the new 
capital requirement set out by Basel III (Henriques 2010). Our underlying assumption is that the bank 
keeps its solvency ratios in line with the minimum requirements. However, we presume most of the 
banks will aim to maintain higher than required ratios to enjoy some headroom and flexibility and to 
comply with some other requirements (systematic or “too big to fail” banks, high beta banks etc).  
Figure 5: Minimum Capital Requirements Under Basel III 
 
                          Source: JP Morgan Research team and author  
Figure 6: Bank Capital Structure Under Basel III 
 
                    Source: JP Morgan Research team and author  
Given the Basel III guidelines set out above and assuming a theoretical COE for a bank along with the 
estimated Basel III (Tier I and II) compliant instruments cost, we can graph the evolution of the cost of 
capital as the minimum capital requirements are phased in through 2019. Bear also in mind that we 
have made also an assumption on the expected cost of capital for the new Basel III hybrids which will 
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be determined by the risk embedded in the instrument95
We estimate the shift in the average cost of regulatory capital (ACRG) by looking at above figure 
which shows the proportions of each component within the capital structure and the below table which 
shows the average cost of regulatory capital.  For example, we see the ACRG increasing from 8.65% 
in 2010 to 9.96% in 2015 to finally 10.36% in 2019 if the bank complies with the minimum required 
capital levels per component. We must note that if our Basel III compliant instrument cost of capital is 
too low
 and the issuer. We must note that the “bail-
in/point of non-viability” optionality of the Tier II as laid out by the August 2010 Consultation paper by 
the Basel Committee on Banking  Supervision will materially add to the overall cost of capital of the 
bank.  
96
 
 and turns out to be at 9.5% for the Tier I and 7.5% or higher for the Tier II, the overall cost of 
capital for the hybrids will start converging to the COE.  
                  Source: author  
                     Figure 7: Increase in he ACRG 
 
         Source: author  
                                                          
95 In terms of “high” or “low” trigger point. 
96 We have used the newly issued CoCos (Credit Suisse, Rabobank, Unicredit) as a benchmark but by all means the cost 
levels could well be higher in the future.  
     
Core Equity Tier I Tier II
% Cost % Cost % Cost
2010 25.0% 11.6% 25.0% 9.0% 50.0% 7.0% 8.65%
2011 25.0% 11.6% 25.0% 9.0% 50.0% 7.0% 8.65%
2012 25.0% 11.6% 25.0% 9.0% 50.0% 7.0% 8.65%
2013 43.8% 11.6% 12.5% 9.0% 43.8% 7.0% 9.26%
2014 50.0% 11.6% 18.8% 9.0% 31.3% 7.0% 9.68%
2015 56.3% 11.6% 18.8% 9.0% 25.0% 7.0% 9.96%
2016 59.4% 11.6% 17.4% 9.0% 23.2% 7.0% 10.08%
2017 62.2% 11.6% 16.2% 9.0% 21.6% 7.0% 10.19%
2018 64.6% 11.6% 15.2% 9.0% 20.3% 7.0% 10.28%
2019 66.7% 11.6% 14.3% 9.0% 19.0% 7.0% 10.36%
ACRG
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We must also highlight that our ACRG framework does not fully capture the increase in the average 
cost given that the final outcome will be driven by the absolute minimum capital requirements and the 
issuing cost of the Basel III compliant instruments. Our framework only shows the impact on the 
ACRG by assuming some proportions and the cost for each capital component.  Below, we run a 
sensitivity table to assess the ACRG under different Tier I and II cost assumptions. Under a very 
aggressive scenario where both Tier I and II display strong “bail-in/point of non-viability” and 
assuming a cost of 11% for the former and 8% for the latter, the ACRG will trend towards the COE. 
This analysis shows the magnitude of the move of Basel III compliant instruments costs on the ACRG 
(Henriques 2011).  
 
                               Source: author  
We estimate that the European banks will definitely see their ACRG significantly increasing given the 
historical reliance on cheap hybrids funding97
4. Understanding the CoCo Value 
. As underscored above, our theoretical analysis is very 
sensitive to the absolute amount of capital, therefore, if any bank is legally bound to hold a higher 
core equity or overall capital levels (such as the Swiss banks”), the ACRG will markedly increase. 
Consequently, the ACRG is driven by the absolute quantity of regulatory capital and the average cost 
of each component within the capital structure. In our empirical analysis, we will look at the capital 
structure pre and post losses and we will evaluate the ACRG under the scenario of CoCos triggering.  
As outlined above, during the credit turmoil, most of the banks had no “going concern” loss absorbing 
capital structures to absorb losses beyond the equity. Despite some Tier 1 instruments being 
contingent on capital ratios, regulators in general struggled to have coupons suspended on most 
hybrids instruments whose purpose would be to serve as a cushion against a potential default.  As a 
consequence, regulators have started to think through new instruments with mandatory write downs 
or equity conversions feature if the CT1 falls below a certain threshold. These instruments are called 
Contingent Convertible Bonds (CoCos). In other words, it is a debt instrument which could be 
impaired (either written down or converted into equity) upon a regulatory event, preferably CT1 falling 
below a minimum threshold.  
4.1 The CoCo concept and typology 
A CoCo bond is a bond which is converted into equity at a predetermined strike price (SP) in the 
event of solvency trigger. The CoCo can be thought of an option (put) bought from the bondholder by 
                                                          
97 As opposed to the US ones given the reliance on the expensive “Trust preferred instruments”. 
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the issuer such that upon a regulatory event98
Consequently, a CoCo is made up of two components: 
 (CT1 falling below a threshold), the option is exercised 
and the bondholder receives equity for its bond at a predetermined price (SP). If the share price at the 
trigger date is X, then the bondholders loses the difference between the strike and the current share 
price (SP-X)/SP% and received the balance, X/SP% in equity (Goldman Sachs 2010).  
• An amount (SP-X)/SP% that gets written down to zero upon a trigger. 
• An amount X/SP% that experiences an equity conversion. 
If the strike price is equal to the conversion price, then the write down is zero (X-X/X) and the initial 
amount is converted into equity.  
Below an overview of the CoCo’s cash flows if and if no conversion event happens. We can see in the 
second graph the loss in coupons and face value after the conversion trigger. 
Figure 8: Overview of CoCos’s Cash Flows 
Source: Credit Suisse Research team  
At the moment there are several Tier I and Tier II loss absorbing bonds in the market but significantly 
differ from the contingent capital based instruments of Basel III and SIMMA. Below a comparison 
between the CoCos and the Tier I and II instruments. We can see the difference between the Low 
CoCos (trigger at 5%) and Tier 2 bonds as “gone concern” instruments whose “bail-in “features kick in 
after the “going concern” instruments (High CoCo / Tier 1 bonds) are converted or written down. 
Needless to say as we go down the capital structure, the instruments become more expensive for the 
banks. 
                                                          
98 Or at the point of non-viability (see  4.4.4.1).  
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Source: author 
Over the last three years several CoCos based instruments have been issued in Europe. The first one 
was the LT2 of Lloyds which was issued to allow the bank to meet the 2010 stress tests. Rabobank’s 
CoCo was meant to replenish the weak CT1 of the bank. The most recent CoCos as of today is the 
Tier II Credit Suisse (CS) CoCo upon which we will base our empirical analysis as it best captures the 
main features of future CoCos market. 
 
Source: Credit Suisse Research team  
As we can see in the table, there are many different types of CoCos: a more debt like CoCo such as 
the Rabobank with principal write down or a more equity like option such as the Lloyds one which 
converts into equity at a fixed price or the CS’s one that converts based on an average share price.  
Instrument Maturity Ranking Coupon Suspension
Going Concern 
loss absorption
Gone Concern 
loss absorption
Low CoCo at 
5% CT1 
trigger
Dated `Tier 2 None None Yes, conversion at 5% CT1
Tier 2 
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Dated `Tier 2 None None
Yes, permanent 
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down or 
conversion into 
equity
High CoCo at 
7% CT1 
trigger
Dated `Tier 2 Yes
Yes, conversion 
or permanent 
write down at 7% 
CT1
None
Tier 1 
(conversion / 
write down)
Perpetual Tier 1 Non cumulative
Yes, temporary 
write down of 
principal; 
mandatory 
cancellation
Yes, permanent 
principal write 
down or 
conversion into 
equity
Gone 
concern 
instruments 
absorbing 
losses after 
Tier and 
High CoCos
Going 
concern loss 
absorbing 
instruments
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4.2 The conversion price 
In our opinion, the conversion price structure of the CoCo will be a key factor of the investor appetite 
for this asset class. There are several options for that. The strike price can be set at the point of 
conversion (like the CS’s CoCo) or at the spot price upon issuance (Lloyds’s ECN) benefiting the 
bondholders in the former and the shareholders in the latter. Following Roberto Herniques of JP 
Morgan, we think that the best way of setting the strike is to tie the conversion price to the underlying 
solvency trigger99
4.2.1 Conversion strike price at the point of conversion 
 or in other words, to link the solvency to the equity valuation. Let us look at the pros 
and cons of each alternative (Ruback 1998). 
This is optimal for bondholders but suboptimal for shareholders. 
Description 
-The conversion strike is not pre-defined and only determined at the point 
where the option is triggered. 
- If we assume the trigger point is consistent with an acute share price fall, the 
conversion is done at distressed levels.  
Bondholder 
- The bondholder achieves a material equity stake as the conversion is 
triggered at distressed levels.  
-The bondholder could experience no loss on the notional as the delivered 
equity can be sold to recoup the notional invested. 
-The bondholder could enjoy a potential upside on the equity as the conversion 
(done at distressed levels) could support the issuer as a “going concern” and 
strengthen market confidence on the issuer. Thus, we expect some share price 
appreciation after the conversion. 
Stockholders 
- Shareholders incur in losses through strong dilution. 
- Shareholders might become minorities in an outcome that resembles a 
corporate restructuring.  
- Shareholders could use pre-emptive rights to mantain their equity stake to 
minimize the cost of dilution. 
Comments 
- From our point of view, this option clashes with the intended loss sharing 
framework for the subordinated debt under Basel III as losses for sub-holders 
are smoothed.  
- The requirement for the institution to have to fail for the CoCo bondholder to 
share in losses is suboptimal and undermines the principle of these instruments 
as “going concern” capital. 
- One of the benefits of this option is that shareholders’ interests are more 
aligned with a more conservative corporate strategy which minimises the 
                                                          
99If the CT1 requires a 50% reduction to reach the trigger level, then the strike price could be determined at 50% below the spot 
price at issuance. 
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probability of the instruments triggering. 
 
4.2.2 Conversion strike price at the point of issuance 
This is suboptimal for bondholders but optimal for shareholders (R. Henriques 2010). 
Description -The strike of the conversion option is pre-defined as the spot share price at the 
point of issuance.  
Bondholder 
- The bondholders has the same downside risk profile as that of shareholders 
given the conversion is done at the issuance price. 
- The bondholder is at the expense of the interest of the shareholders.  
- This is due to the fact that the conversion into equity at pre-determined 
price will result in less shareholder dilution than an emergency rights-issue at a 
distressed level. 
Stockholders 
- The shareholders benefit as the strike price at the point of issuance mitigates 
the potential dilution of a distressed equity cash call. 
- Shareholders benefit from a lower degree of dilution due to the fact that they 
have effectively ‘locked in’ a forwards rights issue at a very advantageous level. 
Comments 
- Bondholders would not enjoy much say in corporate strategy and after 
conversion would most likely remain minorities in the shareholding given that 
CoCos will tend to have outstanding notional value which is proportionally less 
than core equity, as per the Basel III proposed minimum capital requirements. 
- This option would be the approach which regulators feel more at ease with 
given that the loss profile of the instrument would tend to mimic that of a long 
stock position, hence being more in line with the loss absorbing philosophy of 
Basel III. 
 
4.2.3 Conversion strike price linked to the solvency ratio 
We share JP Morgan’s view that an intermediate approach between these two is warranted in terms 
of defining the strike price of CoCo. Under this option, we establish a link between credit and equity 
as we assume that there is a relationship between the solvency levels of a bank and the stock price. 
Therefore, the strike price should be determined as a function of the loss required to bring down the 
solvency ratio (CT1) to trigger the CoCo. According to JP Morgan Equity Research there is empirical 
evidence100
We follow this methodology in our empirical work.  
 that suggests a correlation between the drop in solvency and the fall in share price. By 
doing so, we establish a more balance risk-reward structure for both bondholders and shareholders.  
 
                                                          
100 They did for UBS and RBS and there was high correlation between solvency and share price.  
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4.3 The CS CoCo 
From our view, the CS’s CoCo kick-starts the Basel III compliant Contingent Convertible market and 
set outs a precedent for future issuances. Due to its comprehensiveness, we use it to describe some 
other theoretical features of this instrument. Furthermore, we use the CS’s style of CoCo for our 
empirical analysis.   
CS has been the first in using a fully convertible High Trigger CoCo to comply with the stringent 
capital ratios of the Swiss regulator. Below we can see the main features. 
 
         Source: Credit Suisse Research team  
CS’s CoCo has very clear trigger points. Should the CT1 of the bank falls below 7% (or if the regulator 
considers the bank to be close to hit the 7%), the CoCos is triggered to replenish the CT1 up to a 
reasonable level set out by the regulator. In case of a contingency event, the CoCo will be converted 
into an amount of shares which is equal to its face value divided by the reference share price 
converted into US dollars (USD) at the prevailing exchange rate. The reference share price is the 
average VWAP over the 35th to 5th day prior to the triggering event). If the USD equivalent reference 
price is below USD 20 (“Floor Price”), the amounts of share to be delivered will be the face value 
divided by the Floor Price (FP). Thus, the main risk that the CoCo holder faces is that the CoCos is 
converted when the share price in USD is lower than FP (Goldman Sachs 2010). 
4.3.1 Implied conversion probability in the CoCo  
The trigger event in a CoCo is similar to the default of a regular bond because the bondholder 
receives cash or shares. For the CoCo in general and for CS’s CoCo in particular we can estimate the 
implied probability of conversion by looking at the market price. Using CS’s CDS and an assumed 
recovery, we can estimate the theoretical price of one of its regular bonds. The price is equal to the 
sum of the discounted cash flows weighted by the probability of being received.101
                                                          
101 Can be calculated from CS’s CDS. 
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However, this calculation can turn out different to the market price of the bond. For instance, if the 
bond market price is lower, then the bond is cheaper than CS’s CDS. We can account for this 
cheapness by working out the spread to be added to the discount rates to make the theoretical price 
equivalent to the market price. This is the so called bond’s funding spread102
If we look for a regular bond of CS with the same maturity as that of the CoCo, the funding spread is 
15bps (the bond is 15bps cheaper than the CDS). Using this reasoning for our CoCo, we find a 
funding spread of 265bps, much higher than the 15bps funding spread of the regular bond, meaning a 
higher probability of default than that of a regular bond. Since the funding spread calculation relies on 
probabilities of default, the CoCo seems to be cheap. If we increase the CDS spread used in the 
calculation of the CoCo funding spread, we lower the funding spread until matches the 15bps spread 
of the regular bond. Consequently, we can calculate the implied conversion probability for the CS 
CoCo. If the conversion occurs, CoCo holders receive CS shares which are equal to the principal 
divided by the strike price conversion. If we assume CS share price as at 30th April 2011 ($45) and the 
conversion price at the floor price ($20), the share price gives an assumed recovery of 44% for the 
CoCo (calculated as (100/$20 per share*$20 per share).  
.  
Figure 9: Cs’s CpCo’s Recovery 
 
                                                    Source: author 
Additionally, we can break down the compensation for CoCo’s conversion risk into: 
We expect both parts of the equation to carry a risk premium over historical experience according to 
DB. If we look at our sample of banks in our empirical analysis, none of them have defaulted in their 
senior debt. Following DB, this allows us to link the implied conversion probability to the historical 
conversion probability over a period (Spick 2011): 
 
                                                          
102 Negative funding spread meaning that the bond is more expensive than the issuer’s CDS. 
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Total compensation = compensation if conversion occurs and issuer defaults + 
compensation if conversion occurs and issuer does not default 
Implied conversion probability = implied default probability + k*historical breach probability 
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In this formula, the historical breach probability hinges on the distance to trigger the CS’  CoCo which 
is now 5.2% versus 1.6% back in 2008. The k variable in the equation indicates the compensation 
that the CoCo provides as a multiple of the historical experience. 
 
                    Source: author 
We compute the value to call and to maturity using current and an alternative recovery assumption. In 
both scenarios and for both the call and the maturity date, the k remains above 1x meaning the CoCo 
compensates well for a breach probability being higher than the historical observation.  
4.3.2 Hedging the CoCo 
The value of the CoCo can be protected from potential losses by hedging it with American Put options 
with the strike price at the Floor Price.103  However, one particular feature of the CS CoCo is that the 
bond is USD denominated but the shares are listed in CHF (they are referenced at CSGN.VX) having 
the floor price set at USD 20. Therefore, the option chosen for hedging purposes needs to take the 
foreign exchange effects into consideration. A hedging solution could be an American Put Option 
compo USD on CSGN.VX struck at USD 20104
The payoff upon conversion event resembles a short put option.  
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
103 It is an American option as the conversion can happen at any point in time as opposed to the European option (only at 
maturity). 
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Figure 10: CoCo’s Hedging 
 
                                       Source: Goldman Sachs Research team  
4.3.3 The Value in CoCos coupons 
In our opinion, the CoCos bonds are compelling due to the attractive coupon relative to the 
conversion risk. The coupon of 7.875%, which is paid semiannually, represents a 5.30% excess over 
the 5.5y USD Libor (2.58%). This coupon can be then viewed as a stream of 2.65% semi-annual 
payments. This cash flows stream can be modeled as a strip of coupons with a knock-out105 if the 
CS’s share price hits USD 20106
Therefore, we can see the CoCo coupons similar to barrier options. If we set the barrier level at CHF 
20, the value of the contingent coupons’ excess spread over Libor for the first 5.5yr equals to 19.7% 
of the notional. A more aggressive assumption would be to place the barrier at 30% of current market 
levels (= CHF 13.00). In this case the contingent coupons’ excess spread over Libor is worth 23.4%. 
In both cases the value of the down & out coupons is significantly higher than the value of the put that 
is needed to proxy-hedge the face value of the CoCo bond (15.7% premium spend* for compo USD 
American put option struck at USD 20) . At a premium of 15.7% it takes between 2.5 and 3 years of 
excess coupon payments to earn back the premium spend on the put option  
. Though the knock-out event is actually contingent on a breach of the 
CT1 ratio, we model it as an equity-linked down & out coupon (Saunders 2002).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105 Which causes to lose the coupon stream. 
106 Given the CoCo can be modeled as a long position in a strip of down & out coupons and a short position in a put, the CS 
CoCo has a negative vega meaning that both the implied and realized volatility of CS is expected to increase when the share 
price goes down.  
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Figure 11: CoCo’s Put Premium 
 
Source: Goldman Sachs Research team  
4.3.4 Relative value of the CoCo versus LT2 
First thing that springs to mind when evaluating the CoCos value is how the risk adjusted return of it 
stacks up to those of other subordinated debt such as the LT2. Is the CoCo investor adequately 
compensated for the risk of conversion relative to a credit event? 
To answer that question, we compare the z-spread107
• LT2 + CDS:  CS has currently two USD LT2 bonds outstanding: a 2018 6% bond and the 
2020 5.4% bond. The z spreads are 190bps and 193 bps respectively. The 5y sub CDS 
trades at 138bps (negative basis) meaning that the spread earned on this strategy is 52bps.  
 of a CS LT2 bond with subordinated CDS 
protection to the z spread of the CoCo hedged with put options. Under both scenarios, only the 
coupon is at risk allowing for a fair comparison of compensation between the probabilities of a 
conversion event versus a credit event (price levels are as of March 2011):   
• CoCo + Put: the CoCo bond currently trades at a z spread of 474bps. The 5.5 year American 
put option compo USD costs 15.7%, which is equivalent to a 301bps per annum. Therefore 
the spread comes out at 173bps.  
Therefore, the ratio between both spreads implies that the probability of conversion is more than three 
times the probability of a credit event.  
On a perpetual non call bond basis, CS has a 10 USD 5.860% floater T1 that currently trades at a z 
spread to call of 275bps versus the 474bps z spread of the CoCo.  
4.4 Current debates on the CoCo space 
4.4.1 The scale of the CoCo market 
The importance of the CoCo market cannot be take for granted as these instrument will allow banks 
to comply with newly enhanced capital requirement under Basel III and run down progressively the 
existing non compliant Tier I and II. Therefore, the CoCo instrument has to be feasible in terms of 
structure and pricing to seek the support of the investor community given the potential issuance 
magnitude of these instruments.  
                                                          
107 The constant spread that will make the price of a security equal to the present value of its cash flows when added to the 
yield at each point on the spot rate Treasury curve where a cash flow is received. In other words, each cash flow is discounted 
at the appropriate Treasury spot rate plus the Z-spread. 
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In estimating the scale of the potential issue of Basel III CoCo we rely on the absolute size of the core 
equity of the European banks. We also assume that the normalized CT1 for these banks will range 
between 8%-10% and on top of that, the aforementioned capital buffers. We also assume the overall 
capital ratio will be set at 12%-13%. As a result, we lay out three scenarios to estimate the potential 
Coco market by looking at three different potential capital structures under Basel III: 
 
                                                     Source: author  
Under these scenarios, and using the aggregate RWA of the entire European banking sector at the 
end of 2010, we estimate a CoCo market between €856bn-€1,200bn. Therefore the size of the hybrid 
market will be far larger than that of Basel II. The magnitude of this market reinforces the need to 
design an “investable” hybrid framework to allow these banks to issue these instruments to comply 
with the minimum capital requirements.  
 
Source: author  
According to JP Morgan, the importance of the hybrid market is exacerbated when looking at the 
amortization profile of the current Tier I and Tier II instruments, which are phasing out progressively 
through 2020. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 
I
Scenario 
II
Scenario 
III
CT1 8.0% 9.0% 10.0%
Tier I 1.5% 1.0% 1.0%
Tier II 3.0% 2.5% 2.0%
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Figure 12: Outstanding Tier I and II amortization profile 
 
                            Source: JP Morgan Research team and author  
We can observe in the graph below the amount of Tier 1 bonds calls due over the next 10 years. 
These bonds will have to be grandfathered, called or otherwise should they comply with Basel III rules 
be left outstanding. The amount is significant. 
Figure 13: Amortisation – First Calls of Bank T1s in EUR, USD and GBP 
 
                     Source: Bloomberg and author  
It must be noted though that owing to new special resolution regimes in EC countries some existing 
old non loss absorbing T1 and T2 might remain and mingle with new CoCos which could revise 
up/down our CoCo market size estimation.  
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4.4.2 Swiss vs Basel III type of CoCos 
From our point of view, the Swiss CoCos are interesting as they set out two tranches of CoCos with 
the differentiating factor being the level at which the conversion triggers. Thus, a more senior tranches 
will set the trigger at 5% CT1 whereas the most subordinated piece will be set at 7% CT1. In line with 
the Swiss CoCo proposal, the minimum condition for these CoCos is that they should be at least Tier 
II compliant under Basel III. Therefore, we expect these CoCo structures to be a date subordinated 
instrument,  
However, we find surprising the guideline of Basel III for contingent conversion instruments which are 
to be Tier I in nature108
The CS’s CoCo is the first pure Basel III compliant instrument and according to Roberto Henriques 
from JP Morgan (see  2011 research), underscores the principle of “super-equivalence” whereby the 
national regulator can impose additional requirements above Basel III minimum requirements. We 
expect the application of this principle to be correlated with the size of the banking sector relative to 
that of the economy. Recall, in terms of banking assets/GDP, the Swiss banks account for 6.0x the 
GDP, followed by UK at 4.9x, France at 4.0x or Spain and Germany around 3.2x. As a result, it does 
not come as a surprise that this disproportiate size of the Swiss banks versus the GDP calls for a 
more robust capital structure given the underlying risks for the economy of potential fallout of the 
banking system. The read-across here would be that UK regulator should follow suit given the size of 
the likes of Barclays, Lloyds and RBS represent a huge size of the UK GDP. However, we should be 
cautious when stating that. According to R. Henriques, the Swiss banks boast less capital intensive 
business model given the size of the wealth management in their balance sheets. As such, many of 
the assets under management generate revenues with a small risk weighting (Risk Weighting Assets) 
under Basel III and as a result, the higher capital requirements of the Swiss banks become more 
palatable for these institutions. On the other hand, the UK banks are very capital intensive and the 
implementation of similar solvency ratios and CoCos could become very damaging for the capital 
structure of these banks and hence place them at a disadvantageous position versus their European 
counterparts (Henriques 2010).  
. From our standpoint, the Swiss proposal is more viable as we do not 
envisage a perpetual market for Basel III compliant Tier I instruments for the time being, given the 
sharp increment in risk of the instrument for the investor. Basel III should focus much more on the 
investibility of the structure as these instruments will only become effective if banks can issue them.  
As a consequence, we do not expect the Swiss capital structure to be fully implemented in some 
other countries such as UK but they will be either close to that or otherwise the regulator will resort to 
special resolution regimes such as the 2009 Banking Act coupled with other measures such as “Bail-
in” or “Living Wills”109
We think the ratio of bank assets to GDP will be a critical input into capital levels. We expect UK, 
Sweden, Denmark to follow Swiss in 10% Core Tier 1. We expect US to be 8%-9% and French and 
German be closer to the US.  
.  
We can infer from the graph that, on an IFRS110
• 2 Swiss banks~600% GDP. 
 basis: 
                                                          
108 Perpetual with a call date and no economic incentive to call. 
109 Includes a recovery plan or a resolution plan. The latter includes: liquidation; deposit transfer; bridge bank (“good” and “bad” 
bank; ”bail-in” (stay or conversion) and finally “bail-out”.  
110 International Financial Reporting Standards. 
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• 5 French banks~325% GDP. 
• 5 UK banks~345% GDP. 
• 5 Italian banks~140%GDP. 
• 5 Spanish banks~198 GDP. 
 
Figure 14: Banks’ Assets vs Country GDP 
Source: IMP and author  
4.4.3 “Going Concern” versus “Gone Concern” 
The major change underpinning the new hybrid capital structure under Basel III is that this structure 
should command a higher loss absorbency features on a “going concern” basis. This significantly 
differs from the limited loss absorbing features of the Basel II hybrids and more as a “gone concern” 
given that the principal could only be impaired upon a liquidation.  
Nevertheless, we call into question the nature of the “going concern” profile of the new CoCo 
structures given that the conversions triggers have been fixed at very low levels relative to the 
enhanced minimum requirements (with the capital buffers). Consequently, the amount of losses 
needed to trigger these CoCos would be so big that we doubt the bank could continue operating as a 
“going concern”.111
Another problem for these CoCos is the so called “point of non-viability” (PONV) language. According 
to Goldman Sach, the PONV has a twofold definition: 
 In line with R. Henriques, we question whether these “out of the money” CoCos is 
suitable for a capital structure with is supposed to enjoy flexibility to absorb losses on a “going 
concern” basis. It seems to us that some of the CoCos (mostly the low trigger ones) would just be 
used to replace debt for equity in the event of a liquidation which we guess it really falls short of the 
Basel III intentions which aims, through this capital structure proposal, to quickly prop up failing banks 
on a ”going concern” basis.  
• the decision to make a public sector injection of capital, or equivalent support ,without which 
the firm would have become non-viable, as determined by the relevant authority; and 
• A decision that a write-off, without which the firm would become non-viable, is necessary, as 
determined by the relevant authority. 
                                                          
111 See our empirical project. In some bank to trigger the Low CoCos, losses could amount to €60bn-€70bn. This is a very 
unlikely scenario as the banks will have already reached the PONV and granted the regulator intervention.  
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Under these parameters, the low trigger CoCos would never be triggered given the huge magnitude 
of losses that the banks need to incur which would prompt the authority intervention under the PONV 
language, making the pricing and the investibility of these instruments very difficult. The pricing of 
these instruments would become an intricate process, as investors will not be able to correctly model 
the trigger point which will rely on the regulatory subjectivity112
Therefore, one could question the effectiveness of the suggested CoCo structures given the “out of 
the money” trigger instruments do not seem very compatible with the “going concern” capital thesis of 
Basel III. As Roberto says “after all, it has never happened that regulators have constructed an 
elaborate edifice of regulatory capital, only to discover that in time of distress these instruments failed 
completely in their intended function of providing flexibility to issuers”. As such, the new CoCo 
structures could become ineffective and redundant with the “point of non-viability” language. 
.  
113
Another further problem would be the introduction of alternative resolution regimes such as “bail-ins” 
that might prevent issuers from raising capital in a distress situation. One obvious question would be 
why any equity or debt investor would provide capital when the banks is undergoing distress and 
mounting losses, with a high likelihood of very punitive outcomes for new investors. Thus, we could 
not assume that capital could be raised in a distress scenario to prevent the CoCo being triggered
 
114
4.4.3.1 PONV (Point of Non Viability) 
.  
Basel III includes the PONV, especially for the SIFI (Systematic Important Financial Institutions). This 
clause empowers the regulator to trigger the “burden sharing” across the capital structure regardless 
of the contractual sanctioning of the CoCos. In other words, the regulator can “bail-in” the capital 
structure even if the CoCos have not been set off as the trigger has not been breached. This creates 
from our view too much subjectivity in the capital structure and makes the pricing of CoCo much more 
difficult. Likewise, it increases the amount of discretion that regulators can have in exerting the 
“burden sharing” in the capital structure, exacerbating the investors’ uncertainties. Moreover, it makes 
the pre-defined trigger CoCo quite redundant. We therefore believe that the PONV creates too many 
uncertainties and for the loss absorption to work, it is needed pre-determined thresholds so that the 
order of subordination is respected at all times. The removal of regulatory discretion in the CoCos for 
a more objective trigger will facilitate the investibility of the CoCos115
4.4.4 Order of subordination 
. 
Another interesting debate in the Basel III space in general and CoCo in particular is that the order of 
subordination could be undermined. We have been advocating throughout this section that Basel III 
instruments have to be consistent with “going concern” capital and the market has to have the ability 
to price these instruments. Some of the Basel III features such as the PONV, senior “bail-in”, or low 
triggers might jeopardize the order of subordination as the regulator discretion on one hand and 
“burden sharing” on the funding market on the other hand could breach the order of subordination in 
                                                          
112 JP Morgan European Bank Bail in Survey shows, among other things, that the implementation of the subjectivity regulatory 
optionality makes the Coco less investible. 
113 It must be noted that this is not only specific to CoCo but to some of the recent contingent writedown Tier I structures 
(UCGIM 9.375% and ISPM 9.5%) that have very low trigger levels.  
114 This underscores the inability of the capital markets to raise capital for the banks during the “credit crunch” that saw the 
public capital “bailing out” or rescuing the banking sector. 
115 And also will allow to be rated by rating agencies. Some rating agencies are reluctant to rate these instruments because of 
the PONV which exacerbates the uncertainty of the outcome. 
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the capital structure. We advocate for a capital structure that “bails-in” the providers of risk (equity and 
subordinate) on a “going concern” (restructuring / liability management) and the providers of funding 
(senior) on a “gone concern” in the context of a resolution regime (Ineke 2011).  
The new debate to preserve the order of subordination spins around the possibility of creating a new 
dated write down hybrid tranche above the perpetual Basel III loss absorbing instruments to champion 
the order of subordination and steer clear of the burden-sharing in senior.116
Following R. Henriques, the order of play should highlight the following key principles: 
 Through these 
instruments, the bank will make a differentiation between the providers of capital and the suppliers of 
risk allowing the senior market to provide funds at reasonable cost levels. Moreover, the potential 
losses that investors might incur in at least will follow the order of subordination and will not be subject 
to discretionary provisions that can breach the “status quo” (PONV problem).  
• Order of subordination is respected on a “going” and “gone concern” basis with new dated 
hybrids (with write down/up feature) in the capital structure and the avoidance of PONV. 
• Senior only faces losses in a resolution regime / “gone concern” scenario. 
• Risk should be accountable and measureable by investors by providing specific and  
objective triggers.  
Figure 15: The Order of Play 
              Source: JP Morgan Research team 
As illustrated by the graph, in the event of losses the order of play should be as follows: 
1. Equity in excess of the CT1 should be the first in line to absorb losses. 
                                                          
116 See “An Alternative Finish for Basel III” by R.Henriques. To make the Coco more investable and slightly more economic for 
the issuer, he also proposes a CoCo Fresh that has two triggers: a downside trigger (the traditional trigger if CT1 falls below a 
threshold) and an upside trigger (based on pre-defined share price) where the instruments are also converted into equity (like a 
convertible bond) allowing the investor to share some of the upside.  
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2. Dated CoCo structures should come second with enough size117
3. Write down / up instruments come next in the loss absorption ranking as they only absorb 
losses and not rebuild capital. 
 to replenish the solvency. 
Write down / Write up instruments only allows to share losses with the equity rather than 
rebuilding the capital base.  
a. We share the view with R. Henriques than having temporary write downs in these 
instruments does not undermine the loss absorption and the write up will allow these 
instruments to absorb losses on an ongoing basis118
b. Given the high cost of issuing CoCos, banks should be able to issue  a good blend of 
CoCos and write down/up structures 
.  
4. After the three first layer are exhausted, the Tier II write down instruments come into play. 
a. These instruments should command lower pricing than the others due to the low 
probability of trigger and a “must pay” language.  
5. In the event of consumptions of the entire loss absorption capital structure, a resolution 
regime should kick in as the issuer will probably be on a “gone concern”.  
a. We think that the losses for senior holders in a resolution regime are more palatable 
provided that the order of subordination is preserved at all times. 
4.4.4.1 Write down/Write up vs Conversion 
The new array of Basel III instruments will provide for different characteristics, some of which have 
already been picked up by the main CoCo issuers. Loss absorbing Basel III requirements can be 
articulated through: 
• Permanent / Temporary Write down/up bond: the bond principal is written down (permanently 
or temporarily) once a trigger has been breached. The principal can be written back up to par 
once the bank becomes profitable again and the solvency capital rebuilt.  
• Equity conversion bonds (CoCos): the bond principal is converted into equity at pre-defined 
price once the trigger has been breached.  
To decide which one is more favorable is not easy. Equity investors will be probably more inclined for 
the write down option as they enjoy a “free ride” as they avoid dilutions while sharing losses with debt 
holders. We believe fixed income investors will be torn between both as the write down option (mostly 
the permanent write down) offers them a meaningful downside whereas the equity option might 
prevent them from holding equity (if their investment mandate is fixed income only). 
4.4.5 Special Resolution Regimes and “Bail-ins” 
In general policy makers usually face two options with a failing bank: to rescue the banks or to let it 
collapse. The latter is usually very perilous given the systematic risk embedded119
                                                          
117 At least 3% if we assume a CT1 of 10% and a trigger of 7% to restore market confidence. 
 and the cost. The 
former can be done through “bail-outs” (with taxpayer money as it happened during the credit crisis in 
2008) or through “bail-ins”. This gives the regulator the power to force banks to be recapitalized from 
inside by using private capital and not public money. This is what inherently Basel III is aiming at. To 
do so the regulators has again two options: 
118 Effectively they could be written down again.  
119 Remember the fallout of Lehman Brothers. 
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• “Bail-in” instruments such as CoCo or permanent write down instruments that have 
conversion or write down features to absorb the losses to prop up the capital structure. This 
loss absorbing features are set out in the documentation and the triggers kicks in once the 
solvency ratios fall below a threshold. 
• Special Resolution Regimes (SRR): this framework allows the banking regulators to take over 
the bank at an early stage of distress through “official administration” and they are granted 
with powers and tools to deal with the failing entity (either restructuring or liquidation). This 
regime gives the authority to either convert or write down the debt instrument (even if the 
documentation does not state so) for example to recapitalize a failing bank . Countries with 
Special Resolution Regimes include UK (UK Resolution Regime 2009), Denmark (Danish 
Banking Act), Germany (German Banking Act) and US (FDIC Notice of Proposed Rule).  
From our point of view, the potential implementation of “bail-in”/statutory regimes would result in 
higher expected risk profile for senior debt (the highest submarket in the international capital 
markets), prompting investors to ask for a higher premium for this asset class which will increase the 
funding cost for senior debt and hence for the overall cost of capital for the banks.  
As Moody’s said in January 2011, “A critical question is whether there would be significant demand 
for debt that was either subject to contractual “bail-in” features or that faced the possibility of statutory 
write down. If not, banks would struggle to achieve the improvements in their funding structures that 
regulation will, in time, require. Banks are, in any event, likely to want to maximise their debt issuance 
prior to the new rules coming into force” 
Therefore, according to Moody’s “poorly designed instruments would carry hard-to-measure risks that 
could encourage poorly informed investment decisions as well as undermine investor appetite” 
 
4.4.5.1 Bail ins 
While a more robust solvency framework and stronger capitalization for banks could imply a lower risk 
premiums demanded by investors, the “bail-in” in senior will probably outweigh these benefits 
resulting in a increase of the risk premia. The concept of “bail-ins” is not different from a corporate 
restructuring with a mix of write downs and debt “equitisation” to make sure the company remains as 
a going concern entity. The “bail-in” assumption is that under a going concern, equity and subordinate 
debt holders achieve a higher recovery than under a liquidation scenario. Moreover, by forcing 
stakeholders to share the losses, the “moral hazard” is lessened as the likelihood of “bail-out” 
diminishes. Below a simple “bail-in exercise”. After an asset impairment that “wipes out” the equity, 
both the subordinate and the senior debt are fully or partially “equitied” to replenish the capital 
structure.  
 
Source: author 
Following JP Morgan Research team (2010), below the costs between “bail-outs” and “bail-ins 
 
€bn €bn
Balance Sheet Write-Down / Loss Absorption stage Balance Sheet Write-Down / Loss Absorption stage
Assets 200 Liabilities Assets 180 Liabilities
Impairment (20) Deposits 100 Deposits 100
Senior 70 Senior 60
Subordindate 10 Subordindate 0
Equity Equity
Equity 20 Equity 0
Writedown (20) Sub into equity 10
Senior into equity 10
Total Assets 180 Total Liabilties & Equitiy 180 Total Asse 180 Total Liabilties & Equitiy 180
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Source: JP Morgan Research team 
As we can, under the “bail-out” regime only the equity and partially the subordinate debt were loss 
absorbing forcing tax payers to rebuild, under the “bail-in” framework, the subordinate become full 
loss absorbing and the senior becomes a mezzanine layer to “top up” any capital required left if 
needed.  
In our view, the implementation of the “bail-in” regime will have enormous consequences not only for 
the liabilities and equity holders but for the entire economy: 
• Higher cost of funding: as the cost of liabilities reprices up as the risk premium rises due to 
the loss absorbing features. Banks will have to offset that higher cost of funding but passing 
some of these costs on to the borrowers implying higher credit costs for the economy. 
• Changes in funding patterns: as the banks faces higher funding costs, they will turn to 
cheaper sources of funding namely deposits and covered bonds exacerbating the 
subordination of the senior debt: 
o Increasing deposits: as a cheaper source of funding for banks, they can embark on a 
“deposit war”120
o Increasing covered bonds: due to the increase in risk premia, banks will resort to 
sources of funding that entail lower costs and they are also in demand by the market 
due to the strong collateral. The best example is the covered bond.  
 to gather deposits. However, as the deposits are in nature shorter 
dated than wholesale funding (demand deposits), they would not work effectively in a 
distress scenario as they are quite vulnerable to ouftlows. 
4.4.5.2 Senior “bail-in” 
Basel III and the EC resolution regimes contemplate the implementation of “burden sharing” features 
across the entire capital structure including the banking senior debt, the largest bond market in the 
world. In our view, the implementation of losses on senior holders on a “going concern” basis will 
change the dynamic of this market from funding to risk capital. Accordingly, this market will have to be 
priced for the embedded risks as a “going concern” capital in the event of losses and will probably 
become too burdensome for the capital structure of banks under Basel III. In our opinion, “burden 
sharing” in the senior should only come about under a “gone concern” scenario (liquidation).  
Our bearish stance on the senior debt market is borne out by three facts: 
• Regulation (Basel III, Solvency II121) seems to be pushing issuers and investors toward the 
covered bond format122
                                                          
120 As it happened in Spain over 2010. 
 going forward instead of the senior debt market.  New regulation in 
121 Solvency II is the equivalent of Basel III for insurers but much more complex.  
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banks seems to be moving towards a US style HolCo-OpCo structure where the senior debt 
will be issued by the HolCo (along with the subordinate debt) rather than the Opco (where the 
deposits and the bank assets are held)123
• Furthermore, senior “bail-in”/burden sharing will probably favor covered bond relative to a 
supposedly more expensive senior debt that does not qualify for regulatory solvency. 
. 
o As more covered bonds are issued, senior becomes more subordinated implying 
lower recoveries in a restructuring, liquidation etc (all else equal). 
o Peripheral crisis is deepening and preventing small and weak domestic banks from 
tapping capital market and therefore these banks become very reliant on the covered 
market as the only funding source. 
We really think the implementation of a “bail-in” regime for the senior market will have pernicious 
consequences, especially at a time when the ability of some banks (especially the peripheral banks) 
to issue wholesale funding is very limited. This regime will have unintended consequences in terms of 
higher cost of funding for the banks as the risk premium for investors will rise, the knock on effects of 
senior risk aversion in the largest bond market in the world and the issuance of covered bonds in 
detriment of senior debt as a long term wholesale funding.  
The latter idea will definitely from our view undermine the rational of the resolution regimes and the 
Basel III “bail-in” framework. As the covered bond funding increase along the capital structure, the 
proportion of senior debt decreases resulting in there being less senior debt subject to any type of 
write down mechanism. We think the regulators is looking at the current capital structure where senior 
debt is the largest instrument by far and not at the future capital structure where the covered debt will 
outrun the senior debt, the former not subject to any type of haircut as it is secured by the mortgage 
pool. This might create a situation where the regulator wants to impose losses on the senior layers of 
the failing bank and it just realizes that there is a limited volume of senior debt and that most of the 
financing is coming out of instruments which are carved out of the proposed “bail-in” regime (covered 
bond and deposits). We are confident that the senior “bail-in” regime will encompass higher cost of 
funding for the banks without any workable solution in the event of a failing bank.  
 
5 Final remarks 
We can conclude that one of the failings of bank hybrid capital in the crisis was its inability to absorb 
losses whilst the bank was still a “going concern”. The Basel Committee has set out the path to 
dramatically change the capital structure of the banks to make it loss absorbing and allow the bank to 
remain as a “going concern”. The capital structure final outcome is still underway but we envisage a 
comprehensive capital structure as follows:  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
122 The covered bond is a mortgage backed bond that benefits from a stream of cash flows coming from the pool of mortgages. 
In the event of a bank default, the covered bond is secured by the mortgage pool and also by the recourse to the entire balance 
sheet of the bank ranking pari passu with the senior debt holders (only in some jurisdictions such as Spain or Portugal). 
123 Increasing the cost and the subordination and hence lowering the recovery in the event of liquidation. 
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Figure 16: Potential Capital Structure 
 
Source: author 
Additionally, the “bail-in” framework that triggers the debt conversion into equity across the entire 
capital structure (including the senior debt) in the event of massive losses or the breach of the PONV 
will see the equity suffering “death by dilution” and the senior potentially becoming the major 
shareholder. 
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Figure 17: Equity “Death£ by Dilution 
 
Source: author 
If the senior “bail-in” finally goes ahead, in a extreme scenario of losses taking a toll on the balance 
sheet that hit the PONV, senior holders might end up with a majority controlling stake in the bank.124
 
 
This will definitely undermine the viability of the senior market as the main funding source for the 
banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
124 So we wonder whether senior debtholders as funding providers will want to run the risk of holding equity in a “bust” bank on 
a “going concern” basis. 
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SECTION 2 
The analysis seeks to evaluate the impact of a regulatory event in the cost of regulatory capital 
(CRC). The regulatory event triggers the CoCo as the CT1 falls below a threshold and this has an 
impact in terms of cost and mix of capital in the overall capital structure. We assume that the post tax 
losses bring the CT1 down to 4% (a very extreme scenario) triggering the conversion of the high and 
low Tier I and II CoCos.  
We undertake a twofold analysis: we estimate the average cost of regulatory capital (ACRC) pre and 
post conversion of CoCos for a sample of the largest “TBTF” banks in Europe and US.  
In the first part, we follow the theoretical framework laid out in section III to estimate the ACRC. Firstly, 
we calculate the normalized cost of equity (COE) per bank following the CAPM model. Secondly, we 
estimate the potential cost of the Basel III compliant Tier I and Tier II on the basis of the solvency, 
leverage and profitability characteristics of each bank and we come up with a potential capital 
structure under Basel III standards. Lastly, we estimate the ACRC (effectively the “WACC”) which is 
the weighted average cost of the three capital structures: equity, Tier I and Tier II.  
In the second part, we set out a very aggressive scenario whereby all the banks incur in losses that 
take the CT1 down to 4% from their Basel III normalized CT1 and thus, both the High and Low CoCos 
are triggered. This has a strong impact on the capital structure and hence on the ACRC. We will see 
that.  
In the third part we will undertake a valuation exercise to evaluate the change in share price, 
outstanding shares and equity multiples through the conversion period. 
1  First part: pre conversion analysis of the ACRC 
1.1.Cost of equity 
Our preferred method for calculating the cost of equity is the CAPM due to its relatively simple 
theoretical base and easy to use nature. 
COE= RFA + Equity Beta*ERP  
being RFA=Risk Free Asset and  ERP=Equity Risk Premium125
For our main COE parameters, we estimate their values under normal market conditions. Given the 
acute volatility of the capital markets due to the sovereign risk, low interest rates and heavy 
impairment and losses in the banks that have exacerbated the earnings volatility  between 2009-
2010, the current COE is high relative to its normalized (historical) COE. We still think normalized 
COE should be higher than historically (but not significantly) due to lower ROE and higher overall 
ACRC
 
126
• Higher amount of core equity within the balance sheet under Basel III and therefore lower 
EPS and ROE. Equity multiples
. The former is due to: 
127
                                                          
125 Please see section II in block I  for further details for each of the COE components.  
(and hence share price due to the correlation between P/B 
126 Plus persistent high RFA as the sovereign bond yield will remain high due to macro pressures (fiscal deficit, structural 
problems etc) on the sovereigns. 
127 Price to Book (P/B), Price Earning (P/E) to name a few. 
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and ROE ) are supposed to remain subdued for a while as the ROE decreases while the 
banks adapt their business to suit the capital structure under Basel III128
• Fewer high ROE businesses which usually entail higher capital requirements and therefore 
many banks will forsake as they become too capital intensive for regulatory capital purposes. 
.  
In other words, lower yielding ROE businesses for higher amount of equity in the balance sheet. 
The latter is due to: 
• Higher cost of funding under Basel III through a more comprehensive “burden sharing” capital 
structure that translates into a higher cost of equity. As we have seen in this section, Tier I 
and Tier II CoCo type of instruments can easily yield between 8%-9.5% which surpasses the 
average dividend yield of the banks. If we assume equity multiples will remain low until ROE 
normalizes and debt yield outrun the dividend yield, COE will probably go up. 
However, one can make a thesis about a future lower COE given the more conservative and 
protectionist Basel III capital structure which aims to bolster the balance sheet and smooth the implicit 
earning volatility of the banks. From our view, this could be a partial offsetting factor to our “higher 
than historical COE thesis” but we strongly believe COE will probably rise129
Risk Free Asset (RFA) 
. 
For the risk free rates we have used the 10 year bond yields for the countries where the banks do the 
majority of their business. We normalize the RFA as of 30th of March 2011. At this time, sovereign 
crisis was worsening that witnessed peripheral sovereign bond yields trading 500bps above the 
German bund. We aim to normalize these levels based on historical trends and mostly through a 
comprehensive analysis of the current and future “macro” state of the sovereigns.   
Beta 
Currently the beta of the banking sector is trading high (1.4) relative to its historical levels (1.1) 
leading to a very high COE as a result of the volatility of the earning, the uncertainty of the outcome of 
Basel III, the sovereign concerns and the credit quality of the banks. We expect the beta of the 
banking sector to gradually move down to its historical level for three reasons: 
• Financial leverage will drop under Basel III. 
• Earnings volatility in many banks (mostly wholesale banks) will also go down as some highly 
volatile businesses (securitization) will be scaled back due to the new capital constraints. 
Many banks will have to return to the more stable lending business if the wholesale business 
becomes very capital intensive under Basel III. 
                                                          
128 In appendix 7 we estimate the implied valuation (as of April 2011) of the biggest European banks based on the 2013 market 
consensus ROE from Bloomberg. We aim to work out the improvement in ROA from the current levels in order to meet the 
market consensus ROE which stands at around 9.8%. Banks needs 50bps of improvement in ROA to meet the low 9.8%. 
Banks are overall estimating 12%-14% ROE by 2013 so we struggle to see how they are will achieve that if then have to 
improve the ROA by 100bps.  
129 In appendix 8 we illustrate our “bearish” stance on European financial equities (looking at the main four drivers: growth, 
returns, volatility and multiples) given the impact of Basel III, the sovereign crisis and the difficulty to do right issues to shore up 
solvency. Banks seem to be trapped in a “Catch 22” given the Basel III requires higher solvency than can only met via capital 
raises (banks are trading below P/B so not economical) or RWA declines (away from high intensive capital business and hence 
higher ROEs) that will put inevitably pressure on ROEs.  
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• Operating leverage will probably smooth out as the banks focus on the efficiency ratio 
(cost/income ratio) as the top line of the P&L (earnings in the profit and loss account) 
struggles to return former ROEs.  
For the current beta we have used a 5 year period back to September 2005 and for the historical beta 
we have used a 20 year period up to the start of the financial crisis (September 1987). If we use SX7P 
Index as the dependent variable and SXXP Index as the independent variable, the regression 
outcome is as follows: 
 
                                                     Source: author 
For our cost of equity, we stick to the historical beta as our normalized beta.  
Equity Risk Premium (ERP) 
As discussed in block I, while the RFA is easily observable and betas can be estimated using 
historical data or industry betas, the ERP is not straightforward. Recall there are several methods to 
estimate the equity premium ranging from the realized excess return of equity over government bonds 
in the past; the excess return over bonds investors have expected from equities in the past or the 
excess return investors currently require from equities relative to bonds, just to name a few (Graham 
2005) 
Given the sensitivity of the ERP on the COE, it is essential to accurately estimate the ERP to avoid 
over/underestimate the COE estimation. Below, a summary of the ERP estimates as of March 2010 
by JP Morgan. 
 
                                           Source: author 
Unlike our distressed WACC analysis where we used a 5% ERP, we have decided to increase our 
ERP by 50bps to a 5.5% for our banks sample, which is line with the most recent academic studies 
(see Damodaran) on the ERP for banks and what we think investors expect to require. Recall, the 
banking industry is a high beta and alpha sector and hence investors tend to demand a higher equity 
return to be compensated for the intrinsic risk of this industry130
If we put all these variables together, we derive to the individual COE per bank and the average COE 
for our sample which comes out at 9.9% for the sample. 
.  
                                                          
130 The recovery for the equity in the event of a restructuring is usually null given the high leverage of the capital structure. 
Raw Beta R^2
Current Beta 1.409 1.039
Historical Beta 0.821 0.811
Methods ERP
Historical U.S geometric mean since 1926 4.5%
Geometric academic survey 5.0%
Constant sharpe ratio 5.1%
Implied from AA bonds 5.1%
Implied from dividend discount model 6.0%
Arithmetic academic survey 6.0%
Historical U.S arithmetic mean since 1926 6.4%
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Source: author 
We can observe the difference between the current and the historical (normalized) COE. The 
difference is mainly driven by the beta. At the current ROE, few banks are barely covering their COE 
so we expect the banks to diligently manage their COE and ROE as the new Basel III rules puts 
pressure on the cost of equity. Additionally, in the event of actual and potential losses, COE increases 
as the risk of contingent capital131
1.2 Cost of Tier I and Tier II 
 trigger becomes more likely.  
To estimate the price of the Tier 1 and 2 type of CoCos we look at the CS’s CoCos (7.8% coupon)132
1. We use the main solvency, leverage and profitability ratios, namely Core Tier 1, TCE ratio 
and the normalized ROTE.
 
and then we extrapolate the potential cost of these instruments by turning at the fundamental quality 
of the company in terms of solvency, leverage and profitability. We conduct the following analysis: 
133. We assign a rating (1-7) in ascending order134
                                                          
131 Mostly if the trigger implies debt equity conversion rather than a debt write-down. 
 for each metric 
and then we calculate the blended scoring for the bank. The weighting is as follows: 
132 We discard the Lloyds CoCo as it was issued to allow the bank to pass the stress tests. Additionally, the conversion price is 
set at the time of the issuance, which is different from we can expect from the Swiss type of CoCos , whose conversion price is 
set at the time of the triggering event.  
133 TCE: it is the Tangible Common Equity ratio and is calculated: (Common Equity - Intangibles and Goodwill)/(Total Assets – 
Intangibles and Goodwill); ROTE is the Return on Tangible Equity and is calculated: Net Income for common equity / (Common 
Equity – Intangibles and Goodwill). 
134 Meaning the higher the ratio the higher the rating. 
Company Region RFA Index Beta ERP COE
Current 
Beta
Historical 
Beta
Current Historical
Bank of America US 3.1% SPX 2.38 1.09 5.5% 16.1% 9.0%
Citigroup US 3.1% SPX 2.84 1.42 5.5% 18.7% 10.9%
Goldman Sachs US 3.1% SPX 1.66 1.33 5.5% 12.2% 10.4%
Morgan Stanley US 3.1% SPX 2.26 1.02 5.5% 15.5% 8.7%
JP Morgan US 3.1% SPX 2.01 1.28 5.5% 14.1% 10.1%
Wells Fargo US 3.1% SPX 1.85 1.15 5.5% 13.2% 9.4%
Credit Suisse Europe 2.8% SXXP 1.66 1.36 5.5% 11.9% 10.3%
UBS Europe 2.8% SXXP 1.61 1.14 5.5% 11.6% 9.0%
Deustche Bank Germany 2.7% PXAP 1.54 1.16 5.5% 11.1% 9.0%
Barclays UK 3.5% ASX 2.04 1.44 5.5% 14.7% 11.4%
RBS UK 3.5% ASX 1.93 1.32 5.5% 14.1% 10.8%
Lloyds UK 3.5% ASX 1.84 1.23 5.5% 13.6% 10.3%
HSBC UK 3.5% ASX 1.04 1.31 5.5% 9.2% 10.7%
Standard Europe 2.8% SXXP 1.46 1.23 5.5% 10.8% 9.5%
BNP France 3.0% CAC 1.36 1.13 5.5% 10.5% 9.2%
Soc Gen France 3.0% CAC 1.52 1.21 5.5% 11.4% 9.7%
Santander Spain 4.1% IBEX 1.41 1.04 5.5% 11.9% 9.9%
BBVA Spain 4.1% IBEX 1.42 1.23 5.5% 12.0% 10.9%
Unicredit Italy 4.0% FTSEMIB 1.62 1.07 5.5% 12.9% 9.9%
ISP Italy 4.0% FTSEMIB 1.30 1.07 5.5% 11.1% 9.9%
Average 3.3% 1.74 1.21 5.5% 12.8% 9.9%
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Amongst these three metrics, they key determinant in the pricing of the CoCo should be the 
probability of the conversion option triggering, with the relative size of the CT1 buffer above 
the trigger level being the most important input. Therefore, we believe that the market will look 
at the level of CT1 to assess the solvency of the bank and to price the CoCo accordingly. 
 
2. We evaluate how CS’s rating stacks up versus its peers and relative to the price of its CoCo 
(High Trigger Tier II) and we draw up a list of potential prices for the High Trigger Tier II CoCo 
in line with the blended scoring per bank. We assign a potential price for such Coco to each 
bank. 
.  
3. We assign potential prices for the three remaining CoCos, namely Low Trigger Tier II and 
High and Low Trigger Tier I with the following spreads to the CS’s High Trigger CoCo: 
o Low Trigger Tier II: -2% 
o High Trigger Tier I: +1% 
o Low Trigger Tier II: -1% 
 
 
Source: author 
CT1 70%
TCE 15%
ROTE 15%
CT1 Tier I Tier II CT1 Tier I Tier II
Banc of America 9.5% 12.0% 15.0% 63.3% 16.7% 20.0%
Citigroup 9.5% 12.0% 15.0% 63.3% 16.7% 20.0%
Goldman Sachs 9.5% 12.0% 15.0% 63.3% 16.7% 20.0%
Morgan Stanley 9.5% 12.0% 15.0% 63.3% 16.7% 20.0%
JP Morgan 9.5% 12.0% 15.0% 63.3% 16.7% 20.0%
Wells Fargo 9.5% 12.0% 15.0% 63.3% 16.7% 20.0%
Credit Suisse 10.0% 13.0% 19.0% 52.6% 15.8% 31.6%
UBS 10.0% 13.0% 19.0% 52.6% 15.8% 31.6%
Deustche Bank 9.0% 11.5% 14.5% 62.1% 17.2% 20.7%
Barclays 10.0% 12.5% 15.5% 64.5% 16.1% 19.4%
RBS 10.0% 12.5% 15.5% 64.5% 16.1% 19.4%
Lloyds 10.0% 12.5% 15.5% 64.5% 16.1% 19.4%
HSBC 10.0% 12.5% 15.5% 64.5% 16.1% 19.4%
Standard 10.0% 12.5% 15.5% 64.5% 16.1% 19.4%
BNP 9.0% 11.5% 14.5% 62.1% 17.2% 20.7%
Soc Gen 9.0% 11.5% 14.5% 62.1% 17.2% 20.7%
Santander 9.0% 11.5% 14.5% 62.1% 17.2% 20.7%
BBVA 9.0% 11.5% 14.5% 62.1% 17.2% 20.7%
Unicredit 9.0% 11.5% 14.5% 62.1% 17.2% 20.7%
ISP 9.0% 11.5% 14.5% 62.1% 17.2% 20.7%
Average 9.5% 12.1% 15.4% 62.1% 16.6% 21.2%
Capital Structure per layerSolvency ratios
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1.3 Capital structure and weightings 
To determine the capital base of the banks, we use the guidelines of the comprehensive Basel III 
capital structure including all the buffers (the countercyclical and capital conservation buffer). As we 
are dealing with big and systematic banks (TBTF banks) in our sample, we also think necessary to 
account for the TBTF buffer.  
We foresee the following levels of solvency per ratio and per country: 
 
                                               Source: author 
We believe UK will follow Switzerland in terms of CT1 at 10%135
1.4 Average Cost of Regulatory Capital 
 but its total capital base will probably 
be lower than that of the Swiss banks (15% vs 19%).The US regulator, given the size of its banks, will 
probably set a minimum  9.5% CT1 for an overall capital ratio of 15%. For the other countries we use 
a CT1 around 9.0% for a total capital base of 14.5%. 
Once we factor all the assumptions into the model, the ACRC for the sample comes in at 9.1% on 
average for the entire sample, slightly south of the overall COE at 9.9% underlying the expensive 
profile of the new Basel III regulatory capital with a weighted average cost of the Tier I layer well 
above the 9% for the banks. 
                                                          
135 As a result of the high Assets/ GDP ratio. 
CT1 TIER I TIER II
US 9.5% 12.0% 14.5%
UK 10.0% 12.5% 15.0%
Switzerland 10.0% 13.0% 19.0%
Germany 9.0% 11.5% 14.0%
Spain 9.0% 11.5% 14.0%
France 9.0% 11.5% 14.0%
Italy 9.0% 11.5% 14.0%
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Source: author 
The table below show the excess between the normalized ROE and the COE (and the ACRC). On 
average, the banks should be able to return an excess of 3.9% to their shareholders (as the 
difference between ROE and COE) and 4.8% over the ACRC implying the small pick up between the 
excess return over the COE and ACRC due to the high costly capital structure.  
Long Run 
COE at 
5.5% ERP
High 
Trigger 
at 7%
Low 
Trigger 
at 5%
High 
Trigger 
at 7%
Low 
Trigger 
at 5%
Average 
CRC
Banc of America 9.0% 9.5% 7.5% 8.5% 6.5% 8.6%
Citigroup 10.9% 9.5% 7.5% 8.5% 6.5% 9.8%
Goldman Sachs 10.4% 8.6% 6.6% 7.6% 5.6% 9.2%
Morgan Stanley 8.7% 9.0% 7.0% 8.0% 6.0% 8.2%
JP Morgan 10.1% 9.2% 7.2% 8.2% 6.2% 9.2%
Wells Fargo 9.4% 9.9% 7.9% 8.9% 6.9% 9.0%
Credit Suisse 10.3% 8.8% 6.8% 7.8% 5.8% 8.8%
UBS 9.0% 8.5% 6.5% 7.5% 5.5% 8.0%
Deustche Bank 9.0% 9.4% 7.4% 8.4% 6.4% 8.6%
Barclays 11.4% 9.0% 7.0% 8.0% 6.0% 10.0%
RBS 10.8% 9.1% 7.1% 8.1% 6.1% 9.6%
Lloyds 10.3% 9.3% 7.3% 8.3% 6.3% 9.4%
HSBC 10.7% 9.5% 7.5% 8.5% 6.5% 9.7%
Standard 9.5% 9.4% 7.4% 8.4% 6.4% 8.9%
BNP 9.2% 9.1% 7.1% 8.1% 6.1% 8.6%
Soc Gen 9.7% 9.5% 7.5% 8.5% 6.5% 9.0%
Santander 9.9% 9.4% 7.4% 8.4% 6.4% 9.1%
BBVA 10.9% 9.0% 7.0% 8.0% 6.0% 9.6%
Unicredit 9.9% 9.3% 7.3% 8.3% 6.3% 9.1%
ISP 9.9% 10.2% 8.2% 9.2% 7.2% 9.4%
Average 9.9% 9.3% 7.3% 8.3% 6.3% 9.1%
Tier I Tier II
 Cost of Regulatory Capital   (CRC)
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Source: author 
2 Second part: Pre conversion analysis of the ACRC 
In the second part we test the impact of the CoCos conversion on the cost of the regulatory capital for 
the banks. Our aim is to evaluate the impact on both the cost and the capital structure once the High 
and Low Trigger CoCos are sanctioned due to significant losses. We highlight that the trigger of both 
CoCos would not be too realistic under the PONV thesis outlined above given the size of the losses 
could definitely prompt the regulator intervention. However, it allows us to estimate the impact on the 
ACRC of the CoCo conversion and the change in the capital mix of the banks.  
 Before going about the analysis we set out the main assumptions: 
• Conversion share price: we use the third methodology in section 4.2 whereby the conversion 
strike price is set as a function of the loss required to the CT1 to trigger the CoCos (both High 
and Low).  
o We pre-determine a conversion share price as a function of the solvency trigger level 
for each CoCos (High and Low). Therefore, if a bank has now a 10% CT1, the pre-set 
  
Average 
CRC
Long Run 
COE at 
5.5% ERP
Norm. 
ROE
Excess 
return to 
COE
Excess 
return to 
ACRC
Banc of America 8.6% 9.0% 16.3% 7.3% 7.7%
Citigroup 9.8% 10.9% 10.5% -0.4% 0.7%
Goldman Sachs 9.2% 10.4% 10.1% -0.2% 1.0%
Morgan Stanley 8.2% 8.7% 9.0% 0.3% 0.8%
JP Morgan 9.2% 10.1% 16.4% 6.3% 7.2%
Wells Fargo 9.0% 9.4% 19.1% 9.7% 10.1%
Credit Suisse 8.8% 10.3% 13.1% 2.8% 4.3%
UBS 8.0% 9.0% 9.0% 0.0% 1.0%
Deustche Bank 8.6% 9.0% 9.0% 0.0% 0.4%
Barclays 10.0% 11.4% 14.3% 2.8% 4.3%
RBS 9.6% 10.8% 10.1% -0.7% 0.5%
Lloyds 9.4% 10.3% 14.9% 4.6% 5.5%
HSBC 9.7% 10.7% 16.0% 5.3% 6.3%
Standard 8.9% 9.5% 17.0% 7.5% 8.1%
BNP 8.6% 9.2% 14.4% 5.1% 5.8%
Soc Gen 9.0% 9.7% 16.1% 6.4% 7.1%
Santander 9.1% 9.9% 22.0% 12.2% 12.9%
BBVA 9.6% 10.9% 20.0% 9.1% 10.4%
Unicredit 9.1% 9.9% 11.2% 1.4% 2.2%
ISP 9.4% 9.9% 9.2% -0.7% -0.2%
Average 9.1% 9.9% 13.9% 3.9% 4.8%
Excess Return over CRC
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strike price for each tranche of CoCo would be 30% (High CoCo) and 50% (Low 
CoCo) below the share price at the point of issuance.136
• CT1 after losses: we assume one off losses bring the CT1 down to 4% from its normalized 
level effectively triggering both High and Low CoCos. 
  
• CT1 after losses and conversion: we assume CT1 for all banks should return at least to 8% 
after conversion.  
• ERP (Equity Risk Premium) after conversion: we assume that the ERP should creep up by at 
least 100bps to 6.5% from the 5.5% pre conversion level given the change in capital mix 
(more equity base) and the underlying risk of a potential failing bank. 
• Taxes: we assume a 30% rate for all losses. 
• Normalized earnings: we are using our estimation of normalized earnings in the model for 
each bank. We assume then that losses happen in a quarter on a one-off basis137
We conduct a Post CoCos conversion solvency analysis for each bank in our sample. For explanatory 
purposes we take BAC analysis: 
 and the 
normalized earnings then do not change.  
                                                          
136 In line with JP Morgan, we assume a linear relationship between the fall in CT1 and the strike price at which the conversion 
takes place.  
137 A very aggressive assumption for two reasons: the scale of the one off losses are unrealistic (write-down of €50bns are not 
common) and secondly significant one off losses usually have side effects that drive the normalized earnings down. 
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Source: author 
We describe our assumptions and calculation per column. We assume the same amount of CT1 
deductions to get to the CT1: 
• Initial solvency: we use book equity value and solvency related metrics under Basel III on a 
normalized basis. For example, BAC under a 9.5% CT1 should have a CT1 of $138bn 
assuming the same RWA138
• Post tax loss: we assume sudden losses bring the CT1 below 4% (equivalent of $80bn of 
post-tax losses). 
 as of Q4 2010. If we also assume a normalized Basel III Tier 1 
and Tier 2 ratio of 12% and 15% respectively and 50% of the T1 are High Trigger CoCos and 
the other 50% are Low Trigger CoCos (being T2 the balance), then BAC could have $36bn of 
T1 CoCos and $44bn of T2 CoCos.  
• Solvency post loss: this columns shows how the common equity drops by the $80bn of post-
tax losses to $131bn from $212bn pre losses and hence the CT1 to 4% from 9.5%. 
• Conversion: this column shows the conversion of the full $36bn of T1 CoCos and $22bn of 
the T2 CoCos that result in a $58bn of new common equity. 
                                                          
138 We don’t assume any RWA inflation or mitigation.  
BAC
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss
Conversion
Solvency 
post 
conversion
Equity Book Value 211,686     (80,077) 131,609      58,238       189,847     
Additions / (Deductions) (73,371) (73,371) (73,371)
Core Tier 1 under Basel III 138,315     58,238        116,476     
High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 36,399       36,399        (36,399) -              
Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 43,679       43,679        (21,839) 21,839       
MarketCap 136,332     345,219      345,219     
RWA 1,455,951  1,455,951   1,455,951  
Normalized Earnings 34,522       34,522        34,522       
CT1 % 9.5% 4.0% 8.0%
Tier 1 % 12.0% 6.5% 8.0%
Tier 2 % 15.0% 9.5% 9.5%
# shares (000.000) 10,121       10,121        10,809       20,930       
BV / share 20.9 13.0 9.1
ROE 16% 26% 18%
P/BV 0.6x 2.6x 1.8x
Share price 13.5            34.1             16.5            
Downside % 153% 22%
Value of CoCos 178,281     
Conversion Share Price (40%) 5.4
CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 6.5%
CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 1.5%
Tax at 30% 0% 21,839       
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• Solvency post conversion: This column shows how both the common equity and the CT1 
goes up by the aforementioned $58bn bringing the CT1 back to the 8% level. After full and 
partial of T1 and T2 respectively, T1 ratio comes down to 8% (equal to CT1 after T1 hybrids 
are fully converted) and T2 to 9.5% (only $21bn of outstanding T2 CoCos) 
 
Source: author 
We can see in the table above that the overall post conversion ACRC climbs up to 10.4% from 9.1%. 
A significant uptick on absolute levels no doubt, but lower than a similar exercise under a Basel II 
capital structure (cost of Basel II hybrids averages 6.5%) due to the high cost of the new CoCos.  
Pre conversion event Post conversion event
CT1 Tier I Tier II CT1 Tier I Tier II
Average 
CRC
Banc of America 63.3% 16.7% 20.0% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 9.7%
Citigroup 63.3% 16.7% 20.0% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 11.5%
Goldman Sachs 63.3% 16.7% 20.0% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 10.9%
Morgan Stanley 63.3% 16.7% 20.0% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 9.3%
JP Morgan 63.3% 16.7% 20.0% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 10.7%
Wells Fargo 63.3% 16.7% 20.0% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 10.1%
Credit Suisse 52.6% 15.8% 31.6% 61.5% 0.0% 38.5% 9.8%
UBS 52.6% 15.8% 31.6% 61.5% 0.0% 38.5% 8.8%
Deustche Bank 62.1% 17.2% 20.7% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 9.7%
Barclays 64.5% 16.1% 19.4% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 12.0%
RBS 64.5% 16.1% 19.4% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 11.3%
Lloyds 64.5% 16.1% 19.4% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 10.8%
HSBC 64.5% 16.1% 19.4% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 11.3%
Standard 64.5% 16.1% 19.4% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 10.2%
BNP 62.1% 17.2% 20.7% 42.1% 0.0% 57.9% 8.5%
Soc Gen 62.1% 17.2% 20.7% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 10.4%
Santander 62.1% 17.2% 20.7% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 10.3%
BBVA 62.1% 17.2% 20.7% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 11.3%
Unicredit 62.1% 17.2% 20.7% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 10.4%
ISP 62.1% 17.2% 20.7% 84.2% 0.0% 15.8% 10.5%
Average 62.1% 16.6% 21.2% 79.8% 0.0% 20.2% 10.4%
Regulatory capital structure
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Source: author 
After the conversion of the T1 and T2 CoCos, the COE goes up from 9.9% to 11.2% and the ACRC 
from 9.1% to 10.4% giving a 2.7% excess return over COE and 3.5% over ACRC. We can observe 
that notwithstanding the big losses, the ACRC creeps up but less than expected due to high cost of 
the T1 and T2 instruments under Basel III. The increase in COE after losses due to the increase in 
ERP and the amount of equity within the capital structure is offset by the lower mix of CoCos in the 
overall ACRC.  
Below, the absolute levels of ACRC pre and post conversion per bank. 
Average 
CRC
Long Run 
COE at 
6.5% ERP
Norm. 
ROTE
Excess 
return to 
COE
Excess 
return to 
ACRC
Banc of America 9.7% 10.1% 16.3% 6.2% 6.6%
Citigroup 11.5% 12.3% 10.5% -1.8% -1.0%
Goldman Sachs 10.9% 11.7% 10.1% -1.6% -0.8%
Morgan Stanley 9.3% 9.7% 9.0% -0.7% -0.3%
JP Morgan 10.7% 11.4% 16.4% 5.1% 5.7%
Wells Fargo 10.1% 10.5% 19.1% 8.6% 9.0%
Credit Suisse 9.8% 11.6% 13.1% 1.5% 3.3%
UBS 8.8% 10.2% 9.0% -1.2% 0.2%
Deustche Bank 9.7% 10.2% 9.0% -1.2% -0.7%
Barclays 12.0% 12.9% 14.3% 1.4% 2.3%
RBS 11.3% 12.1% 10.1% -2.0% -1.2%
Lloyds 10.8% 11.5% 14.9% 3.4% 4.1%
HSBC 11.3% 12.0% 16.0% 4.0% 4.7%
Standard 10.2% 10.8% 17.0% 6.2% 6.8%
BNP 8.5% 10.4% 14.4% 4.0% 5.9%
Soc Gen 10.4% 10.9% 16.1% 5.2% 5.7%
Santander 10.3% 10.9% 22.0% 11.1% 11.7%
BBVA 11.3% 12.1% 20.0% 7.9% 8.7%
Unicredit 10.4% 10.9% 11.2% 0.3% 0.9%
ISP 10.5% 10.9% 9.2% -1.8% -1.3%
Average 10.4% 11.2% 13.9% 2.7% 3.5%
Excess Return over CRC
187 
 
 
                             Source: author 
2.1 Sensitivity analysis 
We run a sensitivity scenario analysis to assess the levels of post conversion ACRC. We sensitize the 
main two drivers of the post conversion ACRC, namely the “after losses” CT1 and the “after losses” 
ERP. We observe that the range of ACRC values is very wide from 8.7% (6.5% CT1 and 5.0% ERP) 
to 11.8% (4% CT1 and 8.0% ERP). Our base case scenario is that ACRC should range between 
9.5% to 10.5%, given losses should never bring CT1 below 5% (the bank would reaching the PONV 
and the regulator would step in way before CT1 drops below these levels) and the ERP should at 
least creep up by 100bps to 6.5% given the new risk reward demanded by investors.  
    
 
 
 
Pre Post Change %
Average 
CRC
Average 
CRC
Banc of America 8.6% 9.7% 12.4%
Citigroup 9.8% 11.5% 17.7%
Goldman Sachs 9.2% 10.9% 19.0%
Morgan Stanley 8.2% 9.3% 12.6%
JP Morgan 9.2% 10.7% 16.5%
Wells Fargo 9.0% 10.1% 12.3%
Credit Suisse 8.8% 9.8% 11.3%
UBS 8.0% 8.8% 9.6%
Deustche Bank 8.6% 9.7% 13.6%
Barclays 10.0% 12.0% 19.2%
RBS 9.6% 11.3% 17.4%
Lloyds 9.4% 10.8% 15.6%
HSBC 9.7% 11.3% 16.2%
Standard 8.9% 10.2% 14.5%
BNP 8.6% 8.5% -1.5%
Soc Gen 9.0% 10.4% 14.7%
Santander 9.1% 10.3% 13.7%
BBVA 9.6% 11.3% 18.0%
Unicredit 9.1% 10.4% 14.3%
ISP 9.4% 10.5% 11.7%
Average 9.1% 10.4% 13.9%
CRC Pre and Post Conversion
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   ACRC after losses 
 
                             Source: author 
The table below show the “bps” hike in ACRC after losses. We estimate a normalized ACRC 
increases between 80bps-150bps. 
Bps hike in ACRC after losses 
 
                             Source: author 
3 Valuation considerations 
Banks usually trade on both Price to Book (P/B)139
Price to Book = (ROE-g) / (COE-g) 
 and Price Earnings (P/E). Our prefer method is the 
standard Gordon Growth Model (GGM): 
Where 
 g = growth rate 
ROE: Return on Equity 
COE: Cost of Equity 
P/B (Price to Book): Market Capitalization / Book Equity 
P/E (Price Earnings ratios): Market Capitalization / Net Income 
                                                          
139 Over the turmoil and given the doubtful value of the intangibles and goodwill market turned to Price to Tangible Book . 
CT1 after losses
10.4% 4.0% 4.5% 5.0% 5.5% 6.0% 6.5%
5.0% 8.9% 8.8% 8.7% 8.7% 8.7% 8.7%
5.5% 9.4% 9.3% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1%
6.0% 9.9% 9.8% 9.5% 9.6% 9.5% 9.5%
6.5% 10.4% 10.2% 9.9% 10.0% 9.9% 9.9%
7.0% 10.9% 10.7% 10.4% 10.4% 10.3% 10.2%
7.5% 11.3% 11.2% 10.8% 10.8% 10.7% 10.6%
8.0% 11.8% 11.6% 11.2% 11.3% 11.1% 11.0%
ER
P
Bps of drop in CT1 after losses
##### 4.0% 4.5% 5.0% 5.5% 6.0% 6.5%
5.0% -17 bps -25 bps -40 bps -38 bps -39 bps -41 bps
5.5% 31 bps 21 bps 2 bps 4 bps 1 bps -2 bps
6.0% 80 bps 68 bps 43 bps 47 bps 42 bps 37 bps
6.5% 128 bps 114 bps 85 bps 89 bps 82 bps 76 bps
7.0% 177 bps 160 bps 127 bps 131 bps 123 bps 115 bps
7.5% 225 bps 206 bps 168 bps 174 bps 164 bps 155 bps
8.0% 273 bps 252 bps 210 bps 216 bps 204 bps 194 bps
ER
P
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Historically, there has been a strong correlation between the P/B multiple versus the ROE in banks. If 
ROE is higher than the COE, P/B should trade above 1x as the ROE effectively covers the bank’s 
COE (Morgan Stanley 2003).  
Following our cost of capital regulatory framework, we look at the valuation of our sample of bank pre 
and post regulatory event to observe the evolution of the shares count, the book value per share, the 
normalized ROE and the P/B multiple through the conversion period.  
As expected, the number of share count grows by 84% (101mn of new shares) due to the conversion 
of debt into equity. The Italian banks (Unicredit and ISP) experiences the highest share conversion 
well above 100%. The Swiss banks (CS and UBS) suffers the least dilution due to the initial high 
levels of capitalization.  
 
            Source: author 
Book value per share also drop by 51% due to double effect of a higher share count and a lower book 
equity as our post conversion CT1 stays at 8% from the high initial pre conversion levels (above 9% in 
most cases).  
Pre 
Conversion Conversion
Post 
Conversion Change %
Banc of America 10,121 10,809 20,930 107%
Citigroup 29,056 24,295 53,351 84%
Goldman Sachs 560 279 839 50%
Morgan Stanley 1,546 1,102 2,647 71%
JP Morgan 3,984 2,525 6,509 63%
Wells Fargo 5,268 3,038 8,306 58%
Credit Suisse 1,186 547 1,733 46%
UBS 3,831 1,177 5,008 31%
Deustche Bank 929 823 1,752 88%
Barclays 121,856 135,132 256,988 111%
RBS 1,095,793 1,102,839 2,198,631 101%
Lloyds 681,558      656,180      1,337,737  96%
HSBC 17,707        16,172        33,879        91%
Standard 23,482        14,893        38,375        63%
BNP 1,199          1,189          2,388          99%
Soc Gen 746              721              1,467          97%
Santander 8,440          7,209          15,649        85%
BBVA 4,567          3,601          8,168          79%
Unicredit 19,303        25,519        44,822        132%
ISP 12,655        15,875        28,530        125%
Average 102,189 101,196 203,386 83.9%
Number of shares
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              Source: author 
If we assume these heavy losses that trigger the CoCos are one-offs and the normalized earnings 
remain untouched140
 
, the ROE climbs up to 24% during the conversion from the pre conversion 14% 
to finally stay at 16% after losses and CoCos conversion. The ROE should definitely be lower if the 
CT1 were to be restored to the initial levels but comes in higher owing to the lower post conversion 
CT1 and hence, lower book equity.  
                                                          
140 Quite an ambitious assumptions given these losses should dent the normalized earnings via higher cost of funding or lower 
interest income (and therefore net interest margin should erode), higher provisions etc. 
Pre 
Conversio
Conversio
n
Post 
Conversio Change %
Banc of America 20.9 13.0 9.1 -56.6%
Citigroup 5.6 3.5 2.7 -51.0%
Goldman Sachs 125.7 82.1 75.9 -39.6%
Morgan Stanley 30.6 19.9 16.2 -47.2%
JP Morgan 42.3 26.0 23.1 -45.2%
Wells Fargo 22.3 12.2 12.4 -44.4%
Credit Suisse 28.1 17.0 16.7 -40.6%
UBS 12.2 9.1 8.5 -30.0%
Deustche Bank 52.9 34.3 26.1 -50.7%
Barclays 0.4 0.2 0.2 -60.0%
RBS 0.1 0.0 0.0 -56.7%
Lloyds 0.1 0.0 0.0 -58.0%
HSBC 7.7 4.0 3.4 -56.0%
Standard 1.3 0.6 0.6 -49.2%
BNP 53.2 26.8 24.1 -54.8%
Soc Gen 50.6 28.3 23.5 -53.6%
Santander 8.9 5.3 4.4 -50.4%
BBVA 8.0 4.6 4.1 -48.9%
Unicredit 3.3 2.2 1.3 -60.0%
ISP 4.2 2.7 1.7 -58.6%
Average 23.9 14.6 12.7 -50.6%
BV / share
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                    Source: author 
Same reasoning applies to our P/B equity multiple141. It goes up from 1.0x to 2.4x during conversion 
due to the loss in equity to stabilize at 1.6x. Post conversion P/B comes in at higher levels given the 
post conversion book equity is much lower than the post conversion market capitalization as share 
price normalizes once the one off losses are absorbed142
 
 (See appendix I for details). 
 
 
 
                                                          
141 See also appendix 9 to observe banks’ equity multiples, ROEs, COEs etc as of November 2011. It shows the depressed 
equity  multiples as a result of the acute sovereign and banking crisis.  
142 As the normalized earnings are untouched.  
Pre 
Conversi
Conversi
on
Post 
Conversi Change %
Banc of America 0.6x 2.6x 1.8x 182%
Citigroup 0.8x 1.7x 1.2x 46%
Goldman Sachs 1.3x 1.6x 1.1x -11%
Morgan Stanley 0.9x 1.4x 1.0x 12%
JP Morgan 1.1x 2.7x 1.8x 67%
Wells Fargo 1.4x 3.5x 2.2x 52%
Credit Suisse 1.4x 2.2x 1.5x 6%
UBS 1.4x 1.2x 1.0x -29%
Deustche Bank 0.8x 1.4x 1.0x 22%
Barclays 0.7x 2.7x 1.7x 140%
RBS 0.7x 1.7x 1.2x 78%
Lloyds 0.9x 3.2x 1.8x 98%
HSBC 0.9x 3.1x 1.9x 119%
Standard 1.3x 3.5x 2.0x 53%
BNP 1.0x 2.9x 1.6x 60%
Soc Gen 0.9x 2.9x 1.8x 93%
Santander 0.9x 3.7x 2.4x 154%
BBVA 1.1x 3.5x 2.2x 102%
Unicredit 0.5x 1.7x 1.2x 127%
ISP 0.5x 1.4x 1.0x 82%
Average 1.0x 2.4x 1.6x 73%
P/BV
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Appendix 
1. Bank sample: main valuation metrics  
 
Source: author 
 
Market 
Cap
Share 
Price # shares
Normalize
d 
Earnings
Book 
value 
Equity P/B Tier 1 CT1
Tier 1 
levge B/S levge RWA
Tier 1 
ratio CT1 ratio
Equity 
Tier 1 TCE
(TCE+
Allow) / 
Assets
Banc of America 136,332 13.47 10,121 34,522 211,686 0.6x 163,626 125,139 24% 17.7x 1,455,951 11.2% 8.6% 8.8% 5.9% 7.5%
Citigroup 129,880 4.47 29,056 17,099 162,844 0.8x 140,094 116,202 17% 14.8x 1,086,000 12.9% 10.7% 11.9% 6.9% 8.9%
Goldman Sachs 88,970 158.91 560 7,134 70,399 1.3x 71,000 59,000 17% 13.6x 444,000 16.0% 13.3% 14.6% 7.4% n.a.
Morgan Stanley 42,010 27.18 1,546 4,255 47,279 0.9x 49,400 38,100 23% 20.4x 299,394 16.5% 12.7% 13.4% 4.9% n.a.
JP Morgan 185,552 46.58 3,984 27,660 168,306 1.1x 142,845 115,159 19% 18.3x 1,176,329 12.1% 9.8% 9.8% 5.6% 7.0%
Wells Fargo 168,526 31.99 5,268 22,504 117,719 1.4x 89,400 81,300 9% 15.5x 971,700 9.2% 8.4% 8.3% 6.6% 8.3%
Credit Suisse 47,412 39.97 1,186 4,354 33,282 1.4x 37,700 27,715 26% 42.3x 218,702 17.2% 12.7% 11.1% 2.4% 2.5%
UBS 64,704 16.89 3,831 4,208 46,760 1.4x 35,272 30,369 14% 35.7x 198,875 15.0% 15.3% 18.6% 2.8% 2.9%
Deustche Bank 39,104 42.07 929 4,428 49,200 0.8x 42,565 29,972 30% 54.1x 346,057 12.3% 8.7% 10.3% 1.9% 2.0%
Barclays 35,893 0.29 121,856 7,263 50,858 0.7x 53,546 42,861 20% 35.3x 398,031 13.5% 10.8% 10.6% 2.8% 3.7%
RBS 47,097 0.04 1,095,793 7,282 72,058 0.7x 61,000 50,000 18% 27.6x 474,000 12.9% 10.5% 12.1% 3.7% 4.6%
Lloyds 42,209 0.06 681,558 6,868 46,061 0.9x 47,147 41,371 12% 24.5x 406,372 11.6% 10.2% 10.0% 4.1% 7.1%
HSBC 118,123 0.67 177,069 21,803 135,943 0.9x 124,068 106,836 14% 22.4x 1,078,852 11.5% 9.9% 10.0% 4.5% 5.4%
Standard 39,485 1.68 23,482 5,021 29,548 1.3x 29,537 23,704 20% 17.9x 250,422 11.8% 9.5% 9.2% 5.7% 6.1%
BNP 63,826 53.24 1,199 9,173 63,800 1.0x 68,536 65,349 5% 38.1x 633,000 10.8% 10.3% 8.3% 2.6% 4.1%
Soc Gen 34,473 46.19 746 6,078 37,800 0.9x 34,700 28,100 19% 40.4x 333,000 10.4% 8.4% 8.4% 2.5% 3.7%
Santander 70,822 8.39 8,440 16,527 75,019 0.9x 60,489 53,230 12% 24.2x 604,885 10.0% 8.8% 8.3% 4.2% 5.8%
BBVA 39,884 8.73 4,567 7,352 36,689 1.1x 33,023 30,097 9% 19.9x 314,505 10.5% 9.6% 8.9% 5.1% 6.8%
Unicredit 34,301 1.78 19,303 7,232 64,487 0.5x 43,848 39,047 11% 24.9x 453,478 9.7% 8.6% 8.6% 4.1% 7.0%
ISP 28,296 2.24 12,655 4,809 52,528 0.5x 31,680 27,333 14% 23.2x 354,970 8.9% 7.7% 7.8% 4.5% 6.8%
Average 67,974 56,544 17% 26.5x 574,926 12.2% 10.2% 10.5% 4.4% 5.6%
Main metrics
Solvency
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Assets/
BV
Assets/
TBV
RWA/
TBV
Hybrids/
Tier 1 ROE
Clean 
ROE ROTE
Clean 
ROTE
Long Run 
COE
Growth 
rate
Q4/10 
P/B
Norm. 
P/B
Banc of America 10.7x 17.7x 11.4x 24% -3% 16% -5% 27% 8.6% 2.0% -0.8x 2.2x
Citigroup 11.8x 14.8x 8.4x 17% 3% 11% 4% 12% 10.2% 2.0% 0.1x 1.0x
Goldman Sachs 12.5x 13.6x 6.8x 17% 13% 10% 14% 11% 9.7% 2.0% 1.4x 1.1x
Morgan Stanley 17.3x 20.4x 7.4x 23% 11% 9% 13% 9% 8.2% 2.0% 1.4x 1.1x
JP Morgan 12.6x 18.3x 10.2x 19% 11% 16% 17% 24% 9.5% 2.0% 1.3x 1.9x
Wells Fargo 10.7x 15.5x 12.0x 9% 11% 19% 16% 28% 8.8% 2.0% 1.3x 2.5x
Credit Suisse 31.0x 42.3x 9.0x 26% 10% 13% 14% 18% 9.6% 2.0% 1.1x 1.5x
UBS 28.2x 35.7x 5.4x 14% 7% 9% 9% 10% 8.5% 2.0% 0.8x 1.1x
Deustche Bank 39.1x 54.1x 9.7x 30% 5% 9% 7% 11% 8.6% 2.0% 0.4x 1.1x
Barclays 29.3x 35.3x 9.4x 20% 7% 14% 9% 17% 10.7% 2.0% 0.6x 1.4x
RBS 22.0x 27.6x 8.3x 18% 1% 10% 2% 13% 10.1% 2.0% -0.1x 1.0x
Lloyds 21.5x 24.5x 10.0x 12% -4% 15% -5% 17% 9.7% 2.0% -0.8x 1.7x
HSBC 17.8x 22.4x 10.0x 14% 10% 16% 13% 20% 10.1% 2.0% 1.0x 1.7x
Standard 13.9x 17.9x 10.9x 20% 15% 17% 19% 22% 8.9% 2.0% 1.8x 2.2x
BNP 31.3x 38.1x 12.1x 5% 10% 14% 12% 17% 8.7% 2.0% 1.2x 1.9x
Soc Gen 29.9x 40.4x 11.9x 19% 9% 16% 12% 22% 9.1% 2.0% 1.0x 2.0x
Santander 16.2x 24.2x 12.0x 12% 11% 22% 17% 33% 9.3% 2.0% 1.3x 2.7x
BBVA 15.2x 19.9x 11.2x 9% 10% 20% 13% 26% 10.3% 2.0% 1.0x 2.2x
Unicredit 15.0x 24.9x 11.7x 11% 2% 11% 3% 19% 9.3% 2.0% 0.0x 1.3x
ISP 12.2x 23.2x 12.9x 14% 4% 9% 7% 17% 9.3% 2.0% 0.3x 1.0x
Average 19.9x 26.5x 10.0x 17% 7% 14% 9% 19% 9.3% 2.0% 0.7x 1.6x
Leverage Profitability Valuation
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2. Individual CoCos conversion analysis 
 
Source: author 
Bank of America
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss
Conversio
n
Solvency 
post 
conversio
n Citigroup
Initial 
Solvency
Initial 
Solvency
Initial 
Solvency
Initial 
Solvency
Initial 
Solvency
Equity Book Value 211,686    (80,077) 131,609     58,238      189,847    Equity Book Value 162,844   (59,730) 103,114        43,440          146,554     
Additions / (Deductions) (73,371) (73,371) (73,371) Additions / (Deductions) (59,674) (59,674) (59,674)
Core Tier 1 under Basel III 138,315    58,238        116,476    Core Tier 1 under Basel III 103,170   43,440          86,880       
High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 36,399       36,399        (36,399) -             High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 27,150      27,150          (27,150) -              
Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 43,679       43,679        (21,839) 21,839       Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 32,580      32,580          (16,290) 16,290       
MarketCap 136,332    345,219     345,219    MarketCap 129,880   170,986        170,986     
RWA 1,455,951 1,455,951  1,455,951 RWA ######## 1,086,000    1,086,000 
Normalized Earnings 34,522       34,522        34,522       Normalized Earnings 17,099      17,099          17,099       
CT1 % 9.5% 4.0% 8.0% CT1 % 9.5% 4.0% 8.0%
Tier 1 % 12.0% 6.5% 8.0% Tier 1 % 12.0% 6.5% 8.0%
Tier 2 % 15.0% 9.5% 9.5% Tier 2 % 15.0% 9.5% 9.5%
# shares (000.000) 10,121       10,121        10,809      20,930       # shares (000.000) 29,056      29,056          24,295          53,351       
BV / share 20.9 13.0 9.1 BV / share 5.6 3.5 2.7
ROE 16% 26% 18% ROE 11% 17% 12%
P/BV 0.6x 2.6x 1.8x P/BV 0.8x 1.7x 1.2x
Share price 13.5           34.1            16.5           Share price 4.5             5.9                 3.2              
Downside % 153% 22% Downside % 32% -28%
Value of CoCos 178,281    Value of CoCos 77,864       
Conversion Share Price (40%) 5.4 Conversion Share Price (40%) 1.8
CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065 CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065
CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 1.5% CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2%
Tax at 30% 0% 21,839       Tax at 30% 0% 16,290       
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Goldman Sachs
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss
Conversio
n
Solvency 
post 
conversio
n Morgan Stanley
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss Conversion
Solvency 
post 
conversion
Equity Book Value 70,399       (24,420) 45,979        17,760      63,739       Equity Book Value 47,279      (16,467) 30,812          11,976          42,788       
Additions / (Deductions) (28,219) (28,219) (28,219) Additions / (Deductions) (18,837) (18,837) (18,837)
Core Tier 1 under Basel III 42,180       17,760        35,520       Core Tier 1 under Basel III 28,442      11,976          23,952       
High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 11,100       11,100        (11,100) -             High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 7,485        7,485            (7,485) -              
Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 13,320       13,320        (6,660) 6,660         Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 8,982        8,982            (4,491) 4,491         
MarketCap 88,970       71,344        71,344       MarketCap 42,010      42,551          42,551       
RWA 444,000    444,000     444,000    RWA 299,394   299,394        299,394     
Normalized Earnings 7,134         7,134          7,134         Normalized Earnings 4,255        4,255            4,255         
CT1 % 9.5% 4.0% 8.0% CT1 % 9.5% 4.0% 8.0%
Tier 1 % 12.0% 6.5% 8.0% Tier 1 % 12.0% 6.5% 8.0%
Tier 2 % 15.0% 9.5% 9.5% Tier 2 % 15.0% 9.5% 9.5%
# shares (000.000) 560             560              279            839             # shares (000.000) 1,546        1,546            1,102            2,647         
BV / share 125.7 82.1 75.9 BV / share 30.6 19.9 16.2
ROE 10% 16% 11% ROE 9% 14% 10%
P/BV 1.3x 1.6x 1.1x P/BV 0.9x 1.4x 1.0x
Share price 158.9         127.4          85.0           Share price 27.2          27.5               16.1            
Downside % -20% -47% Downside % 1% -41%
Value of CoCos 23,751       Value of CoCos 17,706       
Conversion Share Price (40%) 63.6 Conversion Share Price (40%) 10.9
CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065 CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065
CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2% CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2%
Tax at 30% 0% 6,660         Tax at 30% 0% 4,491         
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JP Morgan
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss
Conversio
n
Solvency 
post 
conversio
n Wells Fargo
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss Conversion
Solvency 
post 
conversion
Equity Book Value 168,306    (64,698) 103,608     47,053      150,661    Equity Book Value 117,719   (53,444) 64,276          38,868          103,144     
Additions / (Deductions) (56,555) (56,555) (56,555) Additions / (Deductions) (25,408) (25,408) (25,408)
Core Tier 1 under Basel III 111,751    47,053        94,106       Core Tier 1 under Basel III 92,312      38,868          77,736       
High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 29,408       29,408        (29,408) -             High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 24,293      24,293          (24,293) -              
Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 35,290       35,290        (17,645) 17,645       Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 29,151      29,151          (14,576) 14,576       
MarketCap 185,552    276,595     276,595    MarketCap 168,526   225,042        225,042     
RWA 1,176,329 1,176,329  1,176,329 RWA 971,700   971,700        971,700     
Normalized Earnings 27,660       27,660        27,660       Normalized Earnings 22,504      22,504          22,504       
  QUITY
CT1 % 9.5% 4.0% 8.0% CT1 % 9.5% 4.0% 8.0%
Tier 1 % 12.0% 6.5% 8.0% Tier 1 % 12.0% 6.5% 8.0%
Tier 2 % 15.0% 9.5% 9.5% Tier 2 % 15.0% 9.5% 9.5%
# shares (000.000) 3,984         3,984          2,525        6,509         # shares (000.000) 5,268        5,268            3,038            8,306         
BV / share 42.3 26.0 23.1 BV / share 22.3 12.2 12.4
ROE 16% 27% 18% ROE 19% 35% 22%
P/BV 1.1x 2.7x 1.8x P/BV 1.4x 3.5x 2.2x
Share price 46.6           69.4            42.5           Share price 32.0          42.7               27.1            
Downside % 49% -9% Downside % 34% -15%
Value of CoCos 107,316    Value of CoCos 82,302       
Conversion Share Price (40%) 18.6 Conversion Share Price (40%) 12.8
CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065 CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065
CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2% CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2%
Tax at 30% 0% 17,645       Tax at 30% 0% 14,576       
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Credit Suisse
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss
Conversio
n
Solvency 
post 
conversio
n UBS
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss Conversion
Solvency 
post 
conversion
Equity Book Value 33,282       (13,122) 20,160        8,748        28,908       Equity Book Value 46,760      (11,933) 34,828          7,955            42,783       
Additions / (Deductions) (11,412) (11,412) (11,412) Additions / (Deductions) (26,873) (26,873) (26,873)
Core Tier 1 under Basel III 21,870       8,748          17,496       Core Tier 1 under Basel III 19,888      7,955            15,910       
High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 6,561         6,561          (6,561) -             High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 5,966        5,966            (5,966) -              
Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 13,122       13,122        (2,187) 10,935       Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 11,933      11,933          (1,989) 9,944         
MarketCap 47,412       43,543        43,543       MarketCap 64,704      42,084          42,084       
RWA 218,702    218,702     218,702    RWA 198,875   198,875        198,875     
Normalized Earnings 4,354         4,354          4,354         Normalized Earnings 4,208        4,208            4,208         
CT1 % 10.0% 4.0% 8.0% CT1 % 10.0% 4.0% 8.0%
Tier 1 % 13.0% 7.0% 8.0% Tier 1 % 13.0% 7.0% 8.0%
Tier 2 % 19.0% 13.0% 13.0% Tier 2 % 19.0% 13.0% 13.0%
# shares (000.000) 1,186         1,186          547            1,733         # shares (000.000) 3,831        3,831            1,177            5,008         
BV / share 28.1 17.0 16.7 BV / share 12.2 9.1 8.5
ROE 13% 22% 15% ROE 9% 12% 10%
P/BV 1.4x 2.2x 1.5x P/BV 1.4x 1.2x 1.0x
Share price 40.0           36.7            25.1           Share price 16.9          11.0               8.4              
Downside % -8% -37% Downside % -35% -50%
Value of CoCos 13,745       Value of CoCos 9,894         
Conversion Share Price (40%) 16.0 Conversion Share Price (40%) 6.8
CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.07 CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.07
CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 1% CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 1%
Tax at 30% 0% 2,187         Tax at 30% 0% 1,989         
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Deutsche Bank
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss
Conversio
n
Solvency 
post 
conversio
n Barclays
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss Conversion
Solvency 
post 
conversion
Equity Book Value 49,200       (17,303) 31,897        13,842      45,739       Equity Book Value 50,858      (23,882) 26,976          15,921          42,897       
Additions / (Deductions) (18,055) (18,055) (18,055) Additions / (Deductions) (11,055) (11,055) (11,055)
Core Tier 1 under Basel III 31,145       13,842        27,685       Core Tier 1 under Basel III 39,803      15,921          31,842       
High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 8,651         8,651          (8,651) -             High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 9,951        9,951            (9,951) -              
Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 10,382       10,382        (5,191) 5,191         Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 11,941      11,941          (5,970) 5,970         
MarketCap 39,104       44,280        44,280       MarketCap 35,893      72,630          72,630       
RWA 346,057    346,057     346,057    RWA 398,031   398,031        398,031     
Normalized Earnings 4,428         4,428          4,428         Normalized Earnings 7,263        7,263            7,263         
CT1 % 9.0% 4.0% 8.0% CT1 % 10.0% 4.0% 8.0%
Tier 1 % 11.5% 6.5% 8.0% Tier 1 % 12.5% 6.5% 8.0%
Tier 2 % 14.5% 9.5% 9.5% Tier 2 % 15.5% 9.5% 9.5%
# shares (000.000) 929             929              823            1,752         # shares (000.000) 121,856   121,856        135,132        256,988     
BV / share 52.9 34.3 26.1 BV / share 0.4 0.2 0.2
ROE 9% 14% 10% ROE 14% 27% 17%
P/BV 0.8x 1.4x 1.0x P/BV 0.7x 2.7x 1.7x
Share price 42.1           47.6            25.3           Share price 0.3             0.6                 0.3              
Downside % 13% -40% Downside % 102% -4%
Value of CoCos 20,789       Value of CoCos 38,191       
Conversion Share Price (40%) 16.8 Conversion Share Price (40%) 0.1
CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065 CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065
CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2% CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2%
Tax at 30% 0% 5,191         Tax at 30% 0% 5,970         
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RBS
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss
Conversio
n
Solvency 
post 
conversio
n Lloyds 
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss Conversion
Solvency 
post 
conversion
Equity Book Value 72,058       (28,440) 43,618        18,960      62,578       Equity Book Value 46,061      (24,382) 21,679          16,255          37,934       
Additions / (Deductions) (24,658) (24,658) (24,658) Additions / (Deductions) (5,424) (5,424) (5,424)
Core Tier 1 under Basel III 47,400       18,960        37,920       Core Tier 1 under Basel III 40,637      16,255          32,510       
High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 11,850       11,850        (11,850) -             High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 10,159      10,159          (10,159) -              
Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 14,220       14,220        (7,110) 7,110         Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 12,191      12,191          (6,096) 6,096         
MarketCap 47,097       72,818        72,818       MarketCap 42,209      68,684          68,684       
RWA 474,000    474,000     474,000    RWA 406,372   406,372        406,372     
Normalized Earnings 7,282         7,282          7,282         Normalized Earnings 6,868        6,868            6,868         
CT1 % 10.0% 4.0% 8.0% CT1 % 10.0% 4.0% 8.0%
Tier 1 % 12.5% 6.5% 8.0% Tier 1 % 12.5% 6.5% 8.0%
Tier 2 % 15.5% 9.5% 9.5% Tier 2 % 15.5% 9.5% 9.5%
# shares (000.000) 1,095,793 1,095,793  ######## 2,198,631 # shares (000.000) 681,558   681,558        656,180        1,337,737 
BV / share 0.1 0.0 0.0 BV / share 0.1 0.0 0.0
ROE 10% 17% 12% ROE 15% 32% 18%
P/BV 0.7x 1.7x 1.2x P/BV 0.9x 3.2x 1.8x
Share price 0.0              0.1               0.0              Share price 0.1             0.1                 0.1              
Downside % 55% -23% Downside % 63% -17%
Value of CoCos 36,526       Value of CoCos 33,690       
Conversion Share Price (40%) 0.0 Conversion Share Price (40%) 0.0
CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065 CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065
CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2% CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2%
Tax at 30% 0% 7,110         Tax at 30% 0% 6,096         
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HSBC
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss
Conversio
n
Solvency 
post 
conversio
n Standard Chartered
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss Conversion
Solvency 
post 
conversion
Equity Book Value 135,943    (64,731) 71,212        43,154      114,366    Equity Book Value 29,548      (15,025) 14,523          10,017          24,540       
Additions / (Deductions) (28,058) (28,058) (28,058) Additions / (Deductions) (4,506) (4,506) (4,506)
Core Tier 1 under Basel III 107,885    43,154        86,308       Core Tier 1 under Basel III 25,042      10,017          20,034       
High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 26,971       26,971        (26,971) -             High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 6,261        6,261            (6,261) -              
Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 32,366       32,366        (16,183) 16,183       Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 7,513        7,513            (3,756) 3,756         
MarketCap 118,123    218,027     218,027    MarketCap 39,485      50,205          50,205       
RWA 1,078,852 1,078,852  1,078,852 RWA 250,422   250,422        250,422     
Normalized Earnings 21,803       21,803        21,803       Normalized Earnings 5,021        5,021            5,021         
CT1 % 10.0% 4.0% 8.0% CT1 % 10.0% 4.0% 8.0%
Tier 1 % 12.5% 6.5% 8.0% Tier 1 % 12.5% 6.5% 8.0%
Tier 2 % 15.5% 9.5% 9.5% Tier 2 % 15.5% 9.5% 9.5%
# shares (000.000) 177,069    177,069     161,723    338,792    # shares (000.000) 23,482      23,482          14,893          38,375       
BV / share 0.8 0.4 0.3 BV / share 1.3 0.6 0.6
ROE 16% 31% 19% ROE 17% 35% 20%
P/BV 0.9x 3.1x 1.9x P/BV 1.3x 3.5x 2.0x
Share price 0.7              1.2               0.6              Share price 1.7             2.1                 1.3              
Downside % 85% -4% Downside % 27% -22%
Value of CoCos 104,075    Value of CoCos 19,484       
Conversion Share Price (40%) 0.3 Conversion Share Price (40%) 0.7
CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065 CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065
CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2% CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2%
Tax at 30% 0% 16,183       Tax at 30% 0% 3,756         
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BNP Paribas
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss
Conversio
n
Solvency 
post 
conversio
n Societe Generale
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss Conversion
Solvency 
post 
conversion
Equity Book Value 63,800       (31,650) 32,150        25,320      57,470       Equity Book Value 37,800      (16,650) 21,150          13,320          34,470       
Additions / (Deductions) (6,830) (6,830) (6,830) Additions / (Deductions) (7,830) (7,830) (7,830)
Core Tier 1 under Basel III 56,970       25,320        50,640       Core Tier 1 under Basel III 29,970      13,320          26,640       
High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 15,825       15,825        (15,825) -             High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 8,325        8,325            (8,325) -              
Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 18,990       18,990        (9,495) 9,495         Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 9,990        9,990            (4,995) 4,995         
MarketCap 63,826       91,728        91,728       MarketCap 34,473      60,778          60,778       
RWA 633,000    633,000     633,000    RWA 333,000   333,000        333,000     
Normalized Earnings 9,173         9,173          9,173         Normalized Earnings 6,078        6,078            6,078         
CT1 % 9.0% 4.0% 8.0% CT1 % 9.0% 4.0% 8.0%
Tier 1 % 11.5% 6.5% 8.0% Tier 1 % 11.5% 6.5% 8.0%
Tier 2 % 14.5% 9.5% 9.5% Tier 2 % 14.5% 9.5% 9.5%
# shares (000.000) 1,199         1,199          1,189        2,388         # shares (000.000) 746            746                721                1,467         
BV / share 53.2 26.8 24.1 BV / share 50.6 28.3 23.5
ROE 14% 29% 16% ROE 16% 29% 18%
P/BV 1.0x 2.9x 1.6x P/BV 0.9x 2.9x 1.8x
Share price 53.2           76.5            38.4           Share price 46.2          81.4               41.4            
Downside % 44% -28% Downside % 76% -10%
Value of CoCos 45,674       Value of CoCos 29,863       
Conversion Share Price (40%) 21.3 Conversion Share Price (40%) 18.5
CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065 CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065
CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2% CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2%
Tax at 30% 0% 9,495         Tax at 30% 0% 4,995         
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Santander
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss
Conversio
n
Solvency 
post 
conversio
n BBVA
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss Conversion
Solvency 
post 
conversion
Equity Book Value 75,019       (30,244) 44,775        24,195      68,970       Equity Book Value 36,689      (15,725) 20,964          12,580          33,544       
Additions / (Deductions) (20,579) (20,579) (20,579) Additions / (Deductions) (8,384) (8,384) (8,384)
Core Tier 1 under Basel III 54,440       24,195        48,391       Core Tier 1 under Basel III 28,305      12,580          25,160       
High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 15,122       15,122        (15,122) -             High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 7,863        7,863            (7,863) -              
Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 18,147       18,147        (9,073) 9,073         Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 9,435        9,435            (4,718) 4,718         
MarketCap 70,822       165,274     165,274    MarketCap 39,884      73,524          73,524       
RWA 604,885    604,885     604,885    RWA 314,505   314,505        314,505     
Normalized Earnings 16,527       16,527        16,527       Normalized Earnings 7,352        7,352            7,352         
CT1 % 9.0% 4.0% 8.0% CT1 % 9.0% 4.0% 8.0%
Tier 1 % 11.5% 6.5% 8.0% Tier 1 % 11.5% 6.5% 8.0%
Tier 2 % 14.5% 9.5% 9.5% Tier 2 % 14.5% 9.5% 9.5%
# shares (000.000) 8,440         8,440          7,209        15,649       # shares (000.000) 4,567        4,567            3,601            8,168         
BV / share 8.9 5.3 4.4 BV / share 8.0 4.6 4.1
ROE 22% 37% 24% ROE 20% 35% 22%
P/BV 0.9x 3.7x 2.4x P/BV 1.1x 3.5x 2.2x
Share price 8.4              19.6            10.6           Share price 8.7             16.1               9.0              
Downside % 133% 26% Downside % 84% 3%
Value of CoCos 76,134       Value of CoCos 32,416       
Conversion Share Price (40%) 3.4 Conversion Share Price (40%) 3.5
CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065 CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065
CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2% CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2%
Tax at 30% 0% 9,073         Tax at 30% 0% 4,718         
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Unicredit
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss
Conversio
n
Solvency 
post 
conversio
n ISP
Initial 
Solvency
Post Tax 
Loss
Solvency 
post loss Conversion
Solvency 
post 
conversion
Equity Book Value 64,487       (22,674) 41,813        18,139      59,952       Equity Book Value 52,528      (17,749) 34,780          14,199          48,978       
Additions / (Deductions) (23,674) (23,674) (23,674) Additions / (Deductions) (20,581) (20,581) (20,581)
Core Tier 1 under Basel III 40,813       18,139        36,278       Core Tier 1 under Basel III 31,947      14,199          28,398       
High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 11,337       11,337        (11,337) -             High Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 8,874        8,874            (8,874) -              
Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 13,604       13,604        (6,802) 6,802         Low Trigger CoCos (50% T1; 50% T2) 10,649      10,649          (5,325) 5,325         
MarketCap 34,301       72,324        72,324       MarketCap 28,296      48,091          48,091       
RWA 453,478    453,478     453,478    RWA 354,970   354,970        354,970     
Normalized Earnings 7,232         7,232          7,232         Normalized Earnings 4,809        4,809            4,809         
CT1 % 9.0% 4.0% 8.0% CT1 % 9.0% 4.0% 8.0%
Tier 1 % 11.5% 6.5% 8.0% Tier 1 % 11.5% 6.5% 8.0%
Tier 2 % 14.5% 9.5% 9.5% Tier 2 % 14.5% 9.5% 9.5%
# shares (000.000) 19,303       19,303        25,519      44,822       # shares (000.000) 12,655      12,655          15,875          28,530       
BV / share 3.3 2.2 1.3 BV / share 4.2 2.7 1.7
ROE 11% 17% 12% ROE 9% 14% 10%
P/BV 0.5x 1.7x 1.2x P/BV 0.5x 1.4x 1.0x
Share price 1.8              3.7               1.6              Share price 2.2             3.8                 1.7              
Downside % 111% -9% Downside % 70% -25%
Value of CoCos 41,177       Value of CoCos 26,760       
Conversion Share Price (40%) 0.7 Conversion Share Price (40%) 0.9
CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065 CT1 after initial losses 4.0% CT1 0.065
CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2% CT1 to be raised to 8.0% TO 8% 2%
Tax at 30% 0% 6,802         Tax at 30% 0% 5,325         
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3. Core Tier 1 Adjustments 
 
• Deferred Tax Assets:  DTAs resulting from net tax loss carry forwards (profit dependent) are 
deducted from CT1. DTAs from timing differences are only deducted from CT1 if they exceed 
10% of CT1 
• Investments in non-consolidated financials: Includes holdings of insurance companies (also 
majority shareholdings) and investments in other financial institutions (between 10 and 50% 
ownership). Only deducted from Core Tier 1 if they exceed 10% of Core Tier 1 
• Mortgage servicing rights: No longer eligible as capital.  Not material for European banks 
 
These three items are only allowed up to 10% of CT1 individually or 15% in total: 
 
• Minority interest: For genuine operating banking subsidiaries, only the “excess capital” 
attributable to minority shareholders is deducted. Minority interest in subsidiaries which are 
not banks are to be deducted 
• AFS reserve: Unrealized losses are to be deducted. Committee has yet to confirm treatment 
of unrealized gains.  Potential mitigating impact from IAS 9 and pull-to-par. 
• Other: All deduction currently taken 50% from Tier 1 and 50% from Total Capital are to be 
fully deducted from Core Tier 1 Capital (e.g. expected loss). Defined benefit pension fund 
asset should be deducted from Core Tier 1. First loss positions 1250% risk weighted 
 
4. Criteria for new Basel III compliant Tier I and II instruments 
According to Basel Press release and Goldman Sachs, the criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier I 
and Tier II Capital is as follows: 
Tier II 
• Issued externally and fully paid in, without the bank funding the purchase, subordinated to 
depositors, creditors and subordinated debt, neither secured nor covered. 
• Perpetual, no incentives to redeem, callable earliest in Year 5. 
o Supervisory approval to call, and bank must not do anything to create expectation 
that the call will be exercised. 
o Bank must not call the instrument unless replacement at conditions sustainable for 
the income capacity of the bank and the bank is well above minimum capital 
requirements. 
 
• Non-cumulative discretionary coupons paid out of distributable items only 
o Full discretion required, i.e. prohibition of “dividend pushers”. Cancelation must not 
impose restrictions on bank except in distributions to common shareholders (i.e. 
“stopper”). 
• Instrument cannot contribute to “liabilities exceeding assets” test if such balance sheet test is 
part of national insolvency law. 
• Only instruments that are classified as liabilities for accounting purposes must have principal 
loss absorption through conversion to common / write down at a pre-specified trigger point. 
o Write down will have to reduce claim in liquidation, the amount repaid when call is 
exercised and partially / fully reduce coupons (i.e. “permanent”). 
• No features that hinder recapitalization and no credit sensitive dividend feature that reset 
based on bank’s credit standing. 
• SPV issue requires proceeds to be available immediately and without limitation in a form that 
meets or exceeds Additional Tier I capital criteria. 
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Tier II 
•  Issued externally and fully paid in, without the bank funding the purchase, subordinated to 
depositors, creditors, neither secured nor covered. 
•  Minimum 5 years maturity. 
o No step-ups allowed and straight line amortization in last 5 years. 
o Requirements for calling same as for Additional Tier I capital. 
•  No credit sensitive dividend feature, SPV on-loan needs to meet Tier II criteria. 
In general dividend-pushers prohibited, stoppers allowed if don’t hinder recapitalization. Equity 
accounted instruments does not require principal loss absorption (conversion / permanent write 
down). SPV Tier I transaction requires on-loan in Tier I format. Still no further guidance regarding the 
loss absorption requirement upon non-viability for Tier I / Tier II. 
5 New Basel III ratios 
5.1 Leverage ratio 
This ratio will require banks to hold T1 capital equal or above 3% of the unweighted assets (all assets 
in the balance sheet on a nominal basis). It will remain in a test phase until the end of 2017. This 
allows to set another cap in terms of leverage even if the bank’s assets are low risk weighted.  
5.2 Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) 
It aims to measure long term, stable sources of funding versus the liquidity of the assets funded and 
might-be funding needs from the off balance sheet commitments. The ratio is: 
Available Stable Funding (ASF) / Required Stable Funding (RSF) > 100% 
This ratio aims to ensure that the funding matches the assets as accurately as possible and forces the 
bank to hold at least long term funding that tallies well with the long term assets. 
ASF will be made up of: 
• Capital (after deductions) 
• Preference stock (maturity>1yr) 
• Liabilities (maturity>1yr) 
• Stable / “sticky” deposits in a stress period 
• Wholesale funding below a year than can stay in the bank in a stress period. 
The ASF factor (0%-100%) weights each asset class (100% for equity; 90% stable deposits; 50% 
unsecured debt, etc). 
The RSF measures the assets of the balance sheet The RSF factor (0%-100%) indicates the amount 
of an asset which cannot be monetized143
5.3 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 
 during a liquidity “shortfall” over a year. Any encumbered 
asset will get a 100% unless it is below a year.  
It assesses the liquidity capacity of a bank under a severe short term liquidity squeeze over 30 days. 
The ratio is: 
                                                          
143 Through sales or used as collateral. 
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High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) / Net Cash Outflows (NCO) Over 30 days>100% 
HQLA must trade in an active repo or cash market and be available in a stressed scenario. There are 
two levels: 
• Level 1: bank can hold unlimited amounts at market value with no haircuts. These are: 
o Cash and central bank reserves. 
o 0% risk weighted sovereign central bank, public sector enterprise etc. 
o Non 0% risk weighted sovereign debt in domestic currency or in foreign currency 
matching the currency needs of the bank in this country. 
 
• Level 2 can only represent 40% of the pool and have a minimum 15% haircut of market value 
o 20% risk weighted sovereign, central bank, public sector enterprise etc. 
o Covered bonds and  non-financial corporate bonds rated AA- or above144
NCO is calculated as follows: 
. 
NCO = outflows – minimum of (inflows, 75% of outflows) 
Expected outflow are estimated by using a run off rate over the liabilities and off balance sheet 
commitments. The total expected inflows are calculated by applying a rate (at which they could flow) 
on the outstanding contractual receivables. With this ratio, the regulator aims to ensure that the bank 
is covered at least for the 25% of its gross outflows.  
6 Phasing in arrangements 
Below the phase-in schedule for the new solvency ratios and buffers, leverage and liquidity ratios.  
 
             Source: Bank of International Settlements 
                                                          
144Senior and lower rated corporate debt do not qualify 
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Existing bank capital instruments that no longer qualify as Tier I Capital or Tier II Capital under Basel 
III will be phased out starting 1- Jan-2013. Fixing the base at the nominal amount of such instruments 
outstanding as of 1-Jan-2013, their recognition is be capped at 90% from 1-Jan-2013. The cap is 
reduced by 10% in each subsequent year until 2019. This cap will be applied to Tier I and Tier II 
instruments separately and refers to the total amount of instruments outstanding that no longer meet 
the relevant entry criteria. To the extent an instrument is redeemed, or its recognition in capital is 
amortized, after 1-Jan-2013, the nominal amount serving as the base for calculation is not reduced. 
Following Goldman Sachs (2010), the instruments with an incentive to be redeemed will be treated as 
follows: 
 
                                           Source: Goldman Sachs Research team 
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7. ROA vs ROE and implied valuation in European Financial Equities 
 
 
 Source: Author 
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UK Banks COE
BARCLAYS PLC 30,166 62,262 0.5x 3.6% 10% 11.8% 3.0% 7.3% 0.6x 27% 0.8x 72% 0.2% 23.9x 25.0x 0.4% 171 bps
HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 109,096 154,915 0.7x 8.3% 13% 9.2% 4.0% 7.7% 0.8x 18% 1.8x 156% 0.5% 15.8x 25.0x 0.5% 3 bps
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP PLC 30,442 46,902 0.6x -3.9% 11% 11.6% 3.0% 8.6% 0.7x 14% 1.0x 48% -0.2% 21.1x 25.0x 0.5% 500 bps
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP 40,206 76,851 0.5x -3.0% 8% 11.1% 3.0% 7.3% 0.7x 25% 0.7x 26% -0.2% 18.9x 25.0x 0.3% 400 bps
STANDARD CHARTERED PLC 38,134 38,865 1.0x 11.2% 13% 10.1% 5.0% 10.0% 1.0x 1% 1.7x 69% 0.8% 13.3x 25.0x 0.5% -37 bps
Germany Banks
AAREAL BANK AG 1,340 1,997 0.7x 6.0% 9% 10.1% 3.0% 7.7% 0.8x 15% 0.8x 25% 0.3% 20.0x 25.0x 0.4% 19 bps
COMMERZBANK AG 3,972 13,191 0.3x 29.9% 12% 8.8% 3.0% 4.8% 0.5x 79% 1.5x 397% 0.6% 52.8x 25.0x 0.5% -17 bps
DEUTSCHE BANK AG-REGISTERED 24,946 51,590 0.5x 16.0% 12% 9.3% 3.0% 6.0% 0.7x 35% 1.4x 192% 0.4% 35.7x 25.0x 0.5% 6 bps
Swiss Banks
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG-REG 38,816 43,288 0.9x 10.5% 16% 8.6% 3.0% 8.0% 0.9x 4% 2.3x 154% 0.4% 23.5x 25.0x 0.6% 40 bps
UBS AG-REG 57,706 51,842 1.1x 13.9% 15% 9.6% 3.0% 10.3% 1.1x (3%) 1.8x 58% 0.6% 24.9x 25.0x 0.6% 4 bps
Dutch banks
ING GROEP NV-CVA 30,974 45,809 0.7x 12.1% 13% 12.5% 3.0% 9.4% 0.8x 11% 1.0x 48% 0.4% 26.8x 25.0x 0.5% 11 bps
KBC GROEP NV 9,136 18,531 0.5x 17.7% 16% 14.5% 3.0% 8.7% 0.6x 21% 1.1x 120% 1.0% 17.4x 25.0x 0.6% -39 bps
SNS REAAL 854 4,833 0.2x -9.6% 6% 7.2% 3.0% 3.7% 0.5x 195% 0.7x 283% -0.4% 26.4x 25.0x 0.2% 200 bps
Spanish and Portuguese Banks
BANCO SANTANDER SA 65,564 79,753 0.8x 10.6% 14% 12.8% 3.0% 11.1% 0.9x 5% 1.1x 32% 0.7% 14.2x 25.0x 0.5% -27 bps
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTA 35,839 37,881 0.9x 12.1% 14% 13.0% 3.0% 12.5% 1.0x 1% 1.1x 17% 0.8% 14.8x 25.0x 0.6% -31 bps
BANCO POPULAR ESPANOL 5,294 8,700 0.6x 8.5% 8% 12.0% 3.0% 8.5% 0.7x 16% 0.6x (0%) 0.6% 14.8x 25.0x 0.3% -41 bps
BANCO ESP CREDITO (BANESTO) 3,555 5,584 0.6x 12.1% 10% 11.1% 3.0% 8.2% 0.7x 15% 0.9x 35% 0.6% 20.2x 25.0x 0.4% -34 bps
BANCO DE SABADELL SA 3,913 6,650 0.6x 5.1% 8% 11.0% 3.0% 7.7% 0.7x 19% 0.6x 2% 0.4% 14.3x 25.0x 0.3% -11 bps
BANKINTER SA 2,144 2,705 0.8x 7.2% 9% 11.8% 3.0% 9.9% 0.8x 7% 0.6x (20%) 0.4% 20.1x 25.0x 0.3% -4 bps
BANCO PASTOR 800 1,615 0.5x 7.0% 7% 8.8% 3.0% 5.9% 0.7x 35% 0.7x 49% 0.4% 19.0x 25.0x 0.3% -20 bps
BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES-R 2,804 7,207 0.4x 4.3% 6% 17.8% 3.0% 8.8% 0.5x 26% 0.2x (41%) 0.3% 13.4x 25.0x 0.3% -20 bps
BANCO ESPIRITO SANTO-REG 2,899 7,361 0.4x 3.3% 6% 17.8% 3.0% 8.8% 0.5x 26% 0.2x (42%) 0.3% 11.0x 25.0x 0.3% -15 bps
BANCO BPI SA.- REG SHS 955 1,940 0.5x 9.3% 10% 17.2% 3.0% 10.0% 0.6x 18% 0.5x 3% 0.4% 22.8x 25.0x 0.4% -1 bps
Italian Banks
UNICREDIT SPA 27,437 68,187 0.4x 4.8% 7% 12.7% 3.0% 6.9% 0.5x 35% 0.4x 12% 0.4% 13.4x 25.0x 0.3% -17 bps
INTESA SANPAOLO 29,172 55,463 0.5x 4.8% 7% 12.3% 3.0% 7.9% 0.6x 22% 0.5x (11%) 0.4% 11.6x 25.0x 0.3% -28 bps
BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI SIENA 5,625 17,770 0.3x 3.2% 6% 11.0% 3.0% 5.5% 0.5x 59% 0.4x 12% 0.2% 13.1x 25.0x 0.2% -3 bps
BANCO POPOLARE SCARL 2,691 11,940 0.2x 2.0% 5% 11.4% 3.0% 4.9% 0.4x 91% 0.2x (4%) 0.2% 11.3x 25.0x 0.2% 8 bps
BANCA CARIGE SPA 2,850 3,879 0.7x 3.8% 6% 10.0% 3.0% 8.1% 0.8x 11% 0.4x (42%) 0.4% 10.4x 25.0x 0.2% -34 bps
French Banks
BNP PARIBAS 62,363 85,630 0.7x 12.2% 13% 10.5% 3.0% 8.5% 0.8x 11% 1.3x 78% 0.5% 23.3x 25.0x 0.5% -2 bps
CREDIT AGRICOLE SA 25,304 52,800 0.5x 7.6% 11% 11.2% 3.0% 6.9% 0.6x 29% 0.9x 93% 0.3% 29.9x 25.0x 0.4% 67 bps
DEXIA SA 4,034 11,453 0.4x 2.4% 8% 11.7% 3.0% 6.1% 0.5x 47% 0.6x 72% 0.1% 46.0x 25.0x 0.3% 531 bps
NATIXIS 9,766 21,366 0.5x 7.7% 9% 11.3% 3.0% 6.8% 0.6x 32% 0.8x 66% 0.4% 21.4x 25.0x 0.4% 3 bps
SOCIETE GENERALE 30,559 51,800 0.6x 7.1% 12% 11.2% 3.0% 7.8% 0.7x 19% 1.1x 90% 0.3% 22.0x 25.0x 0.5% 52 bps
Average 22,405 34,865 0.6x 7.5% 10% # 11.5% # 3.1% 7.9% 0.7x 29% 90% 62% 0.4% 20.8x 25.0x 0.4% 49 bps
COE
ROA AnalysisROE / P/B Analysis
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8. Our views on Financial Equities going forward 
          
 
Source: Author 
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8. European Equity Current and Forward Multiples: November 2011 
. 
 
Market Consensus Valuation Metrics     
MBV TBV P/TBV ROTE P/BV ROE Implied ROTE
Implied 
ROE P/E
UK Banks YTD 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
BARCLAYS 18,866 43,031 0.44x 7.0% 0.30x 4.8% 6.6% 7.8% 8.6% 5.7% 4.1% 6.3x 4.0% 5.0% 6.1% 0.28 0.33 0.40
HSBC 83,442 128,222 0.65x 14.4% 0.50x 11.0% 11.1% 11.4% 11.8% 5.3% 4.1% 4.5x 5.6% 6.3% 7.1% 0.91 0.99 1.13
LLOYDS 15,643 39,636 0.39x -11.6% 0.34x -10.1% -1.9% 5.6% 8.3% 5.0% 4.4% -3.4x 0.0% 2.2% 5.3% 0.02 0.04 0.07
RBS 19,643 60,152 0.33x -4.7% 0.26x -3.7% -0.6% 3.8% 5.3% 4.2% 3.4% -6.9x 0.0% 1.1% 2.8% 0.01 0.02 0.04
STANDARD 30,255 33,536 0.90x 15.3% 0.73x 12.3% 12.2% 12.6% 12.8% 8.3% 6.8% 5.9x
Germany Banks
COMMERZBANK 6,448 18,417 0.35x -14.9% 0.26x -11.0% 3.7% 6.9% 8.6% 3.6% 2.8% -2.3x 0.0% 2.4% 4.9% 0.16 0.31 0.41
DB 23,275 36,422 0.64x 8.0% 0.44x 5.5% 9.2% 9.2% 9.5% 6.4% 4.5% 8.0x 3.1% 3.2% 3.6% 4.99 5.30 5.94
Swiss Banks
CS 24,060 24,889 0.97x 11.0% 0.57x 6.4% 9.6% 11.5% 12.0% 8.8% 5.4% 8.8x 3.6% 3.8% 5.3% 2.43 3.23 3.77
UBS 38,704 42,425 0.91x 9.6% 0.69x 7.2% 9.3% 10.2% 11.2% 7.8% 6.0% 9.5x 1.0% 1.6% 3.8% 1.15 1.46 1.71
Dutch banks
ING 18,947 43,800 0.43x 15.5% 0.39x 14.0% 13.9% 11.1% 11.0% 5.7% 5.2% 2.8x 0.0% 5.3% 8.1% 1.47 1.36 1.47
KBC 3,070 7,727 0.40x -81.7% 0.18x -36.4% 8.3% 14.2% 14.2% 4.8% 2.4% -0.5x 4.8% 7.3% 10.1% 2.95 4.49 4.98
SNS 412 2,390 0.17x 3.7% 0.09x 1.8% 5.3% 9.9% 4.3% 2.4% 1.4% 4.7x 0.0% 1.5% 18.1% 0.45 0.83 0.93
Spanish and Portuguese Banks
SANTANDER 45,338 46,711 0.97x 15.4% 0.58x 9.2% 9.9% 10.5% 11.0% 13.8% 8.4% 6.3x 11.0% 10.7% 11.1% 0.86 0.90 0.98
BANKIA 5,440 15,831 0.34x 2.3% 0.34x 2.2% 2.1% 2.6% 4.7% 5.2% 5.1% 15.1x 2.9% 3.9% 6.7% 0.21 0.26 0.46
CAIXA 13,479 19,846 0.68x 0.2% 0.64x 0.2% 6.0% 6.2% 7.7% 8.2% 7.8% 280.8x 6.4% 6.4% 6.8% 0.33 0.37 0.46
BBVA 27,600 28,070 0.98x 11.5% 0.69x 8.1% 10.8% 10.4% 11.0% 14.5% 10.3% 8.6x 7.3% 7.3% 7.8% 0.89 0.91 1.01
POPULAR SM 3,968 7,564 0.52x 5.2% 0.48x 4.7% 5.6% 5.0% 6.2% 7.2% 6.6% 10.1x 6.1% 5.9% 7.1% 0.30 0.28 0.38
BANESTO 2,406 5,570 0.43x 0.8% 0.43x 0.8% 6.6% 6.8% 7.8% 5.6% 5.6% 51.9x 7.3% 7.8% 9.3% 0.53 0.56 0.68
SABADELL 3,140 4,904 0.64x 3.5% 0.53x 2.9% 4.5% 4.5% 6.2% 7.6% 6.4% 18.2x 4.0% 4.2% 5.9% 0.18 0.20 0.27
BANKINTER 1,858 3,055 0.61x 6.1% 0.61x 6.1% 6.1% 6.4% 6.9% 8.3% 8.3% 9.9x 4.1% 4.5% 5.0% 0.33 0.36 0.42
PASTOR 764 1,682 0.45x 3.0% 0.44x 2.9% 3.2% 4.3% 4.5% 4.8% 4.7% 15.0x 2.1% 2.6% 3.2% 0.18 0.24 0.22
BCP 987 5,370 0.18x -2.2% 0.14x -1.6% 2.4% 1.7% 3.6% 3.6% 2.8% -8.5x 2.9% 0.7% 5.1% 0.02 0.02 0.04
BES 1,359 5,638 0.24x -1.3% 0.20x -1.1% 4.9% 4.8% 6.2% 4.6% 3.9% -18.7x 4.9% 3.7% 6.4% 0.22 0.21 0.31
BPI 430 841 0.51x 10.7% 0.32x 6.7% 9.9% 8.5% 8.8% 8.7% 5.6% 4.8x 1.4% 3.7% 7.6% 0.00 0.00 0.00
Italian Banks
UNICREDIT 13,780 36,730 0.38x -115.9% 0.25x -76.6% -4.4% 4.0% 5.4% 6.1% 4.2% -0.3x 0.0% 5.3% 7.8% 0.01 0.13 0.17
ISPM 18,440 57,554 0.32x 3.7% 0.31x 3.6% 4.0% 4.5% 5.4% 5.4% 5.3% 8.7x 6.3% 6.8% 7.9% 0.15 0.16 0.20
MONTE 2,951 7,578 0.39x 2.2% 0.18x 1.0% 2.1% 2.7% 3.9% 5.6% 2.8% 17.5x 4.7% 6.2% 8.6% 0.04 0.04 0.06
POPOLARE IM 1,543 6,674 0.23x 7.9% 0.13x 4.3% 2.7% 2.5% 3.6% 3.6% 2.2% 2.9x 3.4% 4.3% 5.9% 0.14 0.14 0.19
UBI 2,561 6,020 0.43x -4.6% 0.21x -2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 3.2% 5.9% 3.1% -9.3x 3.7% 4.6% 6.4% 0.26 0.31 0.41
French Banks 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.00 0.00 0.00
BNP 31,764 54,557 0.58x 4.0% 0.37x 2.5% 10.1% 10.1% 10.0% 7.5% 4.9% 14.7x 6.0% 6.7% 7.3% 5.81 6.18 6.54
CASA 10,294 27,400 0.38x 3.8% 0.19x 2.0% 5.5% 7.1% 7.6% 5.3% 3.0% 10.0x 9.1% 10.9% 12.0% 1.09 1.36 1.52
NATIXIS 5,582 16,046 0.35x 8.6% 0.27x 6.6% 7.9% 7.3% 7.5% 4.3% 3.4% 4.1x 10.1% 10.3% 11.2% 0.45 0.43 0.46
SG 12,247 41,800 0.29x 6.0% 0.23x 4.7% 7.1% 8.1% 8.2% 4.7% 3.8% 4.9x 0.0% 8.9% 10.1% 3.99 4.60 5.16
BPCE
Average ex Greece /Nordic/EE 488,696 880,088 0.5x -1.8% 0.4x -0.3% 5.9% 7.1% 7.8% 6.3% 4.8% 14.7x 3.8% 5.0% 7.1% 0.93 1.09 1.24
MW Average ex Greece/Nordic/ EE 0.7x 4.4% 0.5x 3.5% 8.1% 9.1% 9.8% 7.4% 5.5% 13.8x 4.3% 5.4% 6.6% 1.36 1.51 1.69
Dividend Yield EPS
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US Equity Current and Forward Multiples: November 2011 
 
 Source: Author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Consensus Valuation Metrics     
MBV TBV P/TBV ROTE P/BV ROE Implied ROTE
Implied 
ROE P/E
CUR_MKT_CAP YTD 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
US Brokers
GS 44,885 61,529 0.7x -2.6% 0.63x -2.2% 9.6% 11.5% 12.0% 7.6% 6.7% -28.6x 3.6% 3.8% 5.3% 2.43 3.23 3.77
MS 25,114 49,241 0.5x 17.9% 0.36x 12.5% 9.3% 10.2% 11.2% 5.4% 4.1% 2.9x 1.0% 1.6% 3.8% 1.15 1.46 1.71
US Large Caps
BAC 52,098 131,176 0.4x 19.0% 0.23x 10.8% 9.9% 10.5% 11.0% 4.4% 2.9% 2.1x 11.0% 10.7% 11.1% 0.86 0.90 0.98
BK 21,585 10,270 2.1x 25.4% 0.63x 7.5% 2.1% 2.6% 4.7% 8.6% 3.3% 8.3x 2.9% 3.9% 6.7% 0.21 0.26 0.46
C 68,736 144,764 0.5x 10.4% 0.38x 8.4% 6.0% 6.2% 7.7% 3.9% 3.4% 4.6x 6.4% 6.4% 6.8% 0.33 0.37 0.46
JPM 107,837 122,911 0.9x 13.9% 0.59x 9.4% 10.8% 10.4% 11.0% 8.9% 6.3% 6.3x 7.3% 7.3% 7.8% 0.89 0.91 1.01
PNC 25,716 22,427 1.1x 14.8% 0.69x 8.9% 5.6% 5.0% 6.2% 9.7% 6.2% 7.7x 6.1% 5.9% 7.1% 0.30 0.28 0.38
USB 45,401 20,482 2.2x 24.9% 1.33x 14.9% 6.6% 6.8% 7.8% 15.9% 9.9% 8.9x 7.3% 7.8% 9.3% 0.53 0.56 0.68
WFC 122,399 91,754 1.3x 17.7% 0.88x 11.6% 4.5% 4.5% 6.2% 8.9% 6.2% 7.5x 4.0% 4.2% 5.9% 0.18 0.20 0.27
Aussie Banks
NAB 49,027 32,334 1.5x 17.3% 1.16x 13.2% -4.4% 4.0% 5.4% 18.1% 14.1% 8.8x 0.0% 5.3% 7.8% 0.01 0.13 0.17
ANZ 50,087 30,071 1.7x 17.9% 1.32x 14.2% 4.0% 4.5% 5.4% 20.6% 16.5% 9.3x 6.3% 6.8% 7.9% 0.15 0.16 0.20
CBA 73,453 27,156 2.7x 24.6% 1.97x 17.9% 2.1% 2.7% 3.9% 26.4% 19.5% 11.0x 4.7% 6.2% 8.6% 0.04 0.04 0.06
MQG 7,643 9,858 0.8x 6.2% 0.65x 5.2% 2.7% 2.5% 3.6% 8.6% 7.3% 12.5x 3.4% 4.3% 5.9% 0.14 0.14 0.19
WBC 59,857 30,047 2.0x 20.2% 1.37x 13.8% 2.2% 2.2% 3.2% 19.0% 13.3% 9.9x 3.7% 4.6% 6.4% 0.26 0.31 0.41
Average US only 513,771 654,554 1.1x 15.7% 0.6x 9.1% 7.2% 7.5% 8.6% 8.2% 5.5% 2.2x 5.5% 5.7% 7.1% 0.76 0.91 1.08
MW Average US only $1.04 15.1% 0.7x 9.5% 7.4% 7.6% 8.7% 8.2% 5.7% 3.1x 5.9% 6.0% 7.2% 0.70 0.81 0.95
Dividend Yield EPS
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European Implied ROE and COE for European banks: November 2011 
 
  Source: Author 
Bank Market cap Equity Q3 P/BV Q3 ROE
Consens
us 2013 
ROTE 
target
Perp G 
Rate
Market 
Implice
d ROE
Q2 
Implied 
P/B
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m/ 
(Discou
nt)
2012 
Implied 
P/B
Premiu
m/ 
(Discou
nt)
UK Banks
Country 
RFA
Country 
5 yt CDS Beta ERP COE (rfa)
COE 
(German
y0
BARCLAYS 18,866 61,989 0.3x 4.8% 9% 2.03% 100 1.73 6.00% 12.4% 13.5% 1.0% 4.8% 0.4x 17% 0.6x 101%
HSBC 83,442 167,537 0.5x 11.0% 12% 2.03% 100 0.96 6.00% 7.8% 8.9% 1.0% 4.9% 0.6x 11% 1.4x 175%
LLOYDS 15,643 45,546 0.3x -10.1% 8% 2.03% 100 1.65 6.00% 11.9% 13.0% 1.0% 5.1% 0.4x 15% 0.6x 76%
RBS 19,643 76,242 0.3x -3.7% 5% 2.03% 100 1.62 6.00% 11.7% 12.8% 1.0% 4.0% 0.3x 23% 0.4x 40%
STANDARD 30,255 41,561 0.7x 12.3% 13% 2.03% 100 1.18 6.00% 9.1% 10.2% 1.0% 7.7% 0.8x 4% 1.3x 76%
Germany Banks
COMMERZBANK 6,448 24,869 0.3x -11.0% 9% 2.08% 110 1.20 6.00% 9.3% 9.3% 1.0% 3.1% 0.3x 31% 0.9x 253%
DB 23,275 53,108 0.4x 5.5% 10% 2.08% 110 1.27 6.00% 9.7% 9.7% 1.0% 4.8% 0.5x 13% 1.0x 124%
Sw iss Banks
CS 24,060 42,478 0.6x 6.4% 12% 0.84% 52 1.37 6.00% 9.1% 9.1% 1.0% 5.6% 0.6x 8% 1.4x 141%
UBS 38,704 56,276 0.7x 7.2% 11% 0.84% 52 1.28 6.00% 8.5% 8.5% 1.0% 6.2% 0.7x 5% 1.4x 97%
Dutch banks
ING 18,947 48,276 0.4x 14.0% 11% 2.68% 128 1.63 6.00% 12.5% 13.2% 1.0% 5.8% 0.4x 12% 0.8x 110%
KBC 3,070 17,351 0.2x -36.4% 14% 2.68% 128 1.43 6.00% 11.3% 12.0% 1.0% 2.9% 0.2x 39% 1.2x 581%
SNS 412 4,833 0.1x 1.8% 4% 2.68% 128 1.47 6.00% 11.5% 12.2% 1.0% 2.0% 0.2x 88% 0.3x 243%
Spanish and Portuguese Banks
SANTANDER 45,338 78,289 0.6x 9.2% 11% 6.55% 491 1.28 6.00% 14.2% 14.7% 1.0% 8.9% 0.6x 5% 0.7x 27%
BANKIA 5,440 16,140 0.3x 2.2% 5% 6.55% 491 1.28 6.00% 14.2% 14.7% 1.0% 5.6% 0.4x 13% 0.3x (21%)
CAIXA 13,479 20,973 0.6x 0.2% 8% 6.55% 491 0.88 6.00% 11.8% 12.3% 1.0% 8.2% 0.7x 5% 0.6x (8%)
BBVA 27,600 39,868 0.7x 8.1% 11% 6.55% 491 1.36 6.00% 14.7% 15.2% 1.0% 10.8% 0.7x 3% 0.7x 2%
POPULAR SM 3,968 8,320 0.5x 4.7% 6% 6.55% 491 1.12 6.00% 13.3% 13.7% 1.0% 7.1% 0.5x 8% 0.4x (14%)
BANESTO 2,406 5,638 0.4x 0.8% 8% 6.55% 491 0.97 6.00% 12.4% 12.8% 1.0% 6.1% 0.5x 10% 0.6x 34%
SABADELL 3,140 5,944 0.5x 2.9% 6% 6.55% 491 0.85 6.00% 11.6% 12.1% 1.0% 6.9% 0.6x 7% 0.5x (11%)
BANKINTER 1,858 3,055 0.6x 6.1% 7% 6.55% 491 1.13 6.00% 13.3% 13.8% 1.0% 8.8% 0.6x 5% 0.5x (24%)
PASTOR 764 1,882 0.4x 2.7% 5% 6.55% 491 0.56 6.00% 9.9% 10.4% 1.0% 4.8% 0.5x 14% 0.4x (8%)
BCP 987 7,295 0.1x -1.6% 4% 11.74% 1,082 0.95 6.00% 17.5% 18.6% 1.0% 3.4% 0.2x 34% 0.1x 10%
BES 1,359 6,904 0.2x -1.1% 6% 11.74% 1,082 0.99 6.00% 17.7% 18.8% 1.0% 4.5% 0.2x 22% 0.3x 49%
BPI 430 1,347 0.3x 6.7% 9% 11.74% 1,082 0.80 6.00% 16.5% 17.7% 1.0% 6.3% 0.4x 12% 0.5x 47%
Italian Banks
UNICREDIT 13,780 55,564 0.2x -76.6% 5% 6.99% 562 1.40 6.00% 15.4% 16.1% 1.0% 4.7% 0.3x 19% 0.3x 19%
ISPM 18,440 58,626 0.3x 3.6% 5% 6.99% 562 1.48 6.00% 15.9% 16.6% 1.0% 5.9% 0.4x 13% 0.3x (11%)
MONTE 2,951 16,767 0.2x 1.0% 4% 6.99% 562 1.09 6.00% 13.5% 14.2% 1.0% 3.3% 0.2x 33% 0.2x 26%
POPOLARE IM 1,543 12,201 0.1x 4.3% 4% 6.99% 562 1.15 6.00% 13.9% 14.6% 1.0% 2.7% 0.2x 47% 0.2x 50%
UBI 2,561 12,237 0.2x -2.3% 3% 6.99% 562 1.03 6.00% 13.2% 13.9% 1.0% 3.7% 0.3x 27% 0.2x (19%)
French Banks
BNP 31,764 86,676 0.4x 2.5% 10% 3.70% 250 1.48 6.00% 12.6% 13.4% 1.0% 5.6% 0.4x 13% 0.7x 98%
CASA 10,294 52,800 0.2x 2.0% 8% 3.70% 250 1.58 6.00% 13.2% 14.1% 1.0% 3.5% 0.3x 29% 0.5x 161%
NATIXIS 5,582 20,997 0.3x 6.6% 8% 3.70% 250 1.30 6.00% 11.5% 12.4% 1.0% 4.0% 0.3x 22% 0.6x 115%
SG 12,247 52,600 0.2x 4.7% 8% 3.70% 250 1.85 6.00% 14.8% 15.7% 1.0% 4.4% 0.3x 21% 0.5x 110%
BPCE
Average ex Greece and EE 488,696 1,204,189 0.4x -0.3% 8% # 5.09% 384 1.3 6.00% 12.6% 13.3% # 1.0% 5.3% 0.42x 19% 0.6x 80%
MW Average ex Greece and EE 0.5x 3.5% 10% # 3.53% 240 1.3 6.00% 11.4% 12.0% # 1.0% 6.0% 0.52x 12% 0.9x 91%
ROE / P/B Analysis
COE
213 
 
US Implied ROE and COE for European banks: November 2011 
 
       Source:Author
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RFA
Country 
5 yt CDS Beta ERP COE (rfa) COE (US)
US Brokers
GS 44,885 71,563 0.6x -2.2% 12% 1.87% 56 1.37 6.00% 10.1% 10.1% 1.0% 6.7% 0.7x 6% 1.2x 93%
MS 25,114 70,094 0.4x 12.5% 11% 1.87% 56 1.28 6.00% 9.6% 9.6% 1.0% 4.1% 0.4x 19% 1.2x 232%
US Large Caps
BAC 52,098 230,252 0.2x 10.8% 11% 1.87% 56 1.28 6.00% 9.5% 9.5% 1.0% 2.9% 0.3x 36% 1.2x 418%
BK 21,585 34,529 0.6x 7.5% 5% 1.87% 56 0.46 6.00% 4.6% 4.6% 1.0% 3.3% 0.7x 13% 1.0x 62%
C 68,736 179,342 0.4x 8.4% 8% 1.87% 56 0.88 6.00% 7.1% 7.1% 1.0% 3.4% 0.5x 23% 1.1x 184%
JPM 107,837 182,287 0.6x 9.4% 11% 1.87% 56 1.36 6.00% 10.0% 10.0% 1.0% 6.3% 0.6x 7% 1.1x 86%
PNC 25,716 37,242 0.7x 8.9% 6% 1.87% 56 1.12 6.00% 8.6% 8.6% 1.0% 6.2% 0.7x 5% 0.7x (0%)
USB 45,401 34,210 1.3x 14.9% 8% 1.87% 56 0.97 6.00% 7.7% 7.7% 1.0% 9.9% 1.3x (3%) 1.0x (24%)
WFC 122,399 139,244 0.9x 11.6% 6% 1.87% 56 0.85 6.00% 7.0% 7.0% 1.0% 6.2% 0.9x 2% 0.9x 0%
Average US only 753,838 1,151,764 0.6x 9.1% 9% # 1.87% 56 1.06 6.00% 8.3% 8.3% # 1.0% 5.5% 0.7x 12% 1.0x 117%
MW Average US only 0.7x 9.5% 9% # 1.87% 56 1.08 6.00% 8.3% 8.3% # 1.0% 5.7% 0.7x 11% 1.0x 105%
ROE / P/B Analysis
COE
214 
 
FINAL REMARKS 
The outcome of the two empirical projects perfectly matches the conclusions of our theoretical 
framework.  
In the first part, US companies seem to command a lower WACC on a pre and post restructuring 
basis owing to the effectiveness of the Chapter 11 to enable the company's rehabilitation that boosts 
the expected recovery for all security holders as well as preserving the company's value. The effective 
tools of Chapter 11 (with a proven track record given the number of successful restructurings relative 
to Western Europe bankruptcy proceedings) aim to protect the company while looking after the rights 
of the different stakeholders in the firm. Furthermore, only strong companies with a sound capital 
structure and a viable business plan emerge from Chapter 11. Therefore, our initial theoretical support 
of Chapter 11 as the most efficient restructuring framework finds the necessary empirical validation in 
our model even though the difference is not as significant as presumed given the theoretical 
underpinning. This could be due to the limitations of our model in terms of size, assumptions or lack of 
market data that might create some statistical biases. Nonetheless, we are quite confident about the 
findings and we hope they can support further studies of our pioneering work on the new "distressed" 
WACC role.   
In the second part, our empirical model further champions the theoretical backdrop that underpins the 
empirical model at the end. Our model shows the incremental pick-up in WACC between Basel II and 
III as expected due to the new implementation of loss absorbing instruments plus higher common 
equity requirements. However, if we assume an extreme scenario where a bank's solvency ratio 
illustrated by CT1 falls below a threshold that triggers the CoCo conversion into equity, the post 
conversion WACC creeps up but not meaningfully due to the highly initial cost of capital under Basel 
III. What does it mean for banks? Banks cannot escape from the new loss absorbing capital structure 
which will push the overall WACC up. This is a given. However, banks will have to mitigate it via three 
ways:(1) comply with the minimum solvency ratios and resort to secured debt (covered bonds and 
deposits) au lieu of senior debt (mostly if "bail-in" hits the senior debt) which we expect to reprice up; 
(2) manage the capital structure according to their COE; low beta names will command low COEs and 
therefore will favor equity versus CoCos if COE is lower than CoCos' coupons; (3) banks could issue 
CoCos with both downside (loss absorbing features) and upside (convertible features) features to 
bring down the overall cost of capital (4) Deleverage away from high capital intensive businesses (but 
also high ROEs ones) to reduce the RWA and free up capital. . 
We are confident that we are meaningfully contributing to the theoretical and empirical literature on 
the WACC, more particularly what we call "Distressed" WACC. The WACC not only as a capital 
structure cost guideline but done on a market basis, provides so much information about the current 
and future state of the corporate / bank.  
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